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Abstract 
 
This thesis articulates a new account of political morality by developing a novel critique of 
the standard dirty hands (DH) thesis and a new interpretation of DH. Taking its cue from 
Machiavelli the DH thesis postulates that the possibility of harmony between morality and 
politics is unsatisfactorily idealistic. This thesis endorses Machiavelli's contention, but 
argues that the DH thesis misconstrues Machiavelli’s insights: it fails to live up to its 
capacity to capture the complexity of political ethics and collapses into the idealism it seeks 
to evade. The DH thesis is inadequately ‘static’: it conceives the conflict between morality 
and politics as a momentary paradox of action - an anomaly disrupting the normality of 
harmony. As such it misconceives both the extent and the nature of the rupture between 
morality and politics. For, Machiavelli does not say that one must merely ‘learn how not to 
act well’. Machiavelli is clear that ‘one must learn how not to be good’. By exploring this 
discrepancy, I demonstrate that the DH thesis’ overemphasis on action ignores the way 
moral character enters and jeopardizes politics. I then develop a dynamic account that 
captures DH in all its complexity. The key insight of that account is that approaching 
political ethics entails conceiving politics as a practice and a way of life. In short, DH 
involves a conflict between two incompatible ways of life, each with its own virtues and 
standards of excellence. Hence, the dynamic account captures a more crucial paradox, the 
paradox of character: virtuous politicians should become partially vicious and no longer 
innocent. The thesis then argues that the dynamic account has crucial implications for 
contemporary politics: democratic politicians operate in a context of perpetual conflict and 
dependence which renders the cultivation and exhibition of certain moral vices, including 
hypocrisy and compromise, necessary.  
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1.  Towards a New Political Morality: The Dynamic Account of 
Dirty Hands  
 
A dog starv'd at his Master's Gate, Predicts the ruin of the State 
   A Horse misus'd upon the Road, Calls to Heaven for Human      
blood. The wanton Boy that kills the Fly, Shall feel the Spider's 
enmity. 
W. Blake
1 
 
Many have imagined republics and principalities that have never 
been seen or known to exist in truth; for it is so far from how one 
lives to how one should live that he who lets go of what is done for 
what should be done learns his ruin rather than his preservation 
... Hence it is necessary to a prince, if he wants to maintain 
himself, to learn to be able not to be good, and to use this and not 
use it according to necessity. 
               N. Machiavelli
2 
 
  1.1. Introduction  
 
  A number of philosophers and public pundits have recently suggested that there is 
a moral crisis in contemporary political life which calls for the re-conceptualization of 
political morality - that is, the morality of professional politicians. At the core of this 
narrative of crisis lies the conviction that moral goodness and innocence have been eroded 
by conflict, vice and outrageous acts of wrongdoing. On this account, the re-
conceptualization of political morality is inexorably intertwined with a deeply hopeful quest 
- the rediscovery of something lost: namely, the notion of ordinary moral goodness and 
innocence as an integral aspect of political morality. This hopeful way of thinking about 
political morality has been challenged by a prominent strand of political thought: the dirty 
hands (DH) perspective. Taking their cue from Niccolo Machiavelli’s infamous remark in 
the title quote, contemporary DH theorists plant a question mark on the possibility of 
                                            
1 Auguries of Innocence, 136 
2 The Prince, 61 
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harmony between ordinary morality and politics. In other words, the belief that ordinary 
morality and politics can and should be harmonized constitutes an unsatisfactorily idealistic 
delusion: it deforms our messy and fragmented morality and fails to do justice to the 
complex realities of politics. In this thesis I endorse Machiavelli's central contention, but I 
argue that the orthodox interpretation of DH has misconstrued Machiavelli's point and that, 
consequently, it is nothing more than a thinly veiled version of the idealism it purports to 
reject
3
. So, this thesis seeks to articulate a new perspective on political morality by 
developing a novel critique of the standard DH literature and a new, dynamic interpretation 
of DH which attempts to capture the problem in all its complexity and thereby restore 
Machiavelli’s lost insights. In this introductory chapter, I endeavour to: a) delineate the 
central problem animating my inquiry; b) provide an overview of the argument and; c) offer 
an account of some of the key resources and methodology I shall deploy.     
   
 1. 2. An Ethical Crisis: The Yearning for a New Political Morality 
  
 
 There is a prevalent perception of a growing ethical crisis in contemporary political 
life. Most philosophers and public pundits seem to agree that at the core of our 
contemporary problems lies a deepening moral crisis (c.f. Kuhner, 2008; Elliot, 2012; 
Rushworth, 2009; Nayar, 2009; Cliffe et al, 2000; Vernon, 2010; Pullman, 2010; Sandel, 
2009; 2010; Judt, 2010). As argued, the outrageous acts of torture in Guantanamo Bay and 
Abu Ghraib that followed the equally outrageous events of 9/11 reveal this much
4
. So do the 
expenses and sex scandals that frequently hit the headlines as well as the recent hypocrisies 
                                            
3 Throughout this thesis I shall use the terms ‘conventional’, ‘standard’, and ‘traditional’ 
DH thesis as synonymous to the orthodox way of thinking about the problem which is, as I 
explain later on, mostly owed to Michael Walzer (1973).   
4 For a documentation of the events of Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay see Adams et al 
(2006), Strasser (2004) and The Human Rights Watch (2004). 
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and seemingly dodgy compromises of our public officials
5. “Something has gone horribly 
wrong in Britain”, Peter Oborne writes. Condemning the events that surrounded the London 
riots and the hypocrisy of Britain’s politicians, Oborne argues that British politics is in a 
state of “moral decay” and in need of “a moral reformation” (2011: 1). Unless we restore a 
sense of political morality, Oborne maintains, we shall not prevent our politics from being 
further eroded by hypocrisy, ruthlessness and indecency.  
  
The moral emptiness of contemporary politics was also a central theme of a recent 
pamphlet published by Madeleine Bunting, Adam Lent and Mark Vernon: 
 
In a poll for the World Economic Forum … two thirds of people across 
ten G20 countries believed that the economic recession had been caused 
by a crisis of ethics and values ….  The financial crisis has been 
compounded in the UK by the MPs’ expenses scandals which has badly 
damaged trust in the political system … The poll finding suggests that 
there is still a widespread public expectation that those in positions of 
political and economic power should demonstrate integrity … This is 
what the crisis is really about … ‘This is wrong’ has long ceased to 
have validity as a political statement …Values [have] become a form of 
spin (Bunting, 2010: 5).  
 
These remarks are united by a sense of despair at the state of our contemporary politics. 
Most commentators are quick to point out that moral goodness and innocence have been 
eroded by vice, conflict and outrageous acts of wrongdoing. But, this despair is 
paradoxically accompanied by a sense of faith: most of these philosophers and public 
pundits are also quick to add that we live in an era of great hope (Sandel, 2010; Vernon, 
                                            
5 There are, to be sure, numerous examples of hypocrisy and compromise in politics and, in 
light of the account of DH I shall articulate in this thesis, this is hardly surprizing. What I 
specifically have in mind here however, is the mismatch between Barak Obama’s and Nick 
Clegg’s pre-election promises and post-election achievements which I discuss in more detail 
in chapters 6 and 7. 
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2010; Pullman, 2010; Bunting, 2010). The extent to which this hope is warranted though, is 
partially intertwined with our capacity to rediscover and rehabilitate political morality. As 
Rowan Williams puts it, we must rescue the concept of virtue and “the idea of public life as 
a possible vocation for the morally serious person” (2010a: 4). We must, as he similarly 
emphasizes elsewhere, rediscover the conditions of “how to live as if we were human” 
(Williams, 2010b: 9).  
 
 What emerges from these remarks then is a yearning for a new political morality. 
As I have gestured in the introduction of this chapter, the overarching aim of this thesis is to 
develop an account of political morality by: i) advancing a novel critique of the 
contemporary and standard way of thinking about the DH problem and; ii) developing a 
new, dynamic interpretation of this problem in politics. Before elaborating on how this 
thesis adds value to the current literature of DH, it might be worth saying a bit more on two 
issues which I have touched on in the introduction of this chapter but merit more emphasis. 
First, when I use the term political morality in this thesis, I shall primarily refer to the 
morality of politicians. In other words, my focus here is the practitioner of politics in 
general and the practitioner of politics in our contemporary democratic societies in 
particular. And, as I shall explain, approaching the question of political morality and DH in 
the context of contemporary societies inevitably entails clarifying the character, virtues, 
agency and integrity necessary to lead and sustain a virtuous life of politics. Second, this 
narrative of moral crisis is sparked by a fairly standard way of thinking about political 
morality: it is typically assumed that a virtuous life of politics is (and can be) perfectly 
congruent with an admirable moral life. In the following section, I want to briefly outline 
this common way of thinking about political morality that emerges from this narrative of 
crisis. For, as I shall demonstrate in this thesis, it is this hopeful view which the standard 
DH thesis criticizes as unsatisfactorily idealistic but ultimately collapses into. And, it is this 
view of political morality which the new account of DH I endeavour to develop here rejects 
as utopian and dangerous.   
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1.3. The Standard Solution: Moral Goodness, Innocence and Perfection  
 
 Lurking in the background of the narrative of crisis in contemporary politics is a 
popular way of reflecting on political morality. On this account, our politics is presently a 
dirty and unsavoury business: moral goodness has been eroded by vice, conflict and 
outrageous acts of moral wrongdoing. But it need not (and should not) be like that. The fact 
that practitioners of politics are dirty or that our politics has appealed to nefarious characters 
does not entail that it is impossible to clean up political life per se. This catharsis however, 
is conditioned on injecting ordinary moral demands into politics or on attracting good 
persons into this domain. In this sense, the rehabilitation of political ethics involves the 
rediscovery of something lost: namely, the notion of ordinary moral goodness as an integral 
aspect of political virtue. 
 
 So, what emerges from this prevalent way of thinking about political morality is 
this: public agents must, to echo Rowan Williams’ (2010c: 1) pithy words, escape from the 
abyss of immorality. This insight, Philip Pullman additionally tells us, is made abundantly 
clear in Williams Blake’s poem The Auguries of Innocence, which I have cited in the title 
quote. “At first sight”, Pullman tells us, “vice is more attractive. She is sexier, she promises 
to be a better company than her plain sister virtue” (2010: 1). However, Blake’s message is 
that, moral vice and the thrill to virtue must be overcome (Pullman, 2010; Blake, Auguries 
of Innocence). For, as Pullman maintains, “the public [or the political] and the private [or 
the moral] are one” (2010: 1). On this account, it does not really matter what our specific 
subject is: the virtuous public or political agent turns out to be no different from the good-
hearted moral or innocent private agent. To put it differently, political morality is congruent 
with ordinary morality. Moral innocence and goodness constitute a necessary ingredient 
which “will enable a nation” and its politicians “to live well … morally well” (Pullman, 
2010: 1).  
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 On the face of it, this seems a reasonable way of reflecting on political morality. 
“Ask most people what ethics means”, Lent says, “and they will almost certainly reply that 
it is about obeying the rules or being good” (2010: 57). In short, this way of reflecting on 
political morality involves a quest for an ‘ideal theory’6. Philosophy, according to ideal 
theorists, should involve a quest to conceive and revive the perfect society or the Diogenic 
individual - “the perfect specimen of humanity, without defect or blemish, lacking nothing 
that contributes to the ideal person and the ideal life” (Hampshire, 1987: 140). It is 
imperative, according to John Rawls (who first coined the term ideal theory), to start with 
this vision: “the reason for beginning with an ideal theory” is that it provides “the only basis 
for the grasp of these more pressing problems” and “the urgent matters that we are faced 
with in everyday life” (1971: 9). So the general point of an ideal theory is to present to us a 
conception of the perfectly moral society or individual life that public agents are to lead and 
act upon. In essence, an ideal theory (regardless of its specific content) postulates that 
individual or societal ethics can be understood in a unified and harmonious way that allows 
for the possibility of perfection. So, on the one hand, when it comes to individual political 
morality, it is thought that the dispositions, virtues and actions political or public agents 
should exhibit can be perfectly congruent with those which characterize a moral or a purely 
private individual. On the other hand, when it comes to societal life, it is believed possible 
                                            
6 This characterization of ideal theory is primarily borrowed from John Kekes (2011). 
Whilst some philosophers may disagree with the extent to which his characterization 
coincides with Rawls’, the importance of perfection (which becomes plausible via the 
discovery of universal principles of justice) is also touched by the latter. In The Theory of 
Justice, Rawls writes that “the principles of justice that result [from the ideal theory] are 
those defining a perfectly just society [and] we arrive at a certain ideal conception” (1971: 
351). For the relationship between ideal theory and perfectionism and harmony see also 
Charles Blattberg (2013), Michael Slote (2011) and Stuart Hampshire (1987; 1989). I shall 
say more on Rawls’ ideal theory and how his conception of societal perfection and harmony 
feeds into a conception of the perfect individual in chapter 7. 
 7 
 
to discover certain substantive values and interests that are universal and mutually shared 
across different agents. 
 
Whilst the term ideal theory is relatively recent, the effort behind it is neither novel 
nor uncommon. As John Kekes tells us:  
 
Thinkers working within all the major religious traditions have offered 
versions of it; among philosophers, Plato, the Stoics, the Epicureans, 
Augustine, Aquinas, Spinoza, Leibniz, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, Marx, 
Bentham, John Stuart Mill, and most recently Rawls, have attempted it; 
and contemporary “neos” - neo-Thomists, neo-Kantians, neo-
consequentialists, neo-Marxists, neo-existentialists, neo-contractarians - 
are still at it (2011: 9).  
 
What underpins the claims I have outlined above is a crucial assumption which a large 
portion of philosophers and public pundits have almost unquestioningly inherited from 
Plato: a romantic nostalgia for unity. Put differently, since Plato and Socrates, ideal theorists 
have assumed that our ethical and societal problems are neither perfectly insurmountable 
nor rationally irresolvable. Herein emerges the key conceptual ingredient of ideal theories, 
what Isaiah Berlin (1990) terms the Platonic Ideal or, what we might alternatively term, 
following Stuart Hampshire (1987), the doctrine of moral harmony. In short, this ideal puts 
forward the seductive assumption of value monism: the contention that “all truly good 
things are linked to one another in a single, perfect whole; or, at the very least cannot be 
incompatible” and “that the realization of the pattern formed by them is the one true end of 
all rational activity, both public and private” (Berlin, 1969: x). So, according to this ideal, 
there must exist an underlying harmony in all human values, virtues and across all spheres 
of value or ways of life. Conflicts among them are, if not mere chimeras, mathematical 
puzzles begging for an ultimate and perfect rational solution - that is, a solution without a 
remainder of any sort.   
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A crucial by-product of this line of thinking then, is that individual and societal 
conflict is a disease - a pathology of social and moral thought, something that can and 
should be overcome (c.f. Hampshire, 1989; 1996; 2000; Berlin, 1969; 1971; 1981; 1990; 
Williams, 1972; 1981; 1990; Kalimtzis, 2000; Edyvane, 2007; 2008; 2011; 2013). In this 
sense, imperfection, conflict, vice and acts of wrongdoing are intrinsic neither to individual 
(political) morality nor to the polis. Their roots can always be traced to avoidable and 
irrational human mistakes. True, very few of our politicians might ever achieve this, ideal 
theorists would say. Political agents may be too irrational and sinful to ever become morally 
good or perfectly virtuous. The obstacles to perfection and harmony in individual and 
societal political morality can be numerous- our despair and outrage may well ensue. But it 
is our own irrational lapses and imprudence that are to be blamed. For, this vision must be 
philosophically conceivable - at least in theory, this vision must be true. Or, so it is believed. 
 
1.4. The Dynamic Account of Dirty Hands 
  
 The novel account of political morality I endeavour to develop in this thesis is 
closely aligned to Machiavelli’s political philosophy and seeks to challenge this optimistic 
way of thinking about political morality. I want to suggest that the moralistic vision of 
political life which emerges from the deeply hopeful vision of perfection and harmony - 
either in individual political ethics or in the political community - is wrongheaded. The 
contention that private or ordinary moral virtue constitutes the basis for political virtue is an 
innocent fairy-tale and a dangerous illusion: it displaces the complex realities of politics and 
mischaracterizes the lives politicians lead. To put it simply, philosophers have expended too 
much - and ultimately forlorn - energy on trying to harmonize ordinary morality and 
politics. In this thesis, I shall suggest that a fundamental re-orientation in the way we 
approach politics is required: if we want to make sense of political ethics we should, to use 
Bernard Williams’ (2002a: 3) words, give more autonomy to “distinctively political 
thought”: we should take conflict, pluralism and the messy realities of politics more 
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seriously. Making sense of political ethics then, requires us to turn our attention not to 
ordinary moral virtue but to moral vice. For, as I shall argue, the cultivation and exhibition 
of certain ordinary vices is inextricably intertwined with what it means to lead a virtuous life 
of politics.  
 
 To be clear, the argument I wish to advance in this thesis is not that the vices merely 
constitute an inescapable but nonetheless unfortunate characteristic of politics. Rather, I 
want to suggest that the vices constitute political virtues. In short, the vices are conducive to 
the sustainment of a virtuous political life: they aid practitioners of politics to satisfy some 
of the ends of their practice. In this sense, it is not our present political arrangements, or the 
character of those currently operating within politics, that are at fault per se. If that were the 
accusation, then ideal theorists would simply respond that the proposed solution for our 
current ethical malaise is still philosophically conceivable and not necessarily rationally 
unachievable; all we need to do is to create those moral circumstances and sanitize political 
life: we must lure morally good, innocent and rational individuals into political life. The 
argument I wish to advance here though, is far more disquieting: the aspiration for 
perfection and harmony in individual and societal political ethics is philosophically 
unwarranted and practically impossible. The fault with aspirations of this sort is conceptual, 
not just empirical. 
  
 More importantly, the argument I will develop is not merely intended to upset 
monism or the project of ideal theorists. Rather, this argument constitutes part of the novel 
critique I shall advance against the contemporary DH literature and the new, dynamic 
interpretation of DH I endeavour to develop. To clarify this point, it might be worth saying a 
few words about the account of political ethics I intend to articulate and how it differs from 
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the standard vogue of this perspective which is mostly owed to Michael Walzer’s seminal 
essay Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands
7
 (1973).  
 
On the face of it, the standard DH thesis sits neatly with the argument I wish to 
advance in this thesis. This is partly because of the purported lineage the orthodox version 
of this problem is committed to as well as a certain idealistic and value-monist vision which 
the standard DH thesis is committed against. To cut a long story short, contemporary DH 
theorists trace the insights of their account to Machiavelli’s notorious lesson in The Prince: 
that an expedient and responsible politics requires its practitioners “to learn how not to be 
good” (XV: 57; Walzer, 1973: 164). “Machiavelli”, Walzer emphasizes, “is the first man, to 
state the paradox that I am examining” (1973: 175). And this paradox, he adds, flies in the 
face of a vision shared by our most influential moral frameworks on offer: it plants a 
question mark “not only to the coherence and harmony of the moral universe, but also to the 
relative ease or difficulty-or impossibility-of living a moral life” (Walzer, 1973: 161). At the 
core of the standard DH thesis lies the postulation that in certain momentous and tragic 
circumstances, an innocent and morally perfect course of action is impossible: the action 
guiding prescriptions of morality (which are thought to be deontological) and the demands 
of successful political action (which are taken to be consequentialist) conflict. Thus, 
politicians are required both from a normative and prudential perspective to do or tolerate 
                                            
7 Whilst the standard account of DH is predominantly Walzerian in terms of its conceptual 
structure, it is not embraced only by Walzer. Rather, it is also embraced by more 
contemporary DH theorists such as Steve de Wijze (1994; 1996; 2002; 2005; 2009), 
Michael Stocker (1990; 2000), Suzanne Dovi (2005), Christopher Gowans (1990; 2001), 
Kenneth Winston (1994) and Anthony Cunningham (1992). In addition, this way of 
approaching the problem of DH is embraced by critics of the DH thesis. See for instance the 
account of Kai Nielsen (1996; 2000). However, I should also note here that I do not claim 
that all philosophers who we may label as DH theorists embrace this way of thinking about 
DH. As I shall explain, the accounts of Stuart Hampshire, Bernard Williams, Martin Hollis, 
Richard Bellamy and Sue Mendus for instance are in numerous respects very different from 
the standard DH thesis. I shall say more on this in due course.  
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things which are morally unacceptable and which carry a moral remainder. For instance, 
successful political action may require politicians to lie, cheat and even sacrifice the lives of 
innocent civilians. The core claim of the standard DH thesis then is that it takes conflict and 
the complexity of political ethics seriously; it acknowledges that morality and politics are 
uneasy bedfellows. In Steve de Wijze’s words: 
 
A DH analysis [in political philosophy] provides a more plausible 
characterization of our moral reality … The existence of genuine moral 
conflict, the incommensurability of cherished values, the conflicting 
personal and role-based moral claims, give rise to moral conflict 
situations where those who strive to act morally unavoidably get DH  
(2009: 309). 
 
The affinity between the standard DH thesis and Machiavelli’s political thought has been 
taken for granted (c.f. Nielsen, 1996; 2000; Ramsay, 2000a; Shugarman, 2000a; 2000b; 
Coady, 1993; 2008; Gowans, 2001; Stocker, 1990; de Wijze, 2005; de Wijze & Goodwin, 
2009; Primoratz, 2007; Philp, 2001; Spicer, 2010; Taylor, 2012). But in this thesis I wish to 
question the extent to which the standard DH thesis takes Machiavelli’s insights seriously. 
To be clear, the argument I seek to advance here does not merely involve an exercise in the 
history of political thought. Rather, I want to suggest that the standard DH thesis, by virtue 
of its failure to take Machiavelli’s insights seriously, fails to live up to its capacity to capture 
the complexity of political ethics and collapses into the idealism it seeks to evade. In 
particular, I shall argue that the standard DH thesis is inadequately ‘static’: it conceives the 
conflict between morality and politics as a single and stark paradox of action - a mere tragic 
anomaly which disrupts the normality of past and future harmony. Consequently, the 
orthodox way of thinking about DH in politics misconceives the extent of the rupture 
between morality and politics: Machiavelli’s vision is supplanted by an unsatisfactory vision 
of honesty, innocence and harmony. But it also misconceives the nature of such a conflict. 
For, Machiavelli does not say that one must merely ‘learn how not to act well’. Machiavelli 
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is clear that ‘one must learn how not to be good’. By exploring this discrepancy, I shall 
illustrate that the standard DH thesis’ overemphasis on action fails to capture the way moral 
character - in particular, innocence as a disposition - enters and jeopardizes politics.  
 
I have stated these claims baldly, and the full extent of my critique of the standard 
DH thesis will be developed in the subsequent chapters. What I merely wish to do here is to 
briefly outline some of the problems permeating standard DH approaches and emphasize the 
way the account of DH I endeavour to develop: i) differs from the orthodox conception of 
DH and ii) attempts to correct these problems. So, at the core of the dynamic account of DH 
I wish to develop in the thesis, lies the postulation that approaching political morality and 
the problem of DH in politics requires us to conceive political life as a whole. We are, in 
other words, required to approach politics as a practice and a way of life. And, this involves 
approaching politics, though not entirely, on its own terms: by considering the dispositions, 
virtues, agency and integrity of those aspiring to lead a virtuous political life. In short, the 
standards of political conduct arise from within politics as opposed to any external moral 
standpoint. Simply put, conceiving politics in terms of abstract and universal action-guiding 
rules and principles as deontologists, consequentialists and standard DH theorists do, is 
neither philosophically astute nor conducive to the concrete realities and requirements of 
politics. Instead, we should shift our attention to qualities of character, dispositions and 
habits necessary for participating in politics and meeting its demands and ends.  
 
 Thus, conceiving politics as a practice requires us to consider more carefully the 
virtues (or the moral vices) that contribute to a virtuous political life. It also requires us to 
conceive politics in dynamic or narrative terms. For, political life is not ‘static’ and we 
cannot adequately capture what it means to have DH by merely conceiving it as a 
momentary and dramatic paradox of action. In other words, the key problem with the static 
DH thesis is that it displaces and misrepresents the political virtues. And this problem, as I 
shall argue in chapter 5, can also be explained with reference to the fact that standard DH 
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theorists have inherited the tendency of post-Enlightenment ideal theories to ground 
morality on abstract action-guiding rules. A crucial consequence of this is that the standard 
DH thesis cannot account for the recognition that the conflict between morality and politics 
is perpetual and cuts much deeper than a mere incompatibility of action-guiding 
prescriptions: it also involves a conflict between (at least) two incompatible ways of life 
each with its own virtues.  Put another way, I want to show that the problem of DH in 
politics does not merely involve a paradox of action (or even a continuous series of these): 
it also involves a paradox of character. It is this neglected recognition, I shall argue, which 
constitutes the essence of Machiavelli’s message: leading a political life is fundamentally 
incongruent with leading an admirable moral life. In short, the prevalent static account of 
DH - by virtue of its very nature - cannot adequately capture what leading a virtuous life of 
politics entails: it ignores that politics constitutes an on-going activity and an entire way of 
life, with its own distinct political virtues or ordinary moral vices. Conducive to a virtuous 
life of politics is the cultivation and continuous exhibition of certain ordinary moral vices. 
To put it differently, in the absence of a dynamic approach to political ethics and DH, we 
cannot adequately capture certain distinct virtues which hold together a virtuous life of 
politics and constitute the essence of political integrity. 
 
 An additional but nonetheless related feature of the account of DH I wish to 
develop, is the recognition that politics is a much more internally complex and grubby 
domain of activity than most philosophers in general and standard DH theorists in particular 
recognize. This recognition follows my general point that an adequate account of political 
ethics and DH must draw on the resources of politics itself. So, in the spirit of Machiavelli, I 
shall suggest that conflict is not manifested only with respect to individual morality - 
between an admirable moral life and a life of politics. Rather, the rupture between a moral 
and political life is partially conditioned on the recognition that conflict is also manifested 
externally: between different political agents or groups, each of which has incompatible 
aspirations and interests. In short, politicians are not self-sufficient: they operate in a domain 
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of perpetual conflict and dependence. Knowledge and experience of how to manoeuvre in 
such a messy context is a crucial characteristic of a virtuous politician; it constitutes an 
integral feature of political integrity. In this sense, conflicting loyalties, antipathies, sleazy 
handshakes, treacheries, hypocritical dissimulation and, in certain instances, even cruelty 
cannot be eliminated from the practice of politics as moralists (and even standard DH 
theorists) like to assume. The general point here is that the account of DH I wish to develop 
in this thesis attempts to take the complexity of politics and the context in which politicians 
operate more seriously. In so doing, the dynamic account of DH considers more carefully 
what is peculiar about politics: it provides us with a better grasp of certain ends and 
concepts which are distinctive of politics as a practice, the peculiarity of political 
relationships and the centrality of power, contestation and conflict to this activity.  
 
 So, by developing a dynamic account of DH, I hope to shed new light on the way 
which we should approach the problem of DH in politics. For, by rejecting the orthodox 
interpretation of this problem as unsatisfactorily idealistic and static, I endeavour to help us 
better understand what it really means to have DH in politics. To put it differently, the 
dynamic account of DH constitutes an attempt to capture this problem in all its complexity 
and restore Machiavelli’s insights which have been long lost from the standard DH thesis. In 
connection to this, I should add that the argument I shall advance here reveals that there 
exists a neglected rift in the tradition of DH. Whilst most contemporary discussions of DH 
typically follow and build on Walzer’s analysis (c.f. de Wijze, 1994; 2002; 2005; 2009; de 
Wijze & Goodwin, 2009; Stocker, 1990; Gowans, 2001; van Fraassen, 1990; Dovi, 2005; 
Cunningham, 1992) without questioning its adequacy or the extent to which it sufficiently 
captures Machiavelli’s insights on political ethics, conflict and pluralism it does not follow 
that all philosophers who we may label DH theorists subscribe to this unsatisfactorily 
‘static’ and idealistic way of thinking about the problem. For, as I shall illustrate in this 
thesis, in contrast to the account of political morality and DH presented by standard DH 
theorists, political theorists who can be labelled as DH theorists (such as Stuart Hampshire, 
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Bernard Williams, Sue Mendus, Martin Hollis, and Richard Bellamy for instance) have a 
different, more nuanced and interesting understanding of DH - one which takes 
Machiavelli’s insights on political morality, conflict and pluralism much more seriously. 
 
But, I also hope that the dynamic account of DH shall illuminate the enterprise of 
political philosophy in general. To be more specific, the argument I endeavour to develop 
here shall help us better understand what the crisis we are confronted with is really about. 
For, the narrative of crisis and the standard DH thesis are conceptually similar in at least two 
respects each of which is fuelled by an idealistic account of political morality. The first, 
relates to the time-span of the crisis: what emerges from the narrative of crisis is the sense 
that the crisis we are confronted with is a rather novel and fairly uncommon phenomenon. 
In short, most discussions of moral crisis in contemporary politics convey the picture that 
we are confronted with a ‘static’ problem: we live in a society which is ridden with vice, 
disintegration and conflict and that it is only in our politics where these features tend to be 
observed. Differently put, whatever the precise timeline of the unravelling of this crisis there 
once existed an era in which moral and political virtue were harmonized. And, the way 
forward is to retrieve the notion of ordinary moral goodness which once constituted an 
integral aspect of political virtue. Second, what emerges from the typical cries of despair as 
well as from a considerable portion of works on moral and political philosophy is the sense 
that the crisis we are confronted with is, in its nature and character, a political crisis.  What 
underpins this assumption is the very idealistic way of approaching political morality I have 
outlined above.   
 
The dynamic account I shall develop in the thesis suggests that the sense of the 
crisis is misdirected. For, the aspiration to cleanse politics, popular even amongst 
proponents of the standard DH thesis, constitutes part of the problem. To be clear, I do not 
wish to deny that some of the scandals that periodically hit the headlines are uncongenial to 
a virtuous politics. Nor do I wish to suggest that we do not have any political and social 
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problems at all. What the dynamic account of DH suggests though, is that the crisis we are 
confronted with is far from ‘static’. Nor is it a political crisis per se. It is not ‘static’ because 
politics and morality can be harmonized neither in theory nor in a practice. The vision that 
there once existed a paradise lost where our politics was conducted by angels or saints 
constitutes a historically unfounded and dangerous exaggeration. This point also challenges 
the second conceptual feature of the narrative of crisis: we mistakenly think that the crisis 
we are confronted with is political precisely because we have an unsatisfactorily moralistic 
understanding of what political morality presupposes in the first place. Simply put, our crisis 
is primarily philosophical: it relates to the concepts we employ, and with the virtues, 
actions, structure and context we presuppose when we contemplate political ethics. This 
point is glimpsed by Isaiah Berlin, who expresses the doubts I share and which, as I shall 
demonstrate, also extend to the standard way of thinking about the problem of DH in 
politics:  “Can it be,” he asks, “that the basic assumptions are themselves somewhere at 
fault? …  Can it be that Socrates and the creators of the central Western tradition in ethics 
and politics who followed him have been mistaken, for more than two millennia?” (1969: 
154).  
 
 So what I want to suggest in this thesis is this: we do misconceive political morality 
and the problem of DH in politics and that, by correcting this misconception, it becomes 
easier to render philosophical reflection on pressing political issues intelligible. Hence, 
whilst I would not go as far as to stipulate that there are no ethical problems in 
contemporary politics, I contend that the deeper sense of despair and hope that often 
accompanies the narrative of crisis should be rejected. So should the prevalent and 
moralistic way of reflecting on political morality and DH. Or, so I shall argue. 
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1.5. Plan of the Thesis  
 
 The thesis is divided into eight chapters, including this introduction. In general 
terms, the main purpose of the first half of the thesis (Chapters 2, 3 and 4) is to outline and 
criticize the account of political morality that emerges from the standard DH thesis, whilst 
the second half of the thesis (Chapters 5, 6 and 7) seeks to introduce and defend a more 
nuanced account of political morality that restores Machiavelli’s lost insights and captures 
DH in all its complexity.  
 
 So, in the next chapter (Chapter 2), I wish to elaborate on some of the 
considerations I have introduced in this chapter. In particular, I wish to consider a fairly 
standard account of political morality. In so doing, I wish to reconstruct a perspective which 
seems to sit well with the abovementioned moralistic way of reflecting on political morality 
and which has been subjected to severe criticism by standard DH theorists: what I shall call 
‘the view of innocence’ or of ‘clean hands’. In exploring this perspective, I shall provide a 
schematic sketch of two of our most influential ideal moral theories on offer: Kantianism 
and Utilitarianism. To be clear, it is not my intention to provide a comprehensive treatment 
of such theories. Rather, since this thesis wishes to contribute primarily to the debate about 
DH, the task I wish to undertake is more modest: I want to identify a position standard DH 
theorists have targeted and elucidate certain features which underpin it. As I explain, at the 
core of this perspective lies a version of the Platonic ideal: the contention that moral and 
political action can be harmonized as long as we ensure that political actions accord with 
certain overarching and universal moral principles: the Categorical Imperative or the 
Principle of Utility. This perspective, as I shall show, puts forward the ideal of a certain type 
of innocence and moral perfection - that is, innocence as the absence of moral guilt or 
culpability or moral perfection in action. In other words, moral perfection or innocence is 
attainable if our actions are morally right tout court.  
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In Chapter 3, I shall consider the DH thesis as a plausible alternative account of 
political morality. Even though the DH tradition is a complex one, I will focus on the more 
present and conventional vogue of the DH thesis, which is mostly owed to Walzer (1973; 
1977). First, I will examine the way in which the standard DH thesis conceptualizes and 
frames the problem of DH. Second, I shall consider the specific implications the DH 
problem, as traditionally conceived, poses for the subject matter of the thesis, vis-à-vis the 
view of innocence. In contrast to the unified view of our moral reality advanced by the view 
of innocence, the standard DH thesis purports to take Machiavelli’s insights on politics, 
conflict and the realities of political action seriously. It captures a more nuanced, complex, 
and disunited aspect of morality: at the core of the standard DH thesis lies the recognition 
that in certain tragic circumstances, political agents may be confronted with a paradox of 
action. The upshot of this is that innocence in politics, though desirable, is fragile and far 
from guaranteed. The existence of plural values stemming from the disunity between 
ordinary or private and political or public morality, may, in certain momentous scenarios 
conflict and give rise to the phenomenon of inescapable moral wrongdoing: actions that are 
politically justified but at the same time somehow morally wrong. Finally, I want to register 
a lingering doubt as to whether the standard DH thesis is ultimately that different from the 
idealistic vision it purports to upset.  
  
 In Chapter 4, I develop my critique of the standard DH thesis in more detail. In 
short, my general argument is this: there are still problems with the standard DH thesis; it 
fails to live up to its purported capability to capture the complexity of politics. The general 
point I wish to advance in this chapter is that we need to reconsider what it means to have 
DH in relation to certain on-going activities, most notably politics. To be sure, I do not wish 
to deny that (some of) the insights of the standard DH thesis better capture the 
fragmentation of our moral reality. But, at the same time, it is precisely because these 
insights - the Machiavellian recognition that politics and morality are difficult to harmonize 
- are more sophisticated vis-à-vis those of the view of innocence that the general point I 
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wish to pursue in this chapter is so striking: that the standard DH thesis and the view of 
innocence collapse into a similar idealistic position. In advancing this claim, I shall question 
the extent to which the orthodox DH thesis takes Machiavelli’s insights seriously enough. In 
particular, I suggest that the account of political ethics that emerges from the standard DH 
thesis is overly ‘static’ and. unsatisfactorily serene: it mischaracterizes the nature and extent 
of the rupture between morality and politics. In short, the conflict between morality and 
politics is much more enduring and cuts much deeper than static accounts allow. As I 
demonstrate, the orthodox conception of DH as a single and stark choice which brings about 
the unbearable, but momentary, loss of innocence does not suffice: the problem of DH - if 
situated in the real context of certain on-going activities (most notably politics) - is much 
more enduring and perverse than static accounts allow. It also has certain dimensions that 
are misrepresented by standard DH frameworks. In addition, I suggest that the politician 
standard DH theorists present us with, may not be as good for politics as they maintain. In 
advancing this claim, I argue that conceptualizing DH as a paradox of action is not enough: 
it neglects how moral character - in particular innocence as a disposition - enters and 
jeopardizes politics. For, innocence as a disposition can bring about political disaster 
without necessarily one being confronted with a paradox of action; and it may persist even 
after one’s hands have been dirtied in the traditional way.  
 
 In Chapter 5, I begin to set out a richer and more nuanced account of political ethics 
and DH. In so doing, I wish to turn to a tradition which underpins Machiavelli’s conception 
of politics and agency but which remains elusive for proponents of the standard DH thesis: 
virtue ethics. This tradition, I contend, enables us to develop a framework that grasps DH in 
all its complexity: it enables us to approach political life, with its distinct virtues, 
dispositions and standards of excellence as a whole. In this sense, a turn to virtue ethics 
shall enable us to fill the lacuna left open by Machiavelli, and to effectively retrieve 
elements that have been long lost from the DH perspective. Now, whilst most accounts of 
virtue ethics (both contemporary as well as classic) are underpinned by certain assumptions 
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which I endeavour to resist in the thesis - namely, the Platonic Ideal or the doctrine of final 
rational harmony - I shall suggest that Alasdair MacIntyre’s neo-Aristotelian framework in 
After Virtue, resists these and can thus serve as a theoretical premise upon which we can 
develop a more sophisticated account of DH. In particular, I shall illustrate that MacIntyre’s 
negative account - his concerns surrounding the status of contemporary philosophy - 
reaffirm my scepticism on, and add new insights to, the inadequacy of standard DH 
analyses. More importantly however, I shall utilize elements of MacIntyre’s positive thesis 
to break away from the contemporary ‘static’ conception of DH - its interpretation as a 
single tragic episode - in relation to certain on-going practices. By integrating elements of 
MacIntyre’s framework with Machiavelli’s conception of politics and political virtue (virtù) 
then, I wish to provide the foundations for the development of a ‘dynamic’ account of DH. 
In developing a dynamic account of DH, I conceive politics as a practice and way of life, 
and draw on Machiavelli’s discussion of political agency and virtù in order to sketch some 
of the virtues conducive to virtuous political conduct. As I demonstrate, the richer DH 
perspective which emerges acknowledges that virtuous engagement in politics, requires one 
to become partially vicious and partially virtuous, yet no longer perfectly virtuous or 
morally innocent (dynamic DH). That is to say, the problem of DH, understood in dynamic 
terms, involves a paradox of character, not just a paradox of action: leading a virtuous 
political life requires one to become partially vicious and no longer innocent. 
 
Having outlined the basic conceptual structure of the dynamic account of DH, in 
Chapter 6 I proceed to argue that the paradox of character is not merely of an abstract, 
historical interest. In short, the general points I wish to advance in this chapter are these: i) 
the paradox I identified in the previous two chapters, constitutes a real and inescapable issue 
for democratic politics today; ii) liberal democratic societies are somehow implicated in 
promoting and exacerbating the vices (or at least some manifestations of them). To put it 
differently, democratic politicians operate in a context which renders the cultivation and 
continuous exhibition of some of the vices necessary. I develop this argument by turning my 
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attention to the explicit examination of the vices - and, in particular, to a vice I touch on in 
chapters 4 and 5: hypocrisy. To be more specific, I draw on Machiavelli’s insights on 
political relationships and project these onto the context of liberal democratic politics. In so 
doing, I wish to explore in more detail an insight I briefly gesture at in chapters 4 and 5 and 
which constitutes a crucial feature of the dynamic account of DH: the suggestion that 
hypocrisy is not merely a ‘lesser vice’ (or a political virtue). It also constitutes a necessary 
and valuable by-product of contemporary politics and the glue that holds together a virtuous 
life of politics in such a context. Finally, I argue that attempts, popular amongst political 
moralists, to find an escape route from hypocrisy are an innocent and perilous delusion: the 
more one tries to unmask hypocrisy and extirpate oneself from its practice the more 
hypocritical, unfit for and dangerous to democratic life one becomes. 
 
But, as I shall explain, the account of hypocrisy and dynamic DH in contemporary 
politics I present in chapter 6 is bound to be incomplete without acknowledging the necessi-
ty and value of compromise. And, in the absence of such recognition, we cannot fully cap-
ture the distinctive nature of political integrity either. So, my general aim in Chapter 7 is 
this: I want to argue that compromise is necessary and inescapable in contemporary public 
life and that acknowledging this helps us make better sense of political integrity. To be more 
specific, I shall suggest that: i) compromise is an ambiguous and fox-like public virtue - 
something which is politically expedient but not necessarily morally admirable; ii) a will-
ingness to compromise, whilst uncongenial to moral integrity, constitutes an essential part 
of the integrity of democratic politicians. As I shall argue, attempts to deny the desirability 
of this phenomenon in politics misconstrue the messy context in which politicians operate. 
They also mischaracterize the nature of political integrity. In doing so, I shall build on the 
argument I advance in chapters 5 and 6: that making sense of political ethics and DH also 
entails taking the context in which politicians operate seriously. In this sense, the incongru-
ence between a moral and political life is partially conditioned on the recognition that con-
flict is also manifested externally: between different political agents or groups. Politicians 
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are not self-sufficient: they operate in a domain of conflict and dependence which affects 
the virtues conducive to virtuous political practice. And it is precisely this recognition which 
renders compromise an inescapable feature of ordinary politics and a crucial aspect of polit-
ical integrity. For, whilst commitment to a set of principles which stem from one’s tradition 
or pre-election promises implies a commitment to seeing them realized, the practice of poli-
tics in conditions of interdependence, pluralism and conflict often requires compromising 
and partially abandoning those principles. An innocent and all-or-nothing pursuit of one’s 
principles in politics is bound to promote abstract cruelty - and thereby jeopardize order and 
stability - or lead to defeat: a rigid refusal to compromise one’s principles would mean the 
entire abandonment of any hope of seeing them realized. 
 
In the final chapter of the thesis (Chapter 8), I shall bring together the most crucial 
threads of the dynamic account of DH. In particular, I want to outline why such an account 
matters - not just by virtue of its capacity to make us rethink what it really means to have 
DH in politics but also in terms of its capacity to make us reconsider what it means to lead a 
virtuous life of politics in the context of contemporary liberal democratic societies. Simply 
put, by bringing together the core insights of the dynamic account of DH, I want to deline-
ate: i) not only the contribution of this account to the literature of DH in particular but also 
ii) how this account illuminates the enterprise of political philosophy in general. In so doing, 
I shall revisit the problem I registered in the introduction of the thesis: the prevalent percep-
tion of a moral crisis in contemporary political life. I suggest that, whilst the insights of the 
dynamic account might appear to be prima facie bleak and pessimistic, this is only because 
we have unrealistic expectations on what political morality involves in the first place. In 
short, the nature of the crisis we are confronted with is not political but philosophical: it re-
lates to the concepts we employ and certain assumptions which we have unquestioningly 
inherited from Plato and the Enlightenment project.   
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 1.6. Research Methodology and Method 
 
 This PhD thesis, like similar works of moral and political philosophy will utilize 
secondary sources. I shall generally use standard philosophical tools of conceptual analysis 
and the scrutiny of arguments so as to develop my own distinct account of political ethics 
and DH. To be more specific, since the dynamic account of DH I articulate here shall chal-
lenge the prevalent way of thinking about political morality and DH as unsatisfactorily ide-
alistic and utopian, this thesis can be seen as residing in the tradition of ‘political realism’ 
(c.f. Williams, 2002a; Galston, 2010; Horton, 2009). In the spirit of Niccolo Machiavelli, 
one of the forefathers of this tradition, contemporary political realists suggest that harmony 
and perfection propounded by most philosophers do not represent ideals of political life 
achievable under even the most favorable circumstances (c.f. Hampshire, 1989; 1993; Wil-
liams, 1978; 2002a; Gray, 2000; Galston, 2010; Shklar, 1984; 1989; Bellamy, 2010; Philp, 
2001). This point is nicely raised by Hilary Putnam in his Realism with a Human Face: 
“when a philosopher ‘solves’ an ethical problem for one, one feels as if one had asked for a 
subway token and been given a passenger ticket valid for the first interplanetary passenger- 
carrying spaceship instead” (1990: 179). In a similar vein, Bonnie Honig points to a “myste-
rious phenomenon” in political philosophy: “the displacement of politics” (Honig, 1993: 2). 
Philosophers writing from diverse positions, Honig (1993) tells us, erroneously converge in 
their assumption that philosophical success lies in the elimination of conflict. Philosophical 
analyses of this sort, she maintains, are barely satisfactory, let alone political: they are de-
void of any real world political experience. In short, the general argument I wish to advance 
in this thesis echoes the realist point that an obsession with harmony, monism and perfection 
ends up displacing the realities of politics. Or, in reverse, that an adequate account of politi-
cal ethics and, as I shall argue, DH must draw on the resources and complex realities of 
politics itself.  
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Moreover, in order to provide substance to my arguments and make them more ex-
plicit, I shall use various real life examples, both contemporary and historical. Needless to 
say, this approach dovetails with political realism well. For, as indicated, political realists 
since Machiavelli (The Prince; Discourses on Livy) have long emphasized the importance of 
taking the realities of politics and the lessons of history seriously (or, at least, more seriously 
than most moral and political philosophy has tended to do).  As Raymond Geuss aptly re-
marks: 
 
Political philosophy must be realist. That means, roughly speaking, that it 
must start from and be concerned in the first instance not with how people 
ought ideally (or ought “rationally”) to act, what they ought to desire, or 
value, the kind of people they ought to be etc. (2008: 9).  
 
Or, as Glen Newey similarly puts it:  
 
To say that political philosophy should address the nature of political prac-
tice is not to condemn the discipline to unambitious descriptivism. It is, 
however, to engage with the phenomena of politics as they are. One role for 
political philosophy is precisely to expose … habits of thought [which] per-
vade both academic and lay thinking about [politics] (2001: 28).   
 
In this sense then, the use of real life examples can fruitfully aid my enterprise to provide a 
more realistic and nuanced account of political ethics and DH. Moreover, drawing on our 
contemporary and historical experience shall assist my endeavour to expose the idealistic 
vision of political morality, prevalent amongst the heirs of Plato and the Enlightenment in 
general and proponents of the standard DH thesis in particular. To be clear, I do not wish to 
suggest that the account of political morality put forward by standard DH theorists is ideal-
istic because they do not use real-life examples. For, it is not the case that proponents of the 
orthodox DH thesis fail to draw on contemporary and historical experience (c.f. Walzer, 
1977; de Wijze, 2009). Rather, what is at stake here is standard DH theorists’ idealistic in-
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terpretation of the various case studies they employ. And this, as I shall demonstrate, is 
owed to deeper philosophical problems which permeate their account.  
 
In addition to the utilization of real life examples, the thesis also appeals to works of 
fiction and, in particular, literature and poetry. Now, I should acknowledge here that, this 
particular choice of methodology might seem peculiar. Whilst there are numerous objec-
tions against the use of literature as a philosophical tool, I want to emphasize two which, as 
John Horton and Andrea Baumeister (2003: 9) rightly acknowledge, “have been the two 
most recurrent objections of philosophers to the use of imaginative literature” and are of 
particular relevance to my enterprise. The first, which is in its essence epistemological, pos-
tulates that works of literature are, by their very nature, fictitious and cannot provide in-
sights relevant to the real world. The second intertwined objection pushes this claim a bit 
further: the insights of literature are not merely irrelevant to the real world - they are also 
likely to equip us with a misleading and harmful picture of ethical and political life. What 
both these objections suggest then, is that this particular choice of methodology hardly 
dovetails with my endeavour to provide a more realistic and nuanced account of political 
morality and DH. Put another way, it seems counterintuitive for a thesis that purports to fol-
low the tradition of political realism to draw on works of fiction.    
 
This, however, is not the case. To be clear, I do not wish to suggest that drawing on 
works of literature constitutes the only way of doing political philosophy. I only wish to 
suggest that the conviction that works of literature and poetry merit no place in moral and 
political philosophy (let alone in a philosophy that purports to be realistic) is a misconcep-
tion. What is worth adding to this is that the above objections to the use of literature are far 
from novel: they can be traced in the political and moral philosophy of Plato and Socrates. 
In The Republic, Plato acknowledges the existence of an “old quarrel between (what Plato 
takes to be) philosophy and poetry” (667c). For Plato this quarrel is easily settled: neither 
literature and poetry nor comedy and tragedy are philosophically and politically acceptable 
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or relevant. These works cannot be plausibly seen as providing any fruitful insights to philo-
sophical reflection and ethical knowledge: “it is phantoms (phantasmata) not realities they 
produce” (The Republic, 99a). Nor do they merit a place in his ideal city: “so much of poet-
ry as is hymns to gods or celebration of good men should be admitted into a city” (The Re-
public, 607a). Part of the reason as to why Plato views the works of Homer, Pindar and the 
tragedians as an affront to philosophy and to individual and societal ethics though, stems 
from the fact that such works grapple with issues he strenuously seeks to evade: messiness, 
conflict, tragedy, vice, dependence and imperfection (c.f. The Republic, Book III). In short, 
Plato’s contention that literature and poetry mischaracterize ethical reality and are thus un-
acceptable is preconditioned on a very specific set of philosophical convictions which, as I 
shall argue in the thesis also permeate the standard DH thesis and which, are utopian
8
: a 
love for wholeness, harmony and perfection. This is perhaps the appropriate place to add 
that, it is not a surprise that a host of political philosophers who have long insisted on the 
importance of taking the complexity of politics and morality seriously (i.e. Stuart Hamp-
shire, Bernard Williams, Alasdair MacIntyre, Isaiah Berlin. Hannah Arendt, Peter Johnson, 
Martin Hollis, Sue Mendus and Judith Shklar amongst others) and which this thesis shall 
follow have borrowed insights from works of fiction. As these theorists would have put it, 
because literature more often dwells on the particular and the unique it is capable of provid-
ing us with a more complex, nuanced and realistic picture of our ethical cosmos.   
 
Some of these points as well as the general value of using literature as a means to 
aid philosophical reflection have been recently emphasized by a number of moral and politi-
cal philosophers (c.f. Murdoch, 1956; Adamson et al, 1998; Antonaccio, 2000; Nussbaum, 
                                            
8 A similar point concerning the relationship between Plato’s account of individual morality 
(or his account of the soul) and his account of the ideal city is advanced by Hampshire 
(1989; 1993) and Edyvane (2008). As they argue, whilst Plato presents his ideal city as 
analogous to an ideal soul, his account of the latter is premised on a very specific set of 
political and philosophical convictions. These, they maintain, stem from an already formed 
picture of his ideal Republic.  
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1990; 2007; Williams, 2007; George, 2005; Cunningham, 2005; Horton & Baumeister, 
2003). The marriage of literature and philosophy, these theorists suggest, can provide a 
richer conception of political philosophy as it takes us to places that are very difficult for us 
to visit. In Anthony Cunningham’s words:  
 
By drawing our attention to morally salient features of life and character, 
novels can sharpen our ability to perceive moral subtleties … By taking lit-
erature seriously as a philosophical resource, we do not supplant philoso-
phy. Rather, a marriage of literature and traditional philosophical reflection 
opens the door to a richer conception of … philosophy that can speak to the 
heart of what matters in human life (2005: 131).  
 
Hence, the use of literary examples can reinforce the key aims of the thesis in two intercon-
nected ways. First, it shall provide me with a crucial leverage to take seriously the com-
plexity and messiness of our ethical and political cosmos, the inevitability of conflict and 
the necessity of certain ordinary moral vices in political life. To put it differently, the use of 
literature can fruitfully aid my endeavour to upset the hygienically pallid way of reflecting 
on political morality and DH. Moreover, it shall also help my enterprise to provide a more 
realistic and nuanced account of political ethics and DH - one which is sensitive to the pecu-
liarities of politics as a practice and way of life as well as the complexity of the domain in 
which political practitioners operate.  
 
 The second way in which the utilization of novels can aid the key aims of the thesis 
is glimpsed in Geoffrey Harpham’s pithy observation that “those who gravitate towards nar-
rative gravitate away from Kant. They see, in short, narrative as a way of rescuing ethics 
from Kant” (1992: 159). Whilst challenging Kantian ethics is not my main concern in the 
thesis (though some of the issues I discuss naturally apply to Kant and his followers), Har-
pham’s remark can be also extended to the standard DH thesis. Again, I should emphasize 
here that I do not wish to suggest that standard DH theorists do not utilize literary examples. 
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For, this is not the case - orthodox analyses of the DH problem are replete with literary ex-
amples and allusions to poetry and drama (c.f. Stocker, 1990; 2000; de Wijze, 1994; de 
Wijze & Goodwin, 2009; Gowans, 1990; 2001; Walzer, 1973). But the way standard DH 
theorists use such examples almost contradicts the point of utilizing novels. For, novels typ-
ically present us with complex, detailed and thick descriptions of the interior life of fictional 
characters embroiled in the messy business of politics and living. To utilize novels and at 
the same time frame the problem of DH in ‘static’ terms is to ignore that the character of 
each novel has a certain history, is situated within a certain context and is characterized by 
certain dispositions which may be conducive or catastrophic to a virtuous political life. In 
other words, the use of novels dovetails with my endeavour to upset the prevalent ‘static’ 
formulation of this problem. By implication, it shall also aid my attempt to conceive the 
problem of DH in dynamic or narrative terms. In this sense, the use of narrative shall help 
me illustrate that we ought to approach political life as a whole - that leading a political life 
is not merely a matter of acting but also a matter of character, virtue and disposition. There-
fore, the use of literary characters and examples can reinforce my view of political agency, 
virtue and integrity.  
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                                     2.   The View of Innocence 
 
        Doing everything that is morally right  
         And nothing that is morally wrong would  
              be a tremendous accomplishment.  
        E. Connee
9 
 
         Hygiene … turns out to be an excellent route.  
         As we know it, dirt is essentially disorder …  
                Dirt offends against order. Eliminating it is not a negative  
               movement, but a positive effort to organise the environment. 
         M. Douglas
10 
  
 2.1. Introduction  
 
We live in a period characterized by a restless impatience with politics. With a few 
exceptions, politicians do not enjoy a good press, either among philosophers or the wider 
public. Amidst the recent MPs’ expenses scandals as well as widespread acts of political 
deception and violence, it seems hard to deny at least this much: there is a dire need to re-
conceptualise political morality. As I have gestured in the previous chapter, most contempo-
rary commentators suggest that we need to re-inject ordinary moral considerations into po-
litical life: as Madeleine Bunting puts it, the phrase “this is wrong has long ceased to have 
validity as a political statement … Values [have] become a form of spin” (2010: 5). On this 
account, the reconceptualization of political morality is intertwined with the rediscovery of 
something lost: namely, the notion of ordinary moral goodness and innocence as an integral 
aspect of political morality. 
 
This familiar and optimistic way of reflecting on political morality seems to sit well 
with a perspective which has been severely criticized by proponents of the standard DH the-
sis and which we may describe as the view of innocence or of clean hands (c.f. Walzer, 
                                            
9 The Nature and Impossibility of Moral Perfection, 815 
10 Purity and Danger, 3 
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1973; Gowans, 1990; 2001; Klockars, 1980; de Wijze, 1994; 1996; 2002; 2006; 2009; 
Blattberg, 2013; Stocker, 1990; 2000; Cunningham, 1992). As I shall explain in chapter 3, 
the standard DH thesis suggests that the view of innocence constitutes an unsatisfactorily 
idealistic account of political morality. Its hopeful insights fail to capture the recognition 
that, in certain tragic circumstances, public officials may face a paradox of action: they may 
be compelled for political reasons to do or tolerate things that are immoral and thereby lose 
their innocence. My general aim in this chapter is to reconstruct this hopeful perspective on 
political morality. In other words, since the key point of the thesis is to contribute to the de-
bate about the problem of DH, in this chapter I want to show where the orthodox way of 
thinking about DH comes from. In so doing, I wish to clarify a view which the standard DH 
thesis is committed against: a perceived moral ‘innocence’ in traditional philosophy. 
 
 The discussion is organized into three sections. In the first section, I shall provide a 
preliminary outline of the view of innocence so as to set the context for the subsequent dis-
cussion. I suggest that innocence, at least as understood here (and by proponents of the 
standard DH thesis), refers to a particular version of moral perfection: that is, moral perfec-
tion in action. Simply put, innocence refers to the absence of moral guilt or culpability. In 
short, moral perfection is thought to be attainable iff our actions are morally right tout court. 
In the second section, I focus on two prevalent (and rival) ideal moral theories which, ac-
cording to proponents of the standard DH thesis, constitute the most notable adherents of 
this view: Kantianism and Utilitarianism. In so doing, I shall provide a brief outline of both 
such theories and the respective version of innocence which emerges from each of them. In 
the third section, I shall discuss in more detail a core feature which underpins the view of 
innocence: The Non-Remainders Thesis. This feature, as I explain, constitutes a version of 
the vision which, as I gestured in chapter 1, looms in the background of ideal moral frame-
works since antiquity: what Isaiah Berlin (1990; 1990a; 1990b; 1990c) and Stuart Hamp-
shire (1987; 1989) term the Platonic Ideal or the doctrine of final rational harmony respec-
tively. For, their differences aside, both theories I discuss here are said to be in agreement in 
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at least this much: perfect goodness and innocence are not just plausible in contemporary 
public life. They are also mandatory. The upshot of this, as I explain, is that morality and 
politics are far from incongruent. All our public agents have to do is to ensure that their ac-
tions accord with certain overarching and universal moral principles: the Categorical Imper-
ative or the Principle of Utility. I shall conclude by registering a prima facie doubt as to 
whether the view of innocence and its underlying presuppositions are adequate. 
  
 Before proceeding any further though, I should emphasize an important limitation 
of scope. The accounts of Kantianism and Utilitarianism provided here are highly schemat-
ic. It is not my purpose to provide a comprehensive treatment of either theory, nor do I mean 
to suggest that no version of them could evade the critique of DH theorists. Rather, the task 
I wish to undertake here is far more modest: I want to identify a position that proponents of 
the standard DH thesis have targeted and elucidate certain features which underpin it.  
 
2.2. Moral Perfection and Innocence: A Preliminary Consideration   
 
 
 According to an anecdote about Wittgenstein, Fania Pascal - following the philoso-
pher’s confession of his vices – sarcastically exclaimed: “What is it? You want to be per-
fect?” Wittgenstein bitterly responded: “Of course I want to be perfect” (Monk, 1990: 368- 
369). This story is often taken to illustrate the unrealistic nature of Wittgenstein’s aspira-
tions - the extent to which his moral expectations far exceeded the requirements of morality. 
Much the same intuition underlies the cliché ‘Nobody is perfect’ said in light of an act of 
moral wrongdoing - the speaker is insinuating that moral imperfection is, to some extent, 
inevitable. “Outside the context of moral discussion”, Susan Wolf says, the difficulty of per-
fection may strike some of us “as an obvious point”. However, “within that context, the 
point if it be granted will be granted with some discomfort. For, within that context, it is 
generally assumed that one ought to be as morally good as possible” (1982: 419, my empha-
sis).   
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 A recent exposition of this vision is found in Colin McGinn’s Must I be Morally 
Perfect. McGinn (1992) is adamant that it is not the case that Wittgenstein’s aspirations 
were incongruent with morality; moral perfection is not a supererogatory goal: “it is part of 
morality to require each of us to be perfect: to fall short of moral perfection is to be bad in a 
quotidian sense” (McGinn, 1992: 33). To cut a long story short, McGinn’s vision of moral 
perfection can be summarily formulated in the following dictum: an agent is morally per-
fect, if and only if, he never does what is wrong. For McGinn, this dictum seems to be self-
evidently correct - “an obvious truth” to use his words (McGinn, 1992: 33). Its validity aside 
though, this dictum appears to be simple enough: it supplies “the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for moral perfection in action” (McGinn, 1992: 33; my emphasis). So are its de-
mands: on each occasion, we ought to act in a tout court morally right manner. What acting 
in a tout court morally right manner specifically involves, McGinn does not, nevertheless, 
say. Addressing this issue, proponents of the standard DH thesis tell us, compels us to turn 
to our dominant moral theories (which, as we shall see in due course, advance contrasting 
visions of how moral perfection is attained). What it is important to emphasize for now 
however, is that such a dictum, even in this generic formulation, seems to be intertwined 
with (at least) two interconnected notions (which are also gestured by McGinn). A brief 
comment on these might aid us to flesh out some crucial assumptions which underpin this 
view.   
  
 The first - and most extravagant perhaps - is that of sainthood. As Susan Wolf puts 
it, a moral saint is “a person who is as morally worthy as he can be”, a person “whose every 
action is as morally as good as possible” (1982: 419). Second, moral perfection is attainable 
iff one’s actions are not marked by any form of moral wrongdoing. This notion of perfec-
tion, signifies - and is conditional upon - a particular notion of innocence which is neither 
uncommon nor unfamiliar to us: it often finds contemporary expression in liberal jurispru-
dence (Johnson, 1993; Fletcher, 2000). As Peter Johnson highlights:  
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In liberal jurisprudence innocence means the absence of 
guilt … innocence is lost when a particular guilt is present. 
The establishment of guilt is dependent on the existence of 
a set of legal rules which enable the identification of agents 
and the actions, which … they are guilty of performing. To 
be innocent in this sense is to be not guilty of that with 
which you are charged. This means that the agent does not 
deserve punishment or forgiveness (1993:7).     
 
Consider too the invocation of such a notion in Just War Theory: innocence serves as the 
foundation for the important (and sometimes unnerving) distinction between combatants 
and non-combatants, which both censures and permits certain forms of warfare (c.f. Orend, 
2008). As Michael Walzer emphasizes in Just and Unjust Wars, soldiers must use their 
weapons to target only those “engaged in harm” (1977: 82). Soldiers must discriminate be-
tween civilians, those who are not engaged in warfare, and legitimate military targets, di-
rectly involved in intentional attacks. In short, the moral prohibition on warfare policies 
which would otherwise endanger the lives of civilians depends on our acceptance of the no-
tion that non-combatants are innocent: that they are free from guilt and military involvement 
against us.  
 
 So, liberal jurisprudence and Just War Theory frame innocence in light of a frame-
work of legal rules, against the background of past conduct and as bearing a close connec-
tion with the ideas of responsibility and blameworthiness. So does moral philosophy it 
would seem (or, at least, McGinn - though, as I shall suggest following DH theorists in due 
course, so do our two prevalent moral theories). “Surely”, says McGinn, if one “always con-
forms his actions to certain moral norms, there can be no room left for moral imperfection to 
creep in” (1992: 33 - 34). In this sense, innocence and perfection (as understood and criti-
cized by proponents of the standard DH thesis) is conditioned upon the moral status of our 
actions: if these conform to certain moral laws there is, as argued, no reason to suppose that 
such an ideal is unattainable. In short, such an ideal bears a distinctively ‘passive’ flavour 
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(Johnson, 1993; Slote, 1983): one is morally perfect and innocent merely because one has 
not done something morally wrongful. 
 
 What such an optimistic account of political morality generally entails then, is the 
image of moral hygiene, simplicity, holiness and righteousness. It is precisely these ele-
ments which deem this view prima facie attractive. For, the antithesis between the image 
conveyed by this account of political morality and our contemporary societies is so stark 
that is hard to miss: “holiness and impurity”, to use Mary Douglas’ words, “are at opposite 
poles” (1984: 7). And it is for this reason, she maintains, that “sacred things and places are 
to be protected from defilement” (Douglas, 1984: 7). Insofar as we place some value on the 
moral status of our actions, it is (at least for most us) not easy to disagree with the claim that 
dirt and immorality constitute an affront to what is pure.  Nor can we dispute the widely 
held intuition that our public agents must strive to do what is morally right. Or, so it would 
seem. The recent egregious acts of wrongdoing, spanning from the alleged sex scandals and 
abuses of power - the one involving Dominique Strauss-Kahn, the former chief of IMF 
comes to mind here (Buettner, 2012; Carvajal & de la Baume, 2012) - to acts of public vio-
lence - the astonishing physical assault from a member of the Greek neo-Nazi party against 
two left-wing politicians is a notable example (Smith, 2012) - seem to render this intuition 
even more profound. “Of all moral conditions”, Elizabeth Wolgast tells us, “innocence 
seems easily the best and most desirable”. For “against the background of guilt and traffic 
with wrong, innocence is indisputably better, just as something clean is better than some-
thing soiled, something fresh better than something stale” (1993: 297). Innocence - the ab-
sence of moral wrongdoing- its proponents suggest, appears to be an excellent route and a 
magnificent achievement. But it also constitutes an extremely reassuring vision: if “moral 
perfection is not so extreme and impossible a requirement” McGinn says “the divine comes 
within our reach” (1992: 33).  
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Of course, the question one might well want to ask here is this: But is moral perfec-
tion and innocence possible? I reserve that question for the next chapter, in which I shall 
provide an outline of the standard DH thesis. As I show, adherents of the standard DH thesis 
raise pessimistic insights surrounding the possibility of innocence and perfection (especial-
ly) in politics. What I want to emphasize here though, is that the view of innocence rests on 
three general and interrelated preconditions, which already loom large. First, regardless of 
its precise content, this view seems to be underpinned by the assumption that a stark and 
fine line can (and should) be always drawn between acts that are morally rightful vis-à-vis 
those which are morally wrongful. Otherwise, one has reasons to wonder whether innocence 
is indeed practically attainable. Second, if moral perfection is not “an extreme and impossi-
ble” requirement, as McGinn (1992: 33) contends, it must be ipso facto true that in every 
single case, a tout court morally right or innocent course of action - one that is entirely free 
from moral wrongdoing - should be available to the agent
11
. For, if instances where no 
course of action that is perfectly right exists, innocence seems to become less attainable, if 
not impossible. Finally, there must - somehow - exist a universal and overarching (set of) 
standard(s) or principle(s) by which we can judge whether our actions do conform to this 
ideal. If such a standard is not available, the contention that ‘one is perfect as long as one 
acts in a morally right manner’ loses much of its grip. Thus, the ideal of innocence requires 
this much: a set of fully consistent and overarching moral principles (or laws) through 
which we can determine what the right course of action in every specific case is - ergo the 
course of action that enables us to be perfect.   
 
In connection to these preconditions, this is perhaps the appropriate place to high-
light a crucial issue: the view proponents of the contemporary and standard DH thesis criti-
cize, primarily concerns innocence with respect to a deed not innocence with respect to 
character. To put it differently, the type of moral innocence proponents of the standard DH 
                                            
11 This point is also raised by Clark (1993), Connee (1994) and Calhoun (1995). 
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thesis criticize regards innocence as it applies to actions, not necessarily innocence as it 
applies to persons. To be sure, this distinction  might appear superficial: innocence as it 
applies to a person is often seen as the absence of guilt and an inability to inflict harm 
12
 
(Wolgast, 1993). But this is not always the case. For, as I shall demonstrate in chapter 4, 
there exists a crucial distinction between innocence conceived as the absence of wrongdoing 
and innocence conceived as a disposition. What is worth noting for now, is that the crucial 
difference between these two types of innocence is that innocence as a disposition directly 
relates to certain attitudes and virtues. More importantly, it signifies a lack of knowledge 
and experience of certain practices or ways of life. In this sense, whilst both types of inno-
cence often serve to denote a certain level of moral purity and hygiene, it is not implausible 
for an individual to be guilty with respect to a particular deed but nonetheless retain his in-
nocent character: innocence as a disposition implies an inability to be intentionally and 
knowingly guilty and vicious - it does not exempt one from guilt or vice. As Graham Greene 
in The Quiet American nicely puts it: “innocence [as a disposition] is like a dumb leper who 
has lost his bell, wandering the world, meaning no harm” (1955: 29). Hence, in contrast to 
innocence as the absence of wrongdoing which bears a distinctively passive flavour, inno-
cence as a disposition has a more active sense: it is often responsible for damage and politi-
cal disaster. It is this crucial insight, as I argue in chapter 4, which cannot be accommodated 
by the standard DH thesis. In short, the standard DH thesis - by virtue of its overemphasis 
on action - fails to capture the way moral character enters and jeopardizes politics.  
 
 Irrespective of all this however, the view of innocence and perfection proponents of 
the standard DH thesis challenge is far from uncommon. Or, so standard DH theorists sug-
                                            
12 A similar point is made by Michael Ignatieff (2004) with respect to the virtues of a 
religious life, which as I shall suggest in chapter 5 seem to be closely related to innocence as 
a disposition. Ignatieff seems to suggest that it cannot be the case that religion could, in any 
way, be associated with violence and the vice of cruelty. See also Christopher Gowans 
(2001). 
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gest
13
 (c.f. Nagel, 1972; 1978; Walzer, 1973; de Wijze, 1994; 2002; 2009; Gowans, 1990, 
2001; Stocker, 1990; Cunningham, 1992; van Fraassen, 1990). The attempt to extinguish 
immorality and moral wrongdoing from our lives has been a central pillar of our rich tradi-
tion of moral and political philosophy. In Innocence Lost, Christopher Gowans suggests that 
this view “is a recurrent theme in Western philosophical tradition”. For, “it often finds ex-
pression in religious faith and is frequently coupled with additional beliefs, or hopes, such 
as that our goodness will be rewarded in the end” (2001: 220). However, “the ideal that 
moral innocence may be achieved need not take religious form to have forceful hold upon 
us” (Gowans, 2001: 220). Rather, the main contemporary promulgators of innocence are 
Kantianism and Utilitarianism. For, it is these two theories which are explicitly committed 
to devising a set of criteria for determining the rightness or wrongness of actions and which 
have invited considerable criticism from proponents of the standard DH thesis (c.f. Gowans, 
1990; 2001; Stocker, 1990; Walzer, 1973; Cunningham, 1992; de Wijze, 1994; 2006; 2009; 
de Wijze & Goodwin, 2009). As Stephen de Wijze puts it, “to argue for … [the DH] phe-
nomenon flies in the face of … nearly all consequentialist and deontological moral theo-
rists” (2009: 308). It is to these two ideal moral theories and their respective expositions of 
innocence I now turn. 
 
2.3. Innocence, Moral Perfection and Ideal Moral Theory 
 
 In Dostoevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov, Dmitri Karamazov, before he is to be 
tried for murder, is visited by his brother to whom he expresses his last torment:  
 
It’s God that’s worrying me. That’s the only thing that’s worrying 
me. What if he doesn’t exist?  … Then, if he doesn’t exist, man is 
the chief of the earth, of the universe. Magnificent! Only how is 
he to be good without God? That’s the question. I always come 
                                            
13 This point is also made by proponents of moral dilemmas in general. See in particular 
John Gardner (2005; 2007) and Martha Nussbaum (2000; 2007). 
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back to that …. After all, what is goodness? ... Goodness is one 
thing with me, another with a Chinaman, so it’s a relative thing. 
Or isn’t it? Is it not relative? A treacherous question! You won’t 
laugh if I tell you it’s kept me awake two nights. I only wonder 
how people can live and think nothing about it (1950: 721).  
 
Most moral and political philosophers share something like Dmitri’s worry. Morality, they 
believe, must be grounded on something other than whether one happens to be Russian or 
British, member of this or that culture, society, clan or family, participant in this or that 
practice, wedded to one world view or way of life and so on. Whilst most philosophers may 
try to steer away from religion, they are in agreement that the touchstone of morality must 
be located in certain universally binding and overarching principles
14
. As Martin Benjamin 
puts it:  
 
Ethical theorists have traditionally been drawn to the more ab-
stract and general rather than to the more practical and immediate 
concerns of morality. They have sought a fully consistent, com-
prehensive set of values and principles that, when embraced by 
all, would eliminate rationally irresolvable (or incommensurable) 
moral conflict (1990: 75).  
 
The contention that all moral conflicts must admit to a perfect solution is an important one.  
For, as I shall explain in due course, it is a version of this ancient conviction which also 
permeates the view of innocence DH theorists challenge as utopian in politics. What is 
worth reiterating here though, is a point I briefly acknowledged in chapter 1: the quest for 
discovering such universal principles constitutes, in essence, a quest for an ‘ideal theory’. In 
short, most ideal theories constitute attempts to delineate the conditions of perfection under 
the aegis of reason and harmony: they provide us with a reasonably clear picture of what is 
                                            
14 For a more detailed exposition of this belief, see for instance Isaiah Berlin (1990), John 
Kekes (2011) and Stuart Hampshire (1989).   
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morally and rationally right or just and so of what we should be striving for. As Charles 
Blattberg explains, most ideal theories are united under the assumption that: 
Doing the right thing, and nothing but the right thing, is always 
possible as long as one follows a (correct) theory of morals or 
justice. This is because the unity of theory ensures that one will 
either never have to compromise a value or principle or that the 
wrongness of doing so can be cancelled out. Otherwise put, 
whenever an action complies with a unified vision of what is 
right, it should be considered ‘clean.’ (2013: 1). 
 
At the core of this effort to devise the ideal scheme of human behaviour, proponents of the 
standard DH thesis tell us, lies the ‘covering law model’ of morality (Gowans, 2001). This 
model supposes that the sole concern of morality is to aid us determine and rationally justify 
conclusions of moral deliberation - those action- guiding judgements about what, in the final 
analysis, one ought to do in any situation
15. The covering law model “requires the justifica-
tion of these judgments to take the form of an inference from a first moral principle, as ap-
plied to the facts of the case” (Gowans, 2001: 119).  
 
In short, the basic structure of moral deliberation consists in deriving and applying 
such principles to particular situations in order to determine what ought to be done. This 
model, John Kekes adds, assumes that “moral considerations have overriding importance in 
the evaluation of all actions, because all actions either conform to or violate the prescrip-
tions of the ideal theory”. And since “the requirements of morality are universal” it automat-
ically follows “that they apply to all actions” (Kekes, 2011: 9). It is such an understanding 
of morality - a universal and overarching formula - which sustains the view of innocence. 
For, in doing what ought to be done, there is nothing more to be said about this or that par-
ticular case - one is morally perfect and cannot be plausibly seen as bearing any moral blem-
                                            
15 The covering law model of morality also lurks in the background of the discussions of 
Michael Stocker (1990), Martha Nussbaum (2000; 2007), Michael Neu (2012), Steve de 
Wijze (1994; 1996) and Michael Walzer (1973).  
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ish
16
. And, as proponents of the standard DH thesis suggest, it is precisely this model which 
lies at the core of Kantianism and Consequentialism (c.f. de Wijze, 1994; 1996; 2002; 2009; 
Walzer, 1973; Stocker, 1990; Cunningham, 1992, Gowans, 1990; 2001). Each of the follow-
ing two subsections is concerned with the consideration of these two ideal theories and the 
version of innocence which, according to standard DH theorists, emerges from them. 
 
2.3.1. Innocence, Moral Perfection and Kantianism  
 
 To say that the figure of Immanuel Kant has been influential in Western philosophy 
would be an understatement (c.f. Kagan, 2002; Schneewind, 2002; Baron, 2008). Kant’s 
thought features prominently in contemporary discussions of the just society - the most no-
table example being John Rawls’ (1971) A Theory of Justice.  It also extends to questions of 
morality in various contexts, ranging from business ethics (c.f. Bowie, 1999; Smith & Du-
bink, 2011) to political morality in general (c.f. Roulier, 2008; Pallikkathayil, 2010) and to 
more specific discussions and condemnations of torture and public deception (c.f. Sussman, 
2005; Harel & Sharon, 2008; Mayerfeld, 2008; Ramsay, 2011; Allhoff, 2012; Mahon, 2003; 
Cliffe et al, 2000). Of course, the term Kantian ethics is employed rather loosely: it often 
refers to an array of contemporary deontological theories that rely on Kant’s ideas. Howev-
er, for the purposes of the exercise I wish to conduct here - the reconstruction of the view of 
innocence in its Kantian variant - I shall restrict myself to the examination of Kant’s key 
insights.  
  
                                            
16 This view is often defended by invoking the ought-implies-can (OIC) principle and the 
principle of agglomeration. For the OIC principle, see Kekes (1984), Lemmon (1990), 
Nagel (1990), Stocker (1971), Gowans (2001) and Fischer (2003). For the agglomeration 
principle, see Hampshire (1951), Trigg (1971), Williams (1973b; 1990), Marcus (1980), van 
Fraasen (1990), Sinnott-Armstrong (1984, 1985; 1987a; 1987b) Stocker (1990) and 
McConnell (1978; 2010).  
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 Now, the best place to commence locating the ideas of innocence and perfection in 
Kant’s moral thought is The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. For, it is here where 
Kant’s attempt to establish “the supreme principle of morality” - which if adhered to, ren-
ders our actions morally perfect - originated (2002: 8). From the outset of the Groundwork, 
Kant is adamant that the search for such a principle cannot be effective unless morality is 
“cleansed of everything empirical” (2002: 4- 5). Morality must be neither sought in the par-
ticular nature of any agent, nor in specific contingencies of the world. Reliance on empirical 
grounds distorts the quest for a ‘universal practical philosophy’. It also hinders the possibil-
ity of perfection: it leads to “actions contrary to the (moral) law” and “to evil” (Kant, 2002: 
6 - 28).  
 
 Kant’s remarks suggest that his conception of morality possesses a strongly juridical 
flavour which already sits well with what proponents of the standard DH thesis term the 
covering law model: “morality”, Kant says, “consists in the reference of all action to legisla-
tion” (2002: 52). It is in connection to this insight that the centrality of the notion of duty 
emerges in Kant’s ethics17. Morality, according to Kant, is conditioned upon the fulfilment 
of our duties. In this sense, an action is morally laudatory and right tout court, when it con-
forms to duty. Hence the Kantian conception of moral perfection: one is morally perfect and 
innocent if one’s actions do not involve a moral transgression - a violation of one’s duties.  
 
 But our duties are pre-determined by the moral law - identifying the former, re-
quires us to determine the nature of the latter. Since Kant contends that moral law must be 
purged of anything empirical, its ultimate source cannot be external: “legislation”, he says, 
“is discoverable prior to and abstracted from experience” (Kant, 1990: 36). It is from our 
rational faculty - which, uncontaminated by empirical contingencies, forms a common in-
                                            
17 Hence the term ‘deontological’ (duty + logos) often employed to capture the Kantian 
philosophical tradition. 
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gredient across mankind - which we should derive the moral law
18
. By cleansing philosophy 
from anything (which Kant takes to be) extraneous, we are bound to arrive at the supreme 
principle of morality, expressed as a Categorical Imperative (CI):  
 
Act only in accordance with that maxim (rules of action) through 
which you can at the same time will that it become a universal 
law” (2002: 37; 1990: 40 - 41).   
 
A moral law, Peter Johnson (1993) and Roy Holland (1980) explain, is categorical in (at 
least) three senses. First, it is unconditional and non-negotiable; it constitutes a necessary 
and sufficient condition for innocence and perfection. Because of this, Kant says, moral 
laws are expressed in the form of an ought. An example would be the statements: “You 
ought not to lie” and “You ought not to break a promise”. So, an imperative is categorical if 
it is impermissible for us to violate it: we cannot “take the liberty of making an exception 
for ourselves … even only for this once” (Kant, 2002: 37). Second, a moral judgement is 
categorical in the sense of not requiring an external justification for itself
19
. An absolute im-
perative implies that there is nothing further to be said with regards to the second statement 
- its character forms a part of its meaning. In Kant’s words, “these laws, like mathematical 
postulates, are indemonstrable and yet apodictic” (1990: 40). Morality then, is like Euclidian 
mathematics: to ask why the angles of an isosceles triangle must be equal would imply that 
we have misunderstood what is being said, because that is what an isosceles triangle means. 
Thus, the CI “which declares the action for itself as objectively necessary without reference 
                                            
18 The reasons for this, Kant explains, are simple: not only do external circumstances lead 
us to immoral actions, but if moral laws are also universally binding it would be erroneous 
to derive them from specific practical circumstances. Instead, we must derive these from the 
“universal concept of a rational being” (Kant, 2002: 28). See also Schneewind (2002), 
Becker (1993) and Robert (2012). 
19 Contrast the statement “This is a good chair” with “This is a good act”. The former may 
be explained by reference to its fulfilment of a function but the latter (say an act of 
truthfulness), does not require justification outside itself. 
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to any aim … is valid as an apodictally practical principle” (Kant, 2002: 31). This brings us 
to the third sense in which imperatives are categorical: morality is not justified by reference 
to something beyond itself - it is not subsidiary to any further end. Rather, only something 
which constitutes an end in itself can form a ground of morality. Hence the second formula-
tion of the CI:  
 
Act so that you use humanity as much as your own person as in 
the person of every other, always at the same time as end and 
never merely as means (Kant, 2002:47).        
 
Since rational beings are of absolute value (presumably because they are the only source of 
that which is good without qualification) they must be always treated as ends not merely as 
means
20
.  
 
 So, for Kant, our actions are innocent if they fulfil the following two ‘tests’ as pre-
scribed by the CI: i) universalizability 
21
 and ii) respect for persons. From these tests we ar-
rive at a more nuanced scheme of our duties which are divided into duties towards oneself, 
duties to others and perfect and imperfect duties (Kant, 2002: 37 - 43). As Becker (1993) 
and Robert (2012) explain, perfect duties are those to which one’s every action must con-
form: they entail actions which are permissible and necessary - or, in reverse, perfect duties 
entail absolute prohibitions against certain actions (i.e. breaking promises, stealing, murder 
and lying). Consider for instance lying. For Kant, the maxim to lie would embroil one in a 
practical contradiction - the principle ‘you ought to lie’ cannot be plausibly held as a univer-
sal principle or duty. Hence, “any exception to the duty of veracity nullifies the principle of 
                                            
20 See Becker (1993), Feldman (1978), Rachels (2007) and Raphael (1990).  
21 This involves the following procedure: First, formulate a maxim that enshrines your 
reason for acting. Second, recast that maxim as a universal law governing all rational agents. 
Third, consider whether your maxim is conceivable in a world governed by this law. If it is, 
then ask whether you could rationally will to act on your maxim in this world. If you could, 
then your action is permissible (O'Neill, 1975, 1989; Robert, 2012). 
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universality” (Kant, 1949: 350). More importantly, the liar exploits humanity: he treats oth-
ers as mere means and wrongs humanity in the most essential point of duty. In so doing, the 
liar also wrongs himself: “one renounces one’s personality and, as a liar, manifests oneself 
as a mere deceptive appearance of a human being, not as a genuine human being” (Kant, 
1990: 9). So the duty to be truthful is perfect and unconditional. In contrast, imperfect duties 
are those which one must adopt, but one need not always act upon: actions stemming from 
imperfect duties are morally permissible, but not strictly laudatory
22
.  
 
If we are to bring the basic elements of Kant’s moral thought together, the main the-
sis which emerges is thisː it is our duty as human beings to elevate ourselves to an ideal of 
perfection - the idea of a human being whose actions satisfy the requirements of duty, as 
prescribed by the CI. In so doing, our will is absolutely good - this is a will which “cannot 
do evil, hence whose maxim, if it is made into a universal law, can never conflict with it-
self” (Kant, 2002: 55). Hence, the CI purportedly forms “the single condition” under which 
conflict is eliminated: in a rational and absolutely good will, “all maxims ought to harmo-
nize from one’s own legislation into a possible realm of ends” (Kant, 2002: 54- 55). This 
thesis gives rise to three interlinked implications of Kant’s thought that need to be better 
teased out here. For, as proponents of the standard DH thesis suggest, it is these very impli-
cations which lie at the core of the covering law model and the conditions for innocence I 
have outlined above.  
 
First, since it is impossible for a rational and good will to do evil- since perfection is 
“not a chimerical idea” (Kant, 2002: 62) - it follows that any immoral act must also be irra-
tional. Our moral lapses could be overcome were we more rational and acted in accordance 
with the CI. This gives rise to the second crucial implication of Kant’s theory: a conflict 
within morality is “inconceivable” (1990: 39). “The concepts of duty and obligation”, Kant 
                                            
22 An example of an imperfect duty is the principle ‘Be beneficent’. See Kant (2002) and 
Becker (1993). 
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explains, “express the objective practical necessity of certain actions, and two conflicting 
rules cannot be both necessary at the same time” (1990: 39). Since goodness is conditioned 
upon the moral rightfulness of our actions, it is impossible for two moral rules to be both 
simultaneously right and obligatory. This would entail a practical contradiction, a disharmo-
ny amongst one’s maxims. For Kant, this is intolerable and incongruent with rational agen-
cy. “If it is our duty to act according to one of these rules”, he says, “to act according to the 
opposite one is not our duty and is even contrary to duty”. Hence “when two such grounds 
conflict, practical philosophy says … that the stronger ground of obligation prevails” (1990: 
40). When two duties (seem to) conflict, the CI is invoked to help us to determine our per-
fect duty. Consequently, the weaker ground of obligation is completely annulled
23
. Consider 
for instance Kant’s discussion of ‘the Inquiring Murderer’24, a scenario in which a murderer 
asks us of the whereabouts of his prospective victim. In this scenario, the absolute nature of 
the perfect duty of truthfulness totally overrides the imperfect duty of beneficence. As Kant 
says “to be truthful in all declarations is an absolutely commanding decree of reason, limited 
by no expediency” (1990: 347- 350).  
 
Finally, because Kant’s theory is transcendental and absolute, the specific context or 
agent to which it is applied is unimportant. In connection to this, it cannot be the case that 
certain practical demands for action (those stemming from empirical circumstances) conflict 
with and override the demands for moral action. As Kant stresses in Perpetual Peace, since 
morality is “the sum of laws exalting unconditional obedience in accordance to which we 
ought to act”, it would be erroneous and “inconsistent that we should think of saying that we 
cannot act thus ... There can be quarrel between practical politics and morals” (1903: 161). 
Whilst Kant recognizes that moral and political action may seem to conflict, this conflict is 
only subjective: it exists in “the self-seeking tendencies of men which we cannot actually 
                                            
23 For a more detailed analysis of this point see Gowans (1990; 2001), Nussbaum (2007), 
Stocker (1990; 2000) and Donagan (1977; 1990).  
24 I take this terminology from Korsgaard (1986), Rachels (2007) and Varden (2010). 
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call their morality, as we would a course of action based on maxims of reason”. Objectively, 
he maintains, there can be “no quarrel between morals and politics” (1903: 180). This is 
because “political maxims” are derived “from the pure concept of duty, from the ought 
whose principle is given a priori by pure reason” (1903: 180). In this sense, “politics cannot 
take a step back without first paying homage to morals … all politics must bend its knee 
before right” (1903: 183). Contemporary politicians (or any public or private figure) cannot 
evade the thrust of the CI:  they “cannot get away from the idea of right”. Nor must they 
“dare to base politics on expediency and refuse obedience to the idea of right” (1903: 174). 
To return to the issue of lying, the maxim ‘honesty is the best policy’ is, for Kant, “the nec-
essary condition of politics” (1903: 163). In Kant’s ideal theory then, morality and politics 
coexist in harmony, reconciled under the CI (and by the ideas of universality and rationali-
ty). 
 
2. 3. 2. Innocence, Moral Perfection and Consequentialism 
 
“Do all the good you can, by all the means you can, in all the ways you can, in all 
the places you can, at all the times you can, to all the people you can”. John Wesley’s advice 
(quoted in Shafer-Landau, 2012: 112) captures the motto that defines the consequentialist 
outlook
25. “Consequentialism”, Philip Pettit explains, “is the theory that the way to tell a 
particular choice is the right choice for an agent to have made is to look at the relevant con-
sequences of the decision; to look at the relevant effects of the decision on the world” 
(1993: xiii). In essence, consequentialism involves a cost-benefit analysis: things are worth 
pursuing iff the benefits outweigh the costs. On the face of it, it is hard to deny the attrac-
tiveness of this view. In Amartya Sen’s words: 
 
                                            
25 Whilst consequentialism goes back at least to Bentham, the term is relatively new - it was 
introduced by Anscombe (1958). See Sinnott-Armstrong (2012), Moore (1903), Scarre 
(1996) and Shafer-Landau (2012). 
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We may well puzzle a bit if someone were to tell us ‘This project has 
little benefit and much cost - let us do it!’ We would think that we are 
entitled to ask ‘why? (or more emphatically ‘why on earth’?) Benefits 
and costs have claims to our attention. Furthermore, it may even be 
argued, with some plausibility ... that any “pro” argument for a pro-
ject can be seen as pointing to some benefit that will yield and any 
“anti” argument must be associated with some cost (2000: 934). 
 
Acting for the best, according to consequentialists, is reasonable - to prefer a lesser good to 
a greater one is, in some sense, irrational (c.f. Shafer-Landau, 2012; Mulgan, 2001; Brandt, 
1972; Sinnott- Armstrong, 2012). “Rationality”, Samuel Scheffler explains, “is central to 
consequential evaluation. For “if one has a choice between two options, one of which is cer-
tain to accomplish a goal better than the other, then it is, ceteris paribus, rational to choose 
the former over the latter” (1988: 252). But it is not just that failure to employ an act that 
yields the best consequences is irrational. It is also immoral. It is in connection to this in-
sight, proponents of the standard DH thesis indicate, that the covering law morality and the 
consequentialist variant of the view of innocence emerge. For, consequentialism involves 
the following procedure: i) determine all your options in a given situation; ii) for each op-
tion determine the value of its results (how much good or evil such actions produce) iii) pick 
the action that yields the highest ratio of good to bad results - this is our moral obligation.  
Doing anything else - failing to employ the action that strikes the greatest balance of good 
over bad - is morally impermissible. Simply put, our actions are morally right tout court if 
they produce the best available consequences or maximize the amount of goodness - we are 
innocent of moral transgression iff our actions are optimific. 
 
 Needless to say the differences between Kant’s theory and consequentialism (and 
the account of political morality that emerges from each of these theories) are striking. On 
the one hand, Kantians tell us that we ought to live and act in accordance to the CI: moral 
perfection is possible if we pay sufficient attention to the means of our actions, irrespective 
of what follows. For consequentialists on the other hand we must focus on the consequences 
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of our actions. It is, in other words, the ends, not the means that deem our actions morally 
perfect and innocent. But, at least to my inquiry, it is what these theories share that matters 
most. It is not just that both such theories ground morality on rationality - ergo to be guilty 
of moral culpability is to be irrational. More importantly, both such theories contend that 
morality should be premised on a single and overarching moral principle. This features ex-
plicitly in the most prominent version of consequentialism, Jeremy Bentham’s and John 
Stuart Mill’s Utilitarianism26. As Mill emphasizes: 
 
There must be some standard by which to determine the goodness or 
badness, absolute and comparative of ends, or objects of desire. 
Whatever that standard is, there can be but one; for if there were sev-
eral ultimate principles of conduct, the same conduct might be ap-
proved by one of those principles and condemned by another; and 
there would be needs some more general principle, as umpire be-
tween them (1990: 52).  
 
What lurks in the background of Mill’s remark is (once more) what standard DH theorists 
identify as the covering law model of morality: the belief that the primary task of philoso-
phy is to help us to discern what we ought to do in a particular situation; and, that in doing 
what ought to be done makes for a perfect and innocent act. This, however, is possible only 
if there exists a single fundamental principle or law at the root of all morality. Whilst our 
everyday life seems to be messier, as several such principles exist, “a determinate order of 
precedence among them” is not impossible (Mill, 2000: 8). But this precedence, Mills main-
tains, is possible only if one presupposes that a single overarching moral principle or rule 
exists. Otherwise, establishing such precedence in instances where the various principles 
conflict seems far less plausible. Again, the lack of such a standard is perceived to be intol-
erable. For, this would deem perfection impossible: we would be unable to discern which 
                                            
26 The Utilitarian tradition is of course comprised of many different theories. I shall say 
more on contemporary Utilitarian accounts in the next chapter. 
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the morally right or innocent action in certain circumstances is. “Though the application of 
the standard may be difficult, it is”, Mill tells us, “better than none at all” (2000: 46). 
  
 For utilitarians then, the summum bonum is to be found in the principle of utility
27
. 
Simply put the goodness of outcomes - the rightness of actions insofar as they affect out-
comes - is judged by the degree to which actions secure the greatest benefit to all concerned: 
the greatest happiness for the greatest number (Bentham, 1780). As Bentham explains:  
 
Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign 
masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we 
ought to do … The standard of right and wrong, on the other the 
chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne … The princi-
ple of utility … assumes [this] for the foundation of that system, the 
object of which is to rear the fabric of felicity by the hands of reason 
and of law. Systems which attempt to question it, deal … in caprice 
instead of reason, in darkness instead of light (1780: 11). 
 
In short, utilitarians assume that, for rational and moral individuals, all that matters is pleas-
ure or welfare and the absence of pain - these are the specific consequences which we ought 
to promote or avoid respectively. Utility, in other words, constitutes the directive law of ra-
tional human conduct: it is from this simple principle which all our duties stem. Differently 
put, what one ought to do in a particular situation, requires one to discern the action which is 
conformable to the principle of utility. It is only via such a value, according to Bentham, 
that “the words ought, and right and wrong … have a meaning” (1780: 13).  
 
In essence, utilitarianism is a universal and impartial theory. The principle of utility 
forms a general and universal guide: it tells us how a rational agent ought to behave if she 
attached equal weight to the well-being of all agents. And it is this principle which should 
be invoked in order to resolve any uncertainties we may have when pondering what we 
                                            
27 For a more detailed elaboration of Utilitarianism, see Shafer-Landau (2012), Williams 
(1973a), Rachels (2007), Mulgan (2001) and Kymlicka (2002).  
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ought to do. As Mill puts it, “if utility is the ultimate source of moral obligations, utility may 
be invoked to decide between them when their demands are incompatible” (2000: 46). Of 
course, like Kant, Mill also recognizes that moral conflict might seem to be prima facie pos-
sible: “there exists no moral system” he says in Utilitarianism “under which there do not 
arise unequivocal cases of conflicting obligation. These are the real difficulties, the knotty 
points in the theory of ethics and in the conscientious guidance of personal conduct” (2000: 
46). But, such conflicts are mere chimeras: the existence of a supreme moral value implies 
that these can be perfectly resolved. For, the only object of goodness for this school of 
thought is “the multiplication of happiness” (Mill, 2000: 34). If we ensure that our actions 
accord with the principle of Utility we would realize our true nature: we would become as 
rational and impartial as “a disinterred and benevolent spectator”. This, Mill contends, con-
stitutes “the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality” (2000: 32). Hence the more specific 
Utilitarian version of innocence and perfection: one is innocent of moral transgression - er-
go morally perfect- if one’s actions adhere to the principle of Utility. 
 
2.4. The View of Innocence: Key Features and Implications 
 
So far, I have been trying to clarify and reconstruct a view which has been subjected 
to severe criticism by proponents of the standard DH thesis: the view of innocence. In so 
doing, I have turned to our two most dominant moral theories which, according to standard 
DH theorists, constitute the main contemporary promulgators of this view: Kantianism and 
Utilitarianism. As I have noted, the account of morality that forms the background of these 
moral theories is quite similar. And, so too is the general vision which emerges from them: a 
vision of what is morally and rationally possible in human life. As Gowans tells us, both 
such theories put forward:  
 
a standard of perfection that, though difficult to attain, is nonetheless 
thought to be within the reach of us. The standard is moral innocence, 
or moral purity, the ideal of living one’s life is such a way as to fully 
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comprehensively and harmoniously respond to the requirements of 
morality and thereby exclude all forms of moral wrongdoing (2001: 
219).  
 
At the core of the view innocence lies the conviction that perfect goodness and moral inno-
cence are not only plausible but also constitute a necessary and sufficient requirement of 
morality. Differently put, as long as we focus our rational energies into developing an accu-
rate understanding of what we ought to do - this, according to the ‘covering law model’ is 
the sole concern of morality - perfection and innocence must be realizable in our lives. This 
deeply optimistic outlook of human life is captured in the following line of thought:  
 
There is much that happens to us in our lives which is bad … 
However, in contrast to what happens to us, there is who we are 
and what we do, a matter which is not due to factors beyond our 
control … goodness must be possible … At some deep level it 
must be possible to attain moral innocence. For we need to be-
lieve that the obstacles of moral innocence are all internal and 
surmountable by effort. (Gowans, 2001: 219 - 220).  
 
The view of innocence sits well with the standard accounts of political morality I have out-
lined in the introduction of the thesis. As I have gestured, a key implication of most ideal 
theories is that, at least in theory, it is not implausible to think that politics could be sani-
tized. In a similar vein, the view of innocence suggests that the various immoralities and 
outrageous acts of wrongdoing permeating our contemporary world - whilst difficult to ex-
tinguish - are not irremovable per se: all it takes is sufficient and arduous effort. True, few 
of us - and very few of our politicians - might ever achieve this; our contemporary despair 
and outrage may well ensue. We may be too irrational, weak and corrupt to ensure that our 
actions are always innocent tout court. The obstacles to moral perfection and innocence can 
be numerous. But it is our own irrational lapses that are to be blamed. For, the vision of per-
fection and innocence must exist. This much we (assume) to know. It is a terrifying thought 
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that perfection and innocence might never be attainable. If there were no preserve of perfec-
tion which our best efforts could achieve, the moral universe would be fundamentally un-
fair. 
 
 It is worth adding that the view of innocence and perfection put forward by Kanti-
anism and Utilitarianism is sustained by a version of what proponents of moral conflict and 
value pluralism such as Isaiah Berlin (1990) and Stuart Hampshire (1987) term the Platonic 
Ideal or the doctrine of final rational harmony respectively. As indicated, at the core of this 
ideal lies the assumption of value-monism: “the notion of the perfect whole, the ultimate 
solution in which all good things coexist” (Berlin, 1990a: 13). It is this a priori assumption 
of the possibility of harmony, wholeness and tidiness (as opposed to conflict, pluralism and 
messiness) which sustains the image of perfection and innocence. For, if moral perfection is 
possible, conflict is always bound to be avoidable: it is the product of irrational and amelio-
rable human mistakes. “Perfect beings”, Berlin remarks, would not know conflict: “there 
can be no incongruity, and therefore neither comedy nor tragedy in a world of saints and 
angels” (1990c: 185). The Platonic lineage of the view of innocence is explicitly acknowl-
edged by Gowans who writes that
28
:  
 
With few exceptions … philosophers from Plato on have viewed 
moral dilemmas as mere appearances. This has certainly been the 
case in the two predominant traditions of modern moral philosophy 
- Kantianism and Utilitarianism. Both Kantians and Utilitarians 
have thought that, for any apparent conflict, either one of the con-
flicting ought statements is not true or the two statements do not re-
ally enjoin incompatible actions … It is thought to be impossible 
                                            
28 The Platonic lineage of the view of innocence is also explicitly acknowledged by de 
Wijze who tells us that “Plato's work in The Republic and elsewhere can be plausibly 
interpreted as an attempt to offer a way of ensuring rational self-sufficiency in the face of 
luck and the fragility of goodness” (2005: 455) . 
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that morality could actually impose upon an agent two ‘oughts’ 
when both cannot be fulfilled (1990: 4). 
 
 Or, as he emphasizes later on:  
 
Discussion of moral conflict has roots deep in the history of moral 
philosophy. Among classical theories, the doctrine of the unity of 
the virtues in Aristotle (1980, VI, 13) implies that there can be no 
conflict among the virtues (1990: 5).   
 
Herein emerges the version of the Platonic Ideal that DH theorists criticize - what we can 
term the Non-Remainders thesis: the belief that moral conflicts, either within individual mo-
rality or between morality and politics, are perfectly resolvable in an action guiding sense 
and carry no moral remainder. Simply put, the view of innocence maintains that any conflict 
between moral and political action is fictitious: it does not pose a threat to the possibility of 
perfection or innocence. For any such apparent conflict the fundamental principle of morali-
ty - be it the Categorical Imperative or the Principle of Utility - forms a single currency or 
scale on which conflicting values can be measured and hierarchically ranked or classified 
into a tidy and seamless moral lexicon.   
 
 At this point, it is worth emphasizing two intertwined issues. First, I do not wish to 
suggest that the view proponents of the standard DH thesis seek to upset adequately cap-
tures Berlin’s, Hampshire’s (and Machiavelli’s) insights on harmony and monism - or, in 
reverse, that the standard DH thesis does justice to their insights on conflict and pluralism. 
As I shall demonstrate in chapter 4, despite its purported Machiavellian lineage, the standard 
DH thesis fails to take Machiavelli’s insights on conflict and pluralism seriously: it fails to 
live up to its capacity to capture the complexity of political ethics and collapses into the ide-
alism it seeks to evade. For, the standard DH thesis is inadequately ‘static’: it conceives the 
conflict between morality and politics as a momentous paradox of action - an anomaly dis-
rupting the normality of past and future harmony. The upshot of this, as I shall explain, is 
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that the DH thesis misconceives the extent of the rupture between morality and politics: it 
displaces Machiavelli’s recognition that such a conflict is perpetual. But it also miscon-
ceives the nature of such a conflict: by virtue of its overemphasis on action, the orthodox 
way of thinking about the problem of DH fails to capture the way moral character enters and 
jeopardizes politics. Simply put, by virtue of its failure to take Machiavelli’s realist insights 
into an earnest consideration, the standard DH thesis fails to adequately capture what it 
means to have DH in relation to certain on-going activities such as politics. Second, whilst 
Gowans (1990) is right to suggest that Aristotle’s ideal moral theory does reject the possibil-
ity of conflict, it does not follow that there are no significant differences between his ac-
count and those propounded by Kantians and Utilitarians as standard DH theorists often 
seem to argue (c.f. Gowans, 1990; de Wijze, 1994; 2009). For, as I shall suggest in chapter 
5, unlike the heirs of the Enlightenment, Aristotle held that morality should be grounded on 
the virtues and that it should be understood in teleological terms - not merely in terms of 
abstract action-guiding principles (MacIntyre, 2005). And, it is precisely because propo-
nents of the standard DH thesis have inherited a non-teleological view of morality from the 
Kantians and the Utilitarians that they displace Machiavelli’s insights and fail to adequately 
capture what it means to lead a virtuous life of politics.           
  
 Regardless of all this however, what I merely want to suggest here is that the view 
of innocence shares with the Platonic Ideal this much: both positions put forward an argu-
ment for “the coherence and harmony of the moral universe” which translates into the con-
viction that it is neither difficult nor implausible to live a perfectly moral and innocent life 
in politics (Walzer, 1973: 161). In other words, ordinary morality can and should be recon-
ciled with politics. What is worth adding to this, is that this vision of morality as tidy and 
harmonious has not been merely the product of philosophical discussion. In addition to the 
public pundits I cited in the introduction of this thesis, this view has been expressed by vari-
ous prominent political figures. For instance, Vaclav Havel emphasizes that politics cannot 
be incompatible with ordinary morality: “whilst some say that I am a naïve dreamer who is 
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always trying to combine the incompatible”, he says, “I am still deeply convinced that it is 
simply not true that a politician must lie or intrigue. That is utter nonsense … the sine qua 
non of politician is not the ability to lie” (2000: 11). In a similar vein, Thomas Jefferson in-
dicates: “I never did or countenanced, in public life, a single act inconsistent with the strict-
est good faith; having never believed there was one code of morality for a public and anoth-
er for a private man” (quoted in Hollis, 1982: 390). Consider too the following comment 
from Jimmy Carter, shortly before he assumed the Presidency of the USA: “a nation’s do-
mestic and foreign actions should be derived from the same standards of ethics, honesty, 
and morality which are characteristics of the individual citizens of the nation” (quoted in 
Garrett 1996: 9). What unites such political leaders is the denial of any objective conflict 
amongst politics and morality: these coexist in harmony. 
 
Of course, it remains to be seen whether this vision and its implications are ade-
quate. Indeed, one may wonder whether we do have any a priori guarantee as to whether the 
assumption of harmony which permeates the Platonic Ideal and the view of innocence and 
which sustains the view of perfection (regardless of its specific form) is possible even in 
theory. In connection to this, it might be worth mentioning here that even the philosopher 
who first advanced the vision of harmony and perfection (both in individual as well as so-
cietal ethics) does not deny that lying has a place in politics: Plato suggests that the philoso-
pher kings of his ideal Republic are allowed to lie to their enemies and their citizens
29
. Of 
course, because Plato held that ‘virtue is one’ it was inconceivable that the philosopher 
kings could ever bear a moral imperfection or blemish of any sort. But, one may wonder 
whether lying is a virtue, or whether the act of lying is devoid of any moral blemish. And, if 
Plato’s politician, who is situated in an ideal world, cannot avoid telling a lie - hence com-
                                            
29 Even more ironic, perhaps, is the fact that the vision of societal harmony Plato so 
strenuously seeks to maintain in his ideal Republic is maintained by a lie. See Plato (The 
Republic) and Parrish (2007). I discuss the possibility of societal harmony and its 
implications for the dynamic account of DH in chapters 5, 6 and 7.  
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mitting what, seems to be an act of immorality - what of much less ideal circumstances 
then? For what is worth, even Jimmy Carter - one of the proponents of the Platonic Ideal 
and the view of innocence - failed to import and incorporate the honesty which purportedly 
characterizes morality into the realm of politics and of political action (the 1976 pamphlet 
published in Harper’s magazine entitled ‘Jimmy Carter’s pathetic lies’ is suggestive here30). 
To be clear, I do not wish to provide a comprehensive critique of the view of innocence or 
of the Platonic Ideal here. What I want to highlight though is that, there is no reason to sup-
pose that we should be armed with an a priori guarantee of the proposition that harmony is 
somewhere to be found. Nor is this proposition easily demonstrable if we fall back on the 
ordinary resources of experience and empirical observation. 
 
  2.5. Conclusion  
 
  My aim in this chapter was to consider where the orthodox way of thinking about 
the problem of DH comes from. In so doing, I sought to outline a view which has been se-
verely criticized by standard DH theorists as idealistic and which seems to sit well with the 
popular way of reflecting on political morality I have outlined in chapter 1: the view of in-
nocence or clean hands. I suggested that, moral innocence (as criticized by proponents of 
the standard DH thesis) refers to the absence of guilt or culpability: one is innocent and 
morally perfect iff one’s actions or deeds are always morally right tout court. I then sought 
to clarify this view and its implications, by turning to two of our most predominant moral 
theories - Utilitarianism and Kantianism - which, according to proponents of the standard 
DH thesis constitute the two most prominent sources of expression of this view. Their dif-
ferences aside, both such theories share a very particular way of reflecting on political mo-
rality. This boils down to the postulation that morality must be premised on a summum bo-
num - a fundamental and universal moral principle. Intertwined with this postulation, is the 
‘covering law’ model of morality: moral perfection and innocence is plausible as long as we 
                                            
30 See Brill (1976). 
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ensure that our actions consistently adhere to such an overarching moral principle. As I have 
additionally explained, at the core of the view of innocence lies a version of the Platonic 
Ideal, what I have termed, The Non-Remainders Thesis: the conviction that moral conflicts 
either within individual morality or between morality and politics are perfectly resolvable in 
an action guiding sense and carry no significant moral remainder. What this view conse-
quently denies or seeks to suppress, is the possibility of moral conflict or tragedy. For, since 
moral values are ultimately combinable and compatible into a perfect and harmonious 
whole, a clear-headed person cannot encounter irresolvable moral problems; all immorali-
ties emanate from our own irrational mistakes and are (at least in principle) eliminable.   
 
But I have also registered a prima facie uneasiness about the assumption of harmo-
ny that underpins the view of innocence. Whilst it was not my principal aim here to chal-
lenge the view of innocence or the Platonic Ideal, I have suggested that the assumption of 
harmony is hard to defend in practice. Nor do we have any reason to presuppose that con-
flict between morality and politics should not be intrinsic to a theoretical account of political 
ethics. In the next chapter, I shall turn to an alternative account of political morality which 
seems to take the possibility of conflict between morality and politics - and consequently the 
possibility of imperfection and tragedy - more seriously, and which presents a serious chal-
lenge to the view of innocence: the standard DH thesis. 
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3.   The Standard Dirty Hands Thesis 
 
The implication that something can be right without being expedient, 
Or being expedient without being right, 
is the most pernicious error that could be introduced to human life. 
    Cicero
31 
 
There are great occasions in which some men are called 
to great services, in the doing of which they are excused 
from the common rule of morality. 
          Oliver Cromwell
32 
 
3.1. Introduction  
 
In the previous chapter, I outlined a familiar way of reflecting on political morality 
which has invited considerable criticism by proponents of the standard dirty hands (DH) 
thesis: the view of innocence. In this chapter, I want to consider the contemporary DH thesis 
as an alternative account of political morality. Doing so, might enable us to break away 
from certain assumptions and insights of the view of innocence which appear to be less than 
satisfactory: the conviction that the conflict between morality and politics is only apparent 
and fictitious.   
   
Before outlining the aims of this chapter in more detail, let me open with an example, so 
as to sharpen the focus. On September 18
th
, 1949, Sir Stafford Cripps, then Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, announced the devaluation of the British pound. Though much has been 
written surrounding the rationale of this policy, I want to draw attention to a less cited as-
pect of the case - one which lies at the heart of the controversial questions which politics has 
tended to pose regarding the authority of our common moral understandings. When Cripps 
announced the decision to take the British pound off the Gold Standard, Churchill pointed 
                                            
31 De Officiis, II.9  
32 Memoirs, 567 
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out that Cripps had publically denied this possibility, even though he had already made his 
decision. In short, Cripps intentionally lied and deceived (Hazlitt, 1960; Fleishman et al, 
1981). By revealing his true intentions, Cripps would have precipitated a financial crisis 
undermining any benefits that the devaluation would have otherwise achieved. On the other 
hand, lying is considered to be a morally unacceptable act, especially if done to Parliament 
as it renders proper decision-making by representatives impossible. Cripps’ case provokes a 
question which still perplexes political philosophers: How should we evaluate decisions 
where moral wrongdoing often becomes an essential means towards the fulfilment of signif-
icant political ends? The way this question is addressed raises interesting implications for 
the way we think about political ethics. As Igor Primoratz (2007) and David Shugarman 
(2000a) indicate, there exist two distinct responses to the above question: i) the morality as 
‘seamless view’, or the ‘closure view’33 and ii) the dirty hands (DH) thesis which is mostly 
owed to Michael Walzer (1973; 1977).  
 
The ‘morality as seamless view’, captured in Cicero’s remark in the title quote and tracea-
ble back to the teachings of Plato, holds that moral politics is far from an oxymoron. Rather, 
ordinary moral considerations are of fundamental significance in the evaluation of political 
actions. This contention is akin to the view of innocence: the apparent conflict is perfectly re-
solved via the application of a moral principle. As a consequence of this harmonious solution, 
the agent’s innocence remains intact. On the one hand, deontologists suggest that politicians 
should serve the public’s interest via honest means, rather than resorting to cruelty and decep-
tion (Garret, 1996; Shugarman, 2000a). Assessed through the conventional Kantian lens, 
Cripps’ decision to lie was immoral; lying is always wrong, and should be avoided no matter 
the circumstances. The strict deontological position holds that, since one’s duty is one’s duty, 
morality demanded from Cripps to reveal the truth, and that is all there is to say: case closed. 
On the other hand, utilitarians would suggest that, if Cripps’ lie maximized the utility of the 
                                            
33 This is alternatively termed as the moralistic view of politics (Bok, 1989; Garret, 1996). 
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greatest number (and because only one prospective action can bring about the best end-result), 
all other actions are deemed immoral. Cripps was morally right to lie: case closed. If the only 
way of avoiding a financial catastrophe was for Cripps to lie, many people would agree that 
this is what he should have done. However, in doing so, should his actions be characterized as 
right, tout court?  
 
Against this view, and in line with Cromwell’s suggestion in the title quote, the standard 
DH thesis holds that, in certain circumstances, public officials may face a paradox of action: 
they may be required both from a normative and a prudential perspective to do or tolerate 
things that are wrong, even sometimes genuinely evil and morally unacceptable (c.f. Walzer, 
1973; Klockars, 1980; Dovi, 2005; Coady, 1993; 2000; 2009; de Wijze, 1994; de Wijze & 
Goodwin, 2009; Stocker, 1990; Garret, 1996; Shugarman, 2000a; Primoratz, 2007; Blattberg, 
2013). So, whilst lying is wrong and ought to be avoided, Cripps’ decision to lie, in this cir-
cumstance, was justified, even laudatory. Simply put, Cripps’ decision is right, all things con-
sidered, but also somehow wrongful.  
 
The discussion in this chapter is organized in four parts. In the first part, I offer a prelimi-
nary consideration of the standard DH thesis, discussing (what its proponents perceive to be) 
its historical and terminological origins and the general idea underpinning it. In the second 
part, I build on Michael Walzer’s compelling suggestion surrounding the distinctive nature of 
political action and offer an understanding of DH as a problem of political morality. In partic-
ular, I shall examine the key conceptual features and implications of the standard DH thesis 
and extrapolate them as a set of propositions. Then, I suggest that, whilst DH will remain in-
escapably a political problem, in order to grapple fully with the complexity inherent in the 
paradox, it is necessary to conceive DH as a philosophical problem. Doing so, shall enable us 
to elucidate the way DH theorists challenge the hopeful premises and implications of the view 
of innocence. In the fourth and final part, I consider how, according to Walzer’s (1973; 1977) 
‘Catholic’ account, the democratic politician should respond to the dirt on his hands. In so 
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doing, I want to register a doubt as to whether the standard DH thesis is ultimately that differ-
ent from the view of innocence. As I show, whilst proponents of the standard DH thesis pur-
port to capture the recognition that morality and politics conflict, they simultaneously contend 
that there might be a way out of this conflict. In short, the orthodox way of thinking about the 
problem of DH suggests that sanitizing political life is not implausible: there could, in fact, 
exist a way for the dirty politician to restore his forgone innocence.  
  
Despite this last proviso, the standard DH thesis seems to provide a considerable ad-
vance on the way we think about political morality. In contrast to the harmonious and uni-
fied view of our moral cosmos advanced by the view of innocence, the standard DH thesis 
purports to capture a more nuanced, realistic and disunited aspect of political morality: at 
the core of this thesis lies the recognition that the innocence of the political agent, though 
indispensable, is far from guaranteed. The existence of plural values stemming from the dis-
unity between ordinary or private and political or public morality may, in certain scenarios, 
conflict and give rise to the phenomenon of inescapable moral wrongdoing. In short, ortho-
dox accounts of DH - by virtue of their purported acknowledgment of moral conflict - seem 
to reveal pessimistic insights surrounding the possibility of innocence and perfection in poli-
tics: the fragmented and messy nature of our moral reality deems inescapable certain ‘living, 
forced and momentous’ situations, to borrow the phrase from William James (1896). In 
these tragic situations, the politician is confronted with the prospect of having to sacrifice 
his innocence and, in the absence of some form of expiatory punishment or catharsis, be-
come morally tainted. 
 
3.2. Innocence Lost and the Standard DH thesis: Some Preliminary Consid-
erations  
 
 
Even though the concept of DH is relatively new, the image which the metaphor of dirt 
evokes is an ancient one, and partly underpins the tendency of our philosophical tradition to 
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intertwine the ideas of morality, innocence and cleanliness and to oppose them to a bundle 
of concepts employed to denote immorality, such as those of dirt and pollution. The expres-
sions of ‘one dirtying his hands’ and ‘washing one’s hands in innocence’ originate in the 
Bible. A local murder required the community’s elders to slay a calf, wash their hands in its 
innocent blood and testify “our hands did not shed this blood” (Deuteronomy, 21: 6-7; quot-
ed in Kaptein & Wempe, 2002: 175). It is also in the Bible where we find perhaps the best 
known image surrounding the problem of DH. Faced with a lynch mob of his Jewish sub-
jects demanding the death of a Nazarene troublemaker, Pilate took water and washed his 
hands before the masses, saying “I am innocent of the blood of this just person: see ye to it” 
(Matt. 27:24; quoted in Hollis, 1982: 394). But the term dirty hands employed in discussions 
surrounding political morality in fact derives from Jean-Paul Sartre’s play Les Mains Sales, 
which dramatizes the relationship between morality and the demands of realpolitik
34
 (c.f. 
Walzer, 1973; de Wijze, 2005; Khawaja, 2004; 2008; Klockars, 1980). The exchange be-
tween Hugo, a young idealist, and Hoerderer, the revolutionary leader of the ‘underground’ 
communist party, is taken by proponents of the standard DH thesis to be particularly illumi-
nating, as it provides an insight into the key idea of this problem: 
 
Hoerderer: How you cling to your purity young man! How afraid 
you are to soil your hands! All right, stay pure! What good will it 
do? Why did you join us? Purity is an idea for a yogi, or a monk … 
To do nothing, to remain motionless, arms at your sides, wearing 
kid gloves. Well, I have dirty hands. Right up to the elbows. I’ve 
plunged them in filth and blood. But what do you hope? Do you 
think you can govern innocently? (Sartre, 1955: 224) 
 
Hugo is left with a question which continues to plague moral and political philosophers: Do 
you think you can govern innocently? As standard DH theorists indicate, Hoerderer’s haunt-
                                            
34 Realpolitik refers to realistic and practical politics rather than abstract moral 
considerations. 
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ing and powerful question possesses a sole, clear and disturbing implication: in line with St-
Just’s blithe remark that ‘no one can govern innocently’, Hoerderer chillingly suggests that 
they who possess political power and are borne with the responsibility of good and success-
ful governance, must almost inevitably dirty their hands. They are, in short, compelled to 
commit actions which are morally heinous and thereby lose their innocence (Walzer, 1973; 
de Wijze 1994; 2005; Lukes, 1986; Shugarman, 2000a). It is precisely this striking proposi-
tion, the acknowledged impossibility of governing innocently which constitutes the defining 
feature of the standard DH thesis.  
 
Moreover, the incompatibility and ultimately the loss of moral innocence which results 
from one’s engagement in politics is typically traced to the works of Niccolo Machiavelli 
(The Prince) and Max Weber (1946) who warn us that politics does not provide a fertile 
ground for the salvation of one’s soul. It is, however, the Renaissance Florentine who is so 
often perceived to be the locus classicus of DH. For, as Steve de Wijze explains, “Machia-
velli … the father of contemporary dirty hands theory, was the first to bluntly state that suc-
cess in the world of realpolitik” requires one “to act in ways that are in conflict with com-
passion, forgiveness, fairness, and justice” (2005: 455). Machiavelli’s disquieting recogni-
tion that it is necessary for politicians “to learn how not to be good and to use this 
knowledge or not use it according to necessity” (The Prince, 15: 61) has become the mantra 
of DH theorists
35
. Despite all its infamy, this quote from The Prince features proudly in 
most contemporary analyses of DH, including Walzer’s (1973) eloquent account which con-
stitutes the standard way of thinking about this problem.  
 
                                            
35“Machiavelli” is, according to Walzer, “the first man to state the paradox” of DH (1973: 
175). De Wijze and Goodwin add that the DH thesis captures the “lesson we ought to take 
from Machiavelli”: that politicians need “to learn to not be good” (2009: 531). See also 
Griffin (1989), Tinder (1986), Winston (1994), Ramsay (2000a; 2000b), Coady (1993; 
2004; 2008; 2009), Blattberg (2013), Shugarman (2000a, 2000b) and Primoratz (2007).  
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To be clear, I do not wish to suggest that the standard DH thesis adequately captures 
Machiavelli’s insights on what it really means to have DH in politics. For, as I shall demon-
strate in this thesis, proponents of the standard DH thesis actually misinterpret and displace 
Machiavelli’s (and Sartre’s) ideas on political morality and conflict: they mischaracterize 
both the nature and the extent of the conflict between morality and politics
36
. This point 
forms a part of the prima facie doubt I wish to register against the standard DH thesis in the 
fourth section of this chapter and which I shall develop in more detail in the next chapters. 
What I merely want to emphasize for now though is this: the key insight of the standard DH 
thesis, according to its proponents, can be traced to the ideas of Machiavelli. And this in-
sight, they maintain, captures the realities of politics neatly: it involves the recognition that, 
in certain tragic scenarios, an innocent course of action is unfeasible. It is to a more careful 
consideration of this conventional understanding of DH, one of the “central feature[s] of 
political life” (Walzer, 1973: 162), and its underlying objective presuppositions, compo-
nents and implications I now turn.   
             
3. 3. DH as a Political Problem: Core Conceptual Features of the Standard 
DH Thesis 
 
 
“All Kings is mostly rapscallions”, Huckleberry Finn noted (Twain, 2005: 167). Huck’s 
observation forms one of the core themes of Walzer’s justly famous article, entitled Politi-
cal Action: the Problem of Dirty Hands. Walzer initially draws on, and reaffirms the re-
marks of his predecessors, expounding the “conventional wisdom”, the wisdom of the rest 
                                            
36 I should add here that, in advancing this claim, I shall also identify a neglected rift in the 
DH literature. For, my analysis suggests that, philosophers such as Stuart Hampshire (1989), 
Martin Hollis (1982), Richard Bellamy (2010), Sue Mendus (1988; 2009a; 2009b) and 
Bernard Williams (1978) who we may label DH theorists advance a more nuanced and 
realistic account of DH - one which is alive to Machiavelli’s insights on political ethics and 
conflict. In chapter 4, I shall draw on their accounts in order to question the extent to which 
the standard DH thesis captures Machiavelli’s insights on conflict, pluralism and DH.     
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of us, that politicians are a “good deal worse, morally worse, than the rest of us”. (1973: 
162). This disquieting suggestion seems to be in line with the recent cries of political exas-
peration I documented in chapter 1, as well as our often cynical intuitions surrounding the 
world of politics - our perception of it as a ‘dirty’ business. In recent decades, we have wit-
nessed some astonishing and wide-ranging acts of immorality amongst our public officials, 
spanning from expenses claims for pornographic videos and non-existent mortgages. In 
Thomas Nagel’s words, “the great modern crimes” have always tended to be “public 
crimes” (1978: 75). With politicians perceived as self-serving manipulators, we have come 
to expect them to take bribes, abuse public funds and cheat on their spouses. It is indeed 
remarkably difficult to evade the commonplace perception of politics as an unsavoury do-
main; and like Huck, Hoerderer and Machiavelli, Walzer seems to suggest that it is impos-
sible for one not to pick up some of the odour and dirt that goes with its territory.   
 
There appear to be various reasons, though, why Walzer’s observation surrounding the 
morally dirty status of our politicians is valid, some of which are also acknowledged by the 
view of innocence. For example, one may be irrational or wicked and immoral tout court. 
Nonetheless, the standard DH thesis explains such a ‘conventional wisdom’ with reference 
to another, far more intriguing and disquieting, set of cases. Like the Cripps incident men-
tioned above, cases involving DH are thought to reveal the complex moral choices associat-
ed with political action. Unlike cases involving irrationality or pure wickedness, where the 
agent’s internal impulses lead him to a failure to adopt a readily available and morally right 
avenue, in situations involving DH, the political agent is incapable of acting in a tout court 
morally right manner, because no such option is a priori available.  
 
“The special intrigue of dirty hands”, Anthony Cunningham writes, “revolves around 
the idea that a morally sticky situation is thrust upon us and threatens our innocence through 
no fault of our own” (1992: 240). This is a crucial point which needs to be emphasized, for 
it provides an insight into what the paradox of DH assumes and what it involves in general. 
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Walzer’s discussion of DH departs from the assumption that the homo politicus under con-
sideration is “the sort of man who will not lie, cheat, bargain behind the backs of his sup-
porters, shout absurdities at public meetings, or manipulate other[s]” (1973: 165). In es-
sence, DH is particularly striking as it confronts morally good and innocent men who enter 
political life, “aiming at some specific reform or seeking a general reformation” (Walzer, 
1973: 164). 
  
Taking a cue from Walzer, the literature on DH distinguishes between acts of DH and 
those who inescapably suffer moral corruption through their sincere efforts to govern well 
on the one hand, and the morally dubious activities of the purely immoral and wicked on the 
other (c.f. Stocker, 1990; 2000; Gowans, 2001; Calhoun, 2004). The latter encompass a 
wide range of sleazy acts: “breaking the law for one’s own advantage, stealing from public 
funds” and “enriching oneself or securing sinecures for one’s family” (Williams, 1978: 56- 
57). Such acts, de Wijze explains, are unjustifiably immoral, as they constitute ‘violations of 
an important normative principle or duty for unjustifiable motivations such as greed or self-
aggrandisement’ (2005: 468). In short, sleazy acts tend to be employed out of opportunism: 
the pursuit of self- interest with guile (Williamson, 1979; 1985; 1991; Milgrom & Roberts; 
1992). In contrast, acts of DH involve immoral “actions or omissions occurring within a 
'harness of necessity' ” (de Wijze, 2005: 468). While in cases of unjustifiable immorality 
and mere sleaze, the character of the agent is said to be in need of reform, in cases involving 
DH “no reform of the agent's character or behaviour is necessary” (de Wijze, 2005: 466- 
469). For, as argued, the wrongdoing in question does not stem from internal immoral im-
pulses, but is rather externally imposed and, in a way, tragically forced upon the agent
37
. 
Compared to the immoralities of the purely immoral or the wicked, then, in scenarios in-
                                            
37As Sue Mendus puts it, DH theorists are not “especially interested in sleaze or scandal”. 
Their emphasis is not the expenses and sex scandals that often hit the headlines. Rather, DH 
theorists focus on politicians “who do what is wrong in the service of some nobler - usually 
political - end” (2009a: 1).  
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volving DH, an innocent political agent is moved by political reasons to commit moral vio-
lations.  
 
These moral violations, DH theorists argue, may be necessary for promoting the greater 
good. This feature is implicitly captured in one of the two examples discussed by Walzer 
(1973). Walzer presents us with a presidential candidate who is initially morally innocent, 
wanting to do good and only good, aspiring to put an end to corruption and other brutal 
abuses of power. This theme becomes central to his political campaign. His moral principles 
and innocence are soon nonetheless tested: in order to win the election, he must make a deal 
with an immoral ward boss, involving the granting of construction contracts during the time 
which he will serve in office. If the man sticks to his principles, he will fail to fulfil his pre-
election promises. This decision would not only lead to a failure to promote the public good 
and eliminate corruption, but it would also contradict the politician’s decision to run for of-
fice, which requires from him “to try to win, that is, to do within rational limits whatever is 
necessary to win” (Walzer, 1973: 165). Failure to do so, Walzer suggests, would make a 
mockery of the politician’s decision to run for presidency, which was a commitment to the 
electorate and to those of us who regard the election as significant.  
 
Apart from the promotion of the common good, acts of DH may be unavoidable and ob-
ligatory in situations where the political agent is forced to select between the “upholding of 
an important moral principle and the avoidance of some looming disaster” (Walzer, 1973: 
160). This is evident in Cripps’ case, but it is more dramatically presented in situations of 
‘supreme emergency’, as discussed in Walzer’s Just and Unjust Wars. In such cases, Walzer 
(1977) explains, the ‘harness of necessity’ has a far more tragic flavour: the necessary im-
morality extends beyond mere acts of lying and deception to unavoidable acts of brutality 
and cruelty. One example of a supreme emergency is found in Walzer’s (1973) Ticking 
Bomb Scenario (TBS). This example is worth considering for two reasons. First, the TBS 
has become a paradigm case of DH as it is often employed in contemporary discussions sur-
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rounding the question of whether torture could be justifiable
38
. Second, despite the fact that 
this example is typically taken by standard DH theorists as indicative of the incapacity of 
the view of innocence to grapple the realities of politics, in the next chapter I shall suggest 
that the TBS is in itself a highly idealized and romanticized example. This point constitutes 
part of the wider and more all-encompassing critique I shall advance against the standard 
DH thesis - that it is inadequately ‘static’: it captures neither the realities of politics nor the 
extent and the nature of the rupture between morality and politics.    
 
So, what I want to emphasize here is that standard DH theorists often invoke the TBS in 
order to suggest that the contention that torture is absolutely unjustifiable within liberal de-
mocracies is insensitive to the realities of politics. To be sure, the conviction that torture 
should invariably appear “on the ‘never’ list of the ‘forbiddens’ of human politics”, to use 
Jean-Bethke Elshtain’s words, is neither novel nor uncommon (2004: 77). And this is not 
without reason: the very history and identity of a large strand of our philosophical tradition 
in general and that of liberal democracy in particular is seemingly tied up with an absolute 
prohibition of torture. Torture, Michael Ignatieff (2004) explains, is an anathema to liberal 
democracy as it expresses the view that human beings are expendable. After all, few issues 
have been more settled in morality than torture: “the eradication of the moral basis for tor-
ture”, Kutz writes, “has been one of the defining features of post-Enlightenment liberal poli-
tics” (2007: 235- 239). In a statement reflective of a large portion of the Enlightenment 
thought, Beccaria denounced torture as a “residue of the most barbarous centuries” (2003: 
3). Similarly, this disgust for torture is naturally echoed in the Kantian postulation that such 
                                            
38As Cohan observes, “much of the commentary on torture has alluded to the necessity 
doctrine as justification for torturing a suspect who likely has information concerning a 
‘ticking bomb” (2007: 1587). For discussions on the torture debate see Ignatieff (2004), de 
Wijze (2006), Calo (2009), Gaeta (2004), Meissels (2007), Kamm (2004), Levinson (2004) 
and Greenberg (2006).  
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acts are absolutely unjustifiable, as they fail to treat persons as ends in themselves 
39
 (see 
chapter 2). Recently however, with the rise of terrorism in the post 9/11 era, there have been 
suggestions that the action-guiding prescriptions of the absolutist position against torture 
might not always cohere with the realities of successful political action. In other words, po-
litical officials in liberal democracies may be at least partially justified in resorting to the 
use of torture against captured terrorists in order to divulge life-saving information
40
. It is 
this very suggestion which lies at the heart of Walzer’s TBS.  
 
The TBS, a classic example of an ‘extrication’ problem (Coady, 1993), imagines a poli-
tician who, on coming to power, inherits a colonial war. During his campaign, the politician 
has publicly pledged peace and de-colonization. While opening negotiations with the rebels, 
his capital becomes the target of a terrorist bombing campaign. As a result, his first decision 
as the new leader is hardly an enviable one. He is asked “to authorise the torture of a cap-
tured rebel leader who knows or probably knows the location of bombs hidden in buildings 
around the city, set to go off within the next twenty-four hours” (Walzer, 1973: 167). 
Walzer’s politician is faced with two terrible options. If he decides to authorise torture he 
commits a terrible moral wrong, one that runs contrary to his moral convictions and pre-
election promises which condemned torture as abominable. Yet, if the politician refuses to 
torture the prisoner, he is doomed to violate his primary responsibility to protect citizens 
from harm, failing to fulfil the duties of his office (Walzer, 1973; Nagel, 1972).  
 
In circumstances where the DH problem is inescapable then, the political agent is tragi-
cally confronted with, what has been termed, a moral dilemma. The problem of DH, Walzer 
tells us, specifically stems from an effort “to refuse ‘absolutism’ without denying the reality 
of a moral dilemma” (1973: 162). Returning to the TBS for a moment, and following 
                                            
39 The Kantian point is also advanced (albeit in a slightly different way) by Ramsay (2006; 
2011) and Sussman (2005).  
40 This is also suggested by Ignatieff and Elshtain despite their conviction that torture is an 
anathema.    
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McConnell (1978; 2010) and Sinnott-Armstrong (1987a; 1987b), such a dilemma can be 
conceptually represented and generalized in the following way: i) the political agent is mor-
ally required, or ought to perform, each of two (or more) actions; the agent ought to do A (in 
the TBS A represents the ‘absolutist horn’ of Nagel’s (1972) and Walzer’s (1973) dilemma, 
and refers to refraining from torturing the prisoner, in accordance to the Kantian picture of 
morality) and B (where B refers to protecting the community and promoting the common 
good in accordance to utilitarian/ consequentialist moral predicaments); ii) it is physically 
possible to perform either of these actions separately but both (or all) of the alternatives 
cannot be adopted together and at the same time
41
.  
 
The DH problem is such that the politician is being tragically caught between two con-
flicting and competing reasons for action, between utility and rights, which the agent is 
morally required to obey. But this problem is not merely one which stems from a rupture 
within morality. More specifically, DH is also said to stem from a rupture between morality 
and politics, each characterized by its own values: the paradox conceptually arises from 
what is, from one point of view, the pursuit of the overall public good and the fulfilment of 
one’s political duties, possible only by committing, what is from another point of view, that 
of ordinary morality, morally unacceptable acts (Nagel, 1972; Lukes, 1986). In Walzer’s 
words, the DH dilemma arises because there is a clash between the politician’s “political 
judgements, which are consequentialist in character” with the “moral judgements” of private 
or ordinary life, which are deontological (1973: 175). In short, the political agent is commit-
ted on the one hand to the consequentialist picture, which would promote an expedient polit-
ical decision, and on the other, to a view of ordinary morality, in which the notion of deon is 
central. Here, according to Walzer, there is an echo of Weber’s (Machiavellian) indication 
that: 
                                            
41 A third criterion may be added to make explicit what is implicit in the above conditions: 
iii) there can be no option whereby refusing to adopt either of the competing oughts serves 
as a means to avoid the conflict (Stocker, 1990; de Wijze, 1994).  
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There is an abysmal contrast between the conduct that follows the 
maxim of an ethics of ultimate ends- that is, in religious terms, ‘the 
Christian does rightly and leaves results with the Lord’- and that 
which follows an ethic of responsibility, in which case one has to 
give an account of the foreseeable results one’s action (1946: 120).  
 
Hence, the standard DH thesis suggests that the political responsibilities held by our politi-
cal leaders are bound at times to conflict with absolutist principles which ought to bind eve-
ry moral agent in private or social life; the political agent, once confronted with such a puz-
zle, is doomed to choose between “two courses of action both of which it would be wrong 
for him to undertake” (Walzer, 1973: 160). As a minimal requirement then, the DH problem 
is conceptually premised on the acceptance of the possibility that, in certain tragic circum-
stances, the politician’s act is bound to contain elements of moral wrongfulness42. 
 
However, pace Kai Nielsen (2000), Howard Curzer (2006) and Irfan Khajawa (2004; 
2008), and despite Walzer’s (1973) rather obscure and vague choice of terminology, this is 
not to suggest that a choice cannot be made by the politician, or that the DH problem is con-
ceptually underpinned by a genuine moral dilemma, in a technical philosophical sense. A 
genuine moral dilemma is generally understood as a moral circumstance where ‘an all 
things considered’ right answer to the choice the agent faces is clearly absent, as neither of 
the conflicting moral requirements overrides the other in any relevant way; in other words 
acting in accordance to A or B are equally morally wrong
43
 (Stocker, 1990; de Wijze, 1994; 
Coady, 2009; Parrish, 2007; Kis, 2008). In most scenarios discussed in the DH literature, 
even if the political agent is bound to be morally guilty if he employs either of the two alter-
natives or ‘oughts’, an all-things-considered morally right or justified answer seems to exist. 
 
                                            
42 See de Wijze, (1994; 1996), Stocker, (2000), Lukes, (2005), Winston (1994) and Parrish, 
(2007). This view is also expressed by Williams (1981; 1990) in relation to moral dilemmas.  
43 A genuine moral dilemma is characterized by a sort of symmetry and incomparability. 
See Sinnott- Armstrong (1987a; 1987b), McConnell (2010) and Gowans (1990; 2001). 
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Despite “the numerous virtues of the absolutist position”, Walzer notes, “we would not 
want to be governed by men who consistently adopted that position” and allowed absolutist 
moral precepts to guide their political thinking and actions in all situations (1973: 162). The 
TBS constitutes one such case. Walzer is adamant that in the occurrence of such a tragic 
scenario the politician should “order the man tortured, convinced that he must do so for the 
sake of the people who might otherwise die in the explosions -even though he believes that 
torture is wrong, indeed abominable, not just sometimes, but always” (1973: 167). “Here is 
the moral politician”, Walzer says, “It is by his dirty hands that we know him. If he were a 
moral man and nothing else, his hands would not be dirty” (1973: 168). Though acts of tor-
ture are seen as no less barbarous than in the days of Beccaria, to maintain the Kantian max-
im “better the whole people should perish” than that injustice be done (1965: 100) and re-
fuse to get one’s hands dirty even ‘if the heavens fall’ is not just to overlook the realities of 
politics for the sake of an abstract action-guiding prescription. To refrain from torturing the 
prisoner in this circumstance would also ignore the central place which the notion of politi-
cal responsibility invariably holds at the heart of our conceptions of political morality. In 
short, to adopt the absolutist action-guiding prescription is either to be condemned to politi-
cal impotence and inexpedience or to risk committing even greater atrocities in the effort to 
make a recalcitrant world fit into one’s scheme of unattainable innocence. Thus, as Walzer 
puts it, “it must be right to get one’s hands dirty. But one's hands get dirty from doing what 
it is wrong to do. And how can it be wrong to do what is right? Or, how can we get our 
hands dirty by doing what we ought to do? (1973: 164).  
 
Despite the frequent disputes between DH theorists regarding the question of how to 
terminologically capture this problem, there is a notable agreement over the above concep-
tual point
44
. And it is precisely this conceptual point that partly renders the DH problem so 
                                            
44 I am referring here to de Wijze’s (1994), Stocker’s (2000) and Curzer’s (2006) 
suggestion that Walzer’s definition of DH as a moral dilemma is obscure. The differences 
between such theorists are merely terminological though - whereas Walzer (1973) and 
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provocative. For, the standard DH thesis acknowledges the existence of a paradox of action: 
in certain tragic circumstances, politicians are confronted with the prospect of ‘doing wrong 
in order to do right’ (Walzer 1973; Stocker, 1990; de Wijze, 1994; 2005; 2009). In other 
words, the DH thesis does not suggest that it is impossible to do “the right thing while gov-
erning” (Walzer, 1973; 161), or that, what de Wijze (1994; 2005; 2009), Ignatieff (2004), 
Hampshire (1989), Maskaliunaite (2007) and Lukes (2005) term as, the ‘lesser evil’, a moral 
choice which has more stringency, is not available. Rather, it advances the claim “that a par-
ticular act of government (in a political party or in the state) may be exactly the right thing 
to do in utilitarian terms and yet leave the man who does it guilty of a moral wrong” 
(Walzer 1973: 161). As Walzer similarly notes in Emergency Ethics, once confronted with 
such a dilemma, the politician should opt for the ‘utilitarianism or consequentialism of ex-
tremity’ which re-imposes itself; ergo the politician partially and momentarily overrides the 
‘rights normality’ (Walzer, 2004a: 40). Whilst the consequentialism of extremity is condu-
cive to politically successful and expedient action, it is simultaneously abominable if such 
an act is viewed through the lens of the deontological ethics operative in ordinary morality 
or private life. 
 
As DH theorists indicate, the DH dilemma reflects the distinct characteristics of politi-
cal life, and the ways it differs from ordinary morality or private life in general (Walzer, 
1973; 2004a; 2004b; Weber, 1946; Bellamy, 2010; Buckler, 1993). It comes as no surprise 
then, that the foundations of the orthodox way of thinking about the problem of DH are said 
to be premised on the thought of Machiavelli. The standard DH thesis grants certain special 
immoral permissions to political leaders, when the predicaments of political expedience and 
traditional (or private) morality conflict and take divergent and mutually exclusive routes. 
Politics is a dirty business; consequently the problem of DH can be seen as a natural entail-
                                                                                                                           
Nagel (1972) describe DH as ‘moral dilemmas’, Stocker (1990; 2000) and de Wijze (1994; 
1996; 2009) employ the term ‘moral conflicts’. Despite their criticism of Walzer’s choice of 
terminology they agree that DH involves actions which are justified but wrong.  
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ment of the dirtiness of the political arena. This disquieting assertion, which acknowledges 
the special, different and discontinuous nature and demands of politics from private or ordi-
nary morality lies at the core of Walzer’s defence of such a ‘conventional wisdom’, and is 
reinforced by three interrelated arguments, which I will explore in the next chapter.  
 
But for the moment, all that needs to be highlighted is that the essence of the DH prob-
lem is that in fighting evil and promoting good, the political agent is simultaneously com-
pelled to implement evil and ‘temporize’ with it (de Wijze, 2006). As George Orwell puts it:  
 
We see the need of engaging in politics while also seeing what a 
dirty, degrading business it is. And most of us still have a lingering 
belief that every political choice, is between good and evil, and that 
if a thing is necessary it is also right. We should get rid of this be-
lief which belongs to the nursery! In politics one can never do more 
than decide which of the two evils is the lesser, and there are some 
situations from which one can only escape by acting like a devil or 
a lunatic (1961: 434).  
 
In DH scenarios, the political agent is prevented from engaging in a proper, morally pure, 
reaction to evil. As Weber remarks, the agent “contracts with diabolical powers and for his 
action it is not true that good can follow only from good and evil only from evil, but that 
often the opposite is true” (1946: 125). The paradox is such that “in numerous instances the 
attainment of ‘good’ ends is bound to the fact that one must be willing to pay the price of 
using morally dubious means or at least dangerous ones” (Weber, 1946: 121). This dual 
structure, the simultaneous coexistence of good and evil or moral rightfulness and wrong-
ness in such acts, is also captured in Machiavelli’s assertion that “while the act accuses, the 
result excuses” (Discourses: 139). It is seemingly odd and contradictory to say that a politi-
cal agent is worse for doing his political duty and that he deserves, at the same time, both 
praise and severe moral criticism - that he behaves, in Orwell’s words, ‘like a devil or a lu-
natic’ . Yet, this oddness is one of the defining features of DH; this phenomenon apparently 
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engenders an inescapable no-win situation for the politician as he is morally worse for per-
forming his duty, but even far worse for failing to do so (Walzer, 1973; Nagel, 1972; Cun-
ningham, 1992).  
 
Therefore, the insights of the standard DH thesis extend beyond the mere conse-
quentialist suggestion that the ends fully justify the means. This problem, Walzer explains, 
relates not only “to the coherence and harmony of the moral universe, but also to the relative 
ease or difficulty-or impossibility-of living a moral life” (1973: 161). The structure of the 
paradox is such that, in order to promote the good of the community and fight evil, the poli-
tician must justifiably become morally corrupted, by sacrificing and compromising his abso-
lutist moral principles. In doing so, the ex ante morally innocent agent gets his hands dirty 
ex post, and consequently loses his innocence, as such actions, are in their very detail im-
moral and not definitive of an innocent man. In Walzer’s words “the innocent man is no 
longer innocent” (1973: 161). Rather, “now he is a guilty man” (1973: 167). The moral 
wrongfulness and dirt inherent in DH acts tarnishes not only the act itself, but also the agent 
(Stocker, 1990; 2000; de Wijze, 1994; Lukes, 1986).  
 
Let us pause for a moment to take stock and, based on the above discussion, extrap-
olate the key objective features and conceptual components of the standard DH thesis as a 
set of propositions: i) DH stems from the fact that the political agent is confronted with a 
moral dilemma. ii) Unlike cases involving immoral actions stemming from irrationality or 
pure maliciousness, the DH thesis contends that this dilemma is posed to an ex ante inno-
cent politician; this puzzle is not the product of one’s morally defective past actions or vi-
cious character. In other words, the dirty acts in such scenarios are said to inescapable - they 
are forced upon an ex ante innocent political agent. iii) The DH dilemma suggests that there 
exists a disharmony between successful political conduct and morality, as it precisely stems 
from a conflict between ordinary or private morality, characterized by a deontological ethic 
and consequentialist/ utilitarian moral concerns operative in the domain of politics. iv) Once 
 76 
 
this dilemma is posed, the politician opts for the utilitarian/ consequentialist competing im-
perative, overriding the absolutist imperatives of ordinary morality. v) Whilst the politi-
cian’s choice is perceived as the ‘all things considered’ morally right one, or the ‘lesser 
evil’, it still contains elements of moral unacceptability, to say the least. Thus, the standard 
DH thesis intriguingly stipulates that it is philosophically and practically possible for a polit-
ical action to be simultaneously composed by elements of moral rightfulness and moral 
wrongfulness. In this sense, an act of DH is one which is a) morally justified even obligato-
ry, but also b) somehow morally wrongful, if not abominable. vi) This problem not only 
morally pollutes the act ex post, but also the ex ante innocent political agent, whose innocent 
and perfectly good moral record becomes tainted as a result of his DH acts.  
 
The central claims and implications of the standard DH thesis seem to fly in the face 
of our most prominent ethical frameworks. To be sure, it is not just that the DH thesis - by 
virtue of its purported Machiavellian flavour - deems the action-guiding prescriptions of 
conventional Kantianism as unsatisfactorily abstract and insensitive to the realities of poli-
tics. The postulation that it is plausible for a political act to be simultaneously composed by 
elements of moral rightfulness and wrongfulness, morally tarnishing the political actor is 
regarded by proponents of the view of innocence as philosophically incoherent and perni-
ciously erroneous, if not sheer non-sense. This much is also suggested in Cicero’s claim in 
the title quote. In addition, contemporary absolutists such as Sharon Sutherland (2000) and 
Maureen Ramsay (2000a; 2000b) are unconvinced that an intelligible distinction between 
DH and consequentialism/ utilitarianism exists. In what follows, I shall take these two lines 
of criticism together and consider the way contemporary DH theorists typically respond to 
them. In so doing, I shall approach DH as a philosophical problem so as to examine how, 
according to its proponents, the standard DH thesis provides a considerable advance on the 
way we think about political morality vis-à-vis the view of innocence. 
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3.4. DH as a Philosophical Problem: Pluralism, Conflict and the Stand-
ard DH Thesis 
  
 The contemporary debate surrounding DH primarily revolves around the possibility 
and coherence of moral dilemmas and conflicts - and, as Walzer puts it, the “relative ease or 
difficulty-or impossibility-of living a moral life” (1973: 161). In other words, the debate 
concerns the question of whether the key insight of DH, the phenomenon of inescapable and 
justified moral wrongdoing - and consequently the loss of innocence - is a valid one
45
. As 
John Parrish (2007) points out, whilst the conceptual structure of DH is accepted without 
much argument, proponents of innocence deny that there is a problem of DH at all. Our two 
dominant moral theories, John Lemmon reminds us, are adamant that in situations of moral 
conflict “we are forced”, if we are to remain within the confines of morality and rationality, 
“to restore consistency to our code by adding exception clauses to our present principles or 
by giving priority to one principle over another or by some such device” (1965: 48). And, as 
I shall explain in due course, it is this denial of moral conflict that sustains the deeply hope-
ful view of innocence and perfection (and thereby deems the insights of the standard DH 
thesis blatantly contradictory and offensive to practical logic) that DH theorists challenge as 
unsatisfactorily idealistic.  
 
 Before proceeding any further though, it is worth emphasizing here that the view of 
innocence is not merely embraced by classical utilitarians or deontologists. Taking a cue 
from Mill and Bentham, contemporary utilitarians typically respond to suggestions of DH 
by accepting that certain apparent evil actions should, as a matter of fact, be performed or 
tolerated in order to achieve the maximum possible public utility, while in turn denying that 
such acts are morally wrongful in any way. For, whilst values may seem to conflict, to sug-
                                            
45 See Walzer (1973), Stocker (1990; 2001), de Wijze (1994; 1996) and Meissels (2007). 
The insights of DH are also accepted by proponents of moral dilemmas. See Nussbaum 
(2000; 2007), Gardner (2007), Gowans (1990; 2001), Statman (1995), Lemmon (1990), 
Marcus (1980), Williams (1990) and van Fraassen (1990). 
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gest that such conflicts are neither apparent nor perfectly resolvable is intolerable. For ex-
ample, Richard Hare suggests that simple deontological principles have their place at the 
level of character-formation, and at the intuitive level (1972; 1978). But at the more funda-
mental, what he calls the ‘critical level’, “there is a requirement that we resolve the conflict” 
that may appear between moral duties in everyday deliberation (Hare, 1981: 26). The logical 
properties of moral judgement, which entail act-utilitarianism, preclude the possibility of 
insoluble moral conflicts. At the ‘critical level’ whether an action ought to be done is deter-
mined on the basis of the goodness of its consequences vis-à-vis those of the alternative 
courses of action: where whatever we do or fail to do leads to the occurrence of evil or sus-
tains it, we do nothing wrong by doing the lesser evil. In a similar vein, Kai Nielsen stresses 
that in DH scenarios the political agent does what, all things considered, is the morally right 
thing to do: “the thing he ought - to - through and through ought- in the circumstances, to 
do” (2000: 22). In a restatement of this view, Irfan Khawaja argues that “what is morally 
right” and “what is morally expedient” should be equated and seen as converging; conse-
quently “if an act is justified, it cannot be accurately described as ‘evil’, however bloody or 
repulsive it might be” (2008: 29). Hence, when faced with a choice between two evils, a 
political leader is outright justified in choosing the option which achieves the better (or less 
bad) all-round consequences; so presumably the agent has clean hands
46
. To claim other-
wise, these philosophers insist, would reveal a conceptual mistake. In doing what one ought 
to do, the contention that we are simultaneously somehow wrongful is misguided and con-
fusing, to say the least.    
 
Similar remarks are made by more sophisticated deontological accounts, such as 
those of Alan Donagan (1977; 1990) and Kenneth Howard (1977) who generally follow 
Kant’s suggestion that morality is unitary and of a piece. Rather than facing the prospect of 
transgressing the demands of absolutism operative in ordinary morality or private life, 
                                            
46 Walzer expresses this in the following way: “even when one tortures, his hands will be 
clean, for he has done what he should do as best he can” (1973: 169).  
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Donagan reformulates the deontological position and its counterintuitive action-guiding pre-
scriptions. Contra Walzer, he suggests that common morality need not demand of the politi-
cian that she abstain from performing what DH theorists and consequentialists identify as 
the overall preferable course of action. He insists nonetheless, that such an action is fully 
morally justifiable for non-consequentialist reasons
47: the deontological principle “thou shall 
not stand idly by the blood of thy neighbour” permits the politician to torture the prisoner 
and avoid getting DH. Therefore, for the sake of rationality, and via the application of an 
abstract principle, “the problem of DH dissolves” (Donagan, 1977: 188- 189). 
 
 Again, what emerges from the arguments advanced by both sides is a version of the 
Platonic Ideal which is deeply ingrained in the view of innocence - what I have termed in 
the previous chapter as, the Non-Remainders Thesis: the belief that moral conflicts either 
within individual morality or between morality and politics are perfectly resolvable in an 
action guiding sense and carry no moral remainder. Recall that this position generally as-
sumes that all values are comparable and commensurable; a ‘lexical ordering’ of values is 
unproblematic and feasible or deontological considerations can be factored into a conse-
quentialist calculation of the overall best course of action. Moral values fit neatly into a uni-
tary and harmonious moral cosmos and, once the most preferred option is found, the com-
peting ones are immediately discarded. In Lemmon’s words, “the situation is as it is in 
mathematics: there, if an inconsistency is revealed by derivation, we are compelled to modi-
fy our axioms; here, if an inconsistency is revealed in application we are forced to revise our 
                                            
47 Others, abandon Kantian absolutism for what is called “threshold” deontology, which 
holds that deontological norms govern up to a point; but when the consequences become so 
dire that they cross the stipulated threshold, consequentialism takes over (Coady, 2009). In 
the TBS for example, the politician may not torture the prisoner to save the lives of two 
others, but he may do so to save a thousand lives if the “threshold” is higher than two lives 
but lower than a thousand. Nonetheless, with the exception of Nagel (1972) and perhaps 
Walzer’s (2004a; 2004b) later modifications of the standard DH thesis which bear a certain 
resemblance to this position, threshold deontologists usually deny the DH problem. 
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principles” and discern which course of action accords to our actual duty and rationally re-
solve such an alleged conflict (1990: 112). Although a situation may look like a moral con-
flict, it is only an apparent one. For, moral conflicts are like puzzle solving: all we have to 
do is to find the right answer. 
 
It is this postulation which has been severely criticized as unsatisfactorily idealistic 
by contemporary DH theorists. As Thomas Nagel exclaims, it is naïve and erroneous to hold 
that there exists a perfect “solution to every moral problem in which the world can face us” 
(1972: 144). This much is also suggested by Walzer who argues that, when the demands of 
political and ordinary morality collide, “we do not talk or act” as if the moral principles 
which had not been acted upon “had been set aside, cancelled, or annulled” (1973: 171). 
This is an important point that needs to be highlighted here. A central claim of the standard 
DH thesis is that attempts to deny the possibility of moral conflict deform and fail to do jus-
tice to a large portion of our evaluative world and to the realities of political action (c.f. 
Walzer, 1973; Cunningham, 1992; Stocker, 1990; de Wijze, 1994; 2006; 2009; de Wijze 
and Goodwin, 2009). To be sure, this is not to suggest that orthodox DH analyses complete-
ly reject these ideal theories. As indicated, Walzer’s conventional exposition of DH is prem-
ised on the acceptance of both of them. “These demands of deontology” and “consequential-
ism”, de Wijze points out, “all exert an influence in the complex moral lives of agents” 
(2005: 457). And it is precisely because the principles propounded by both such ideal theo-
ries are taken more seriously, that the belief propounded by each of them - that in situations 
of moral conflict an innocent course of action must exist- is deemed unsatisfactory. In other 
words, standard DH theorists suggest that our moral reality is much more complicated and 
messy than proponents of innocence would like to admit: our moral landscape is composed 
of plural values, which cannot be cashed out into a common currency of evaluation, as Mill 
and Hare believe was true for utility, nor can any such standard be given comprehensive and 
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fully overriding priority over other rival claimants, as Kant and Donagan hold for the supe-
rior standard of duty
48
.  
 
In connection to this, I should (once more) highlight two issues here. First, in addi-
tion to Machiavelli, the pluralist insights of the standard DH thesis are also traced to more 
contemporary proponents of this idea such as Isaiah Berlin, Stuart Hampshire and Bernard 
Williams, who have drawn on the Florentine’s ideas49. For instance, de Wijze tells us that: 
“I agree with philosophers such as Isaiah Berlin … who argue for a plurality of values 
which can conflict with one or another and for which there can be no rational resolution” 
(1994: 18). Second, despite their acknowledgement of Machiavelli (as well as Hampshire, 
Berlin and Williams) I shall argue that proponents of the standard DH thesis fail to grapple 
adequately his insights on pluralism and conflict. They also fail to capture the complex re-
ality of politics as they purport to do. For, as I shall argue in chapter 4, the standard DH the-
sis is inadequately ‘static’: it misconceives both the extent and the nature of the conflict be-
tween individual morality and politics. And, as I shall suggest in chapter 7, the standard DH 
thesis - by virtue of its ‘static’ interpretation of moral conflict in individual political ethics - 
also fails to adequately capture the messy and conflict-ridden context in which contempo-
rary politicians operate. Simply put, the orthodox way of thinking about the problem of DH 
is, in fact, much more closely aligned to monism as opposed to the pluralist vision it pur-
ports to embrace.  
 
What I merely want to emphasize for now though, is that a central claim of the 
standard DH thesis is that it provides an alternative way of thinking about political morality 
and our ethical cosmos. And this, as gestured, is intertwined with frequent references to the 
                                            
48 See Walzer (1973), de Wijze (1994; 1996; 2005; 2009), Stocker (1990) and Parrish 
(2007).  
49 These theorists’ more specific conception of conflict and pluralism shall become more 
evident in subsequent chapters, where I shall draw on their accounts to both criticize the 
standard DH thesis as well as develop my own distinct account of DH in politics.   
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realities of politics, moral conflict and pluralism -or, in reverse, to the inadequately idealis-
tic assumptions of harmony and monism which permeate the view of innocence. For in-
stance, Michael Stocker points out that, it is not just that consequentialists and deontologists 
oversimplify and “misunderstand … large portions of our evaluative world” (1990: 12). 
They also “misunderstand what they over-concentrate on” (Stocker, 1990: 12). The alleged 
contradiction arises due to the fact that our prevalent moral theories subscribe to the cover-
ing law model of morality. As I have suggested in the previous chapter, these ideal theories 
are concerned only with addressing what Martha Nussbaum (2000) and Michael Neu (2012) 
term as ‘the obvious question’: the question of how, under some given circumstances, one 
should act. As DH theorists argue, what this dual commitment to value-monism and to the 
covering law model fails to capture are the two core (and intertwined) conceptual features of 
DH dilemmas: i) ‘double-counted impossible oughts’ and ii) ‘non - action guiding act eval-
uations’50.  
 
The notion of ‘double-counted impossible oughts’ indicates the way in which values 
are employed as a means of discerning the overall value of an act and again in its own right. 
The latter notion refers to the fact that moral values have a force beyond simply factoring 
into an assessment of how one ought to act in particular situation. When confronted with a 
DH scenario, “the dirty feature”, the transgression of a moral principle, value or duty which 
ought to hold in private life, “is taken into account once in determining the overall value of 
the act and again on its own”. Such a feature is thus “double counted” (Stocker, 1990: 13). 
However, when this feature is taken up on its own, it is taken up in an evaluation that is not 
action guiding. As Walzer explains, whilst such oughts may not serve to guide one’s action, 
they neither evaporate nor are they completely discarded: they “still stand” (1973: 171). 
                                            
50 These features - which are thought as “general and conceptually unproblematic” aspects 
“of our acts and moral reality” (Stocker, 1990: 13) - are also discussed by de Wijze (1994; 
1996) and Cunningham (1992) and are implicitly accepted by Walzer (1973), Gardner 
(2007) and Gowans (2001).  
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This is exactly what is missed by our dominant moral theories. The vision that one 
is innocent of moral transgression - the postulation that in “doing exactly what is to be done 
... “makes for a perfect act or at least one such that neither it nor its agent can be faulted” 
(Stocker: 1990: 12) - is plausible only because proponents of innocence erroneously over-
concentrate on ‘overall, action- guiding act evaluations’ and completely ignore the partial, 
constituting considerations which compose the overall evaluation and are expressive of gen-
uine values. So, in situations involving moral dilemmas or conflicts, the overall evaluation 
does not completely render impotent the moral significance of the ‘partial evaluations’ 
which are adjudicated and necessary to arrive at such an overall evaluation. Rather, the par-
tial evaluations, the oughts which are not acted upon, “retain their moral relevance” (Stock-
er, 1990: 13). And, as de Wijze explains, such evaluations remain and “exert an influence on 
what one has become” (1994: 8). Such features are also evident in the examples I have dis-
cussed earlier. In short, proponents of the standard DH thesis contend that the consequen-
tialist/ utilitarian oughts - reflected in Cripps’ actions to prevent an economic catastrophe 
and the politician’s decision to save the innocent lives in the TBS - take precedence (they 
are, in other words, morally right as overall, action guiding act evaluations). However, the 
partial constituting features of these actions - lying to the Parliament and press as well the 
torturing of an individual respectively - despite being overridden in terms of action-
guidance, still exert influence on the characterization of such actions and consequently mor-
ally taint the agents’ innocence. 
 
Even though the DH problem seems to be a startling oxymoron, to maintain that, in 
a scenario like the TBS or Cripps for example, the partial and constituting disvalue of the 
act of torture or of deception disappears, is even more counterintuitive. The view of inno-
cence, by virtue of its overconcentration on abstract action-guiding principles, provides a 
rather over-simplified and detached account of the realities of political action which, in cer-
tain scenarios, is bound to be inescapably imperfect, messy and dirty. In other words, the 
view of innocence fails to account for the relatively widespread recognition “that a certain 
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course of action” may, indeed, be “the best thing to do on the whole in the circumstances, 
but that doing it involves doing something wrong” (Williams, 1972: 93; Walzer, 1973: 160). 
Herein emerges one of the central philosophical premises of the DH thesis, what is frequent-
ly referred to as the ‘Moral Remainders Thesis’: although moral conflicts are resolvable in 
an action-guiding sense, they are nevertheless not soluble tout court, as they involve a ‘mor-
al cost’ or a ‘moral residue’51. 
 
That there exists a ‘remainder’, which tells against the act and morally tarnishes the 
political agent, is further enhanced by de Wijze (1994). Taking a cue from Bernard Wil-
liams (1990), de Wijze suggests that the charges of logical inconsistency, irrationality and 
conceptual confusion are raised against the standard DH thesis, because the value-monism 
underpinning our prevalent moral theories is inescapably (yet fallaciously) intertwined with 
an assumption that values closely resemble cognitive beliefs. Consequently, when a conflict 
of beliefs occurs, the agent holds two beliefs that are inconsistent with one another due to 
empirical demands: both beliefs cannot be simultaneously true. Nor, is the conflict between 
these, genuine or (partially) insoluble. For instance, the beliefs that Obama is the President 
of the US and that Obama is thirty years old are inconsistent. For, in order to be President a 
citizen must be at least thirty-five years old. Either Obama is thirty years old and not the 
President of the US, or he is the President and not thirty years old. However, as de Wijze 
suggests, a conflict of values involved in DH scenarios more closely resembles a conflict of 
desires.
 
For example, one may want both to smoke cigarettes and to be healthy. Such a con-
flict is not logically inconsistent, but rather presents itself as a conflict when the fact that 
smoking is unhealthy is added to the desires. If smoking was not unhealthy, a conflict of 
                                            
51 As suggested, such a ‘moral remainder’ not only pollutes the act itself but it also denotes 
that the innocence of the agent is eradicated ex post. See Walzer (1973), Williams (1972; 
1990), Gowans, (2001), Stocker, (1990), de Wijze, (1994; 1996; 2006). This thesis is also 
emphasized in the literature of moral dilemmas. See Nussbaum (2007; 2000), Statman 
(1995), Sinnott-Armstrong (1987a; 1987b) and the collection of essays in Gowans (1990).  
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desires would not exist, and one could both smoke and be healthy without either desire in-
terfering with the other. Contra the view of innocence, in these cases one is not able to find 
perfect solution to such a conflict by simply readjusting his desires. For, when one desire is 
foregone in favour of another, the force of the unrealized desire is not abandoned in the 
same way as a conflict of beliefs. Though quitting smoking and being healthy seems to be 
right as an overall evaluation, a particular desire to smoke - the partial constituting evalua-
tion - will remain, despite being overridden and not acted upon.  
 
To recap, the recognition that acts of DH are philosophically plausible and an ines-
capable feature of politics brings to the fore the inadequacies of the view of innocence. The 
standard of moral purity and perfection which is advanced by both consequentialists and 
deontologists is not just premised on a rather crude distinction between right and wrong. 
The deeply hopeful insights of the view of innocence depend much “on radically implausi-
ble views of value and action” (Stocker, 1990: 13) which ignore and leave unexamined 
problematic and pervasive aspects of the reality of moral life: the possibility of conflict, 
moral tragedy and inescapable wrongdoing
52
. In contrast:  
 
A DH analysis  provides a more plausible characterization of our 
moral reality … The existence of genuine moral conflict, the in-
commensurability of cherished values, give rise to moral conflict 
situations where those who strive to act morally unavoidably get 
DH (de Wijze, 2009: 309).    
 
Pace Sutherland and Ramsay, even if the standard DH thesis seems to have a relatively 
strong utilitarian/ consequentialist flavour (at least in terms of its action-guidance), unlike 
utilitarianism/ consequentialism, the purportedly value-pluralist portrayal of our moral reali-
ty underpinning the orthodox DH thesis, reveals a deep scepticism surrounding the conten-
                                            
52 See also Walzer (1973), Gowans, (2001) de Wijze (1994; 1996; 2009) and de Wijze and 
Goodwin, (2009). 
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tion that there exists a standard or algorithm which yields tout court correct or perfect solu-
tions to moral puzzles to those who get their ‘calculations’ right. By virtue of its acknowl-
edgement of moral conflict, the standard DH thesis disquietingly suggests that in politics, 
moral degradation and the loss of innocence can never be totally controllable. Even if politi-
cians strive to maintain their innocence, in certain occasions this is largely, if not totally, 
beyond their control. 
 
But the suggestion that DH is a politically realistic and philosophically coherent 
possibility raises a further question, especially if this problem is situated in the context of 
liberal democracies: How should the politician respond to the dirt on his hands in such a 
contemporary context? To put it differently, if innocence is lost, is such a loss irretrievable? 
In what follows, I want to explore how the standard DH thesis approaches this question. In 
doing so, I want to register a doubt as to whether the standard DH thesis is, after all, so very 
different from the view of innocence to which it is often opposed.  
 
3.5. A Doubt about the Standard DH Thesis  
 
Situating DH within the democratic context creates additional and more contempo-
rary conundrums. If the problem is viewed from the lens of democratic theory, the absolutist 
action-guiding prescription of the view of innocence seems to find an alternative mode of 
expression. As Sue Mendus notes, “those who focus on the nature of democracy are almost 
unanimous in thinking” that dirty acts ought to be avoided, as “they constitute a betrayal of 
democratic values” (2009b: 4). For instance, Peter Oborne stresses that “in a properly func-
tioning liberal democracy there should be no call for the mendacity advocated by Plato or 
Machiavelli; citizens have a right to form a fair and balanced judgment, and are entitled to 
be informed about their political choices”. This, he argues, “includes a right not to be de-
ceived”. For, “deception, even when practiced for the best of motives”, as the DH theorist 
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suggests, “is the worst kind of bad faith” 53 (2005: 119- 120). The main concern of theorists 
of democracy is that DH acts hinder, and are incompatible with, democracy in general and 
the democratic values of accountability and transparency in particular. Yet, for the reasons 
explored in the previous sections, this does not seem sufficient to eradicate the DH problem. 
Though such theorists may want politicians to allow democratic values and the imperatives 
of the (Kantian) view of innocence to guide their thinking in everyday decision-making, in 
certain circumstances, such a possibility is deemed impossible and undesirable. I shall ex-
plore in more detail some of the problems that permeate this way of thinking about demo-
cratic politics in chapters 6 and 7. What I want to emphasize here though, is that the demo-
cratic context and the above-mentioned values play an important role in Walzer’s (1973; 
1977) analysis of how the DH politician should respond to the dirt on his hands. For, ac-
cording to Walzer (1973; 1977), such values should steer the DH politician to respond in a 
very particular way to the tragedy which has befallen him. More importantly, these values 
also provide the basis for the hope that there might exist a resolution, albeit an imperfect 
one, to the problem of DH in politics.  
 
Walzer’s claim that politics and morality might be reconcilable has received little, if 
any, attention in the literature of DH 
54
 but is an important one: it raises the question of 
whether the orthodox way of thinking about the problem of DH suffices. Whilst the standard 
conception of DH seems to initially embrace Machiavelli’s insights, it ultimately concedes 
that Machiavelli’s picture of political morality is undesirably bleak and should somehow be 
                                            
53 Similar claims are made by Bok (1980), Shugarman (2000b) and Thompson (1989).  
54 The only authors who discuss this idea are Levy (2007), Meissels (2007) and de Wijze 
(2012). None of these philosophers however, challenges Walzer’s conceptual structure of 
DH. Levy and Meissels focus solely on the issue of punishment, and whether this is 
plausible, without discussing Walzer’s conviction that the politician’s innocence can (and 
should be) restored. De Wijze (2012) follows Walzer even closer and provides three 
justifications for punishing the DH politician, with the restoration of one’s innocence 
forming one of these.  
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resisted. In other words, whilst the conventional account of DH purports to challenge the 
monism of the view of innocence, the standard DH thesis and the view of innocence do not 
seem to be substantially different after all. For, Walzer’s critique of the view of innocence 
veils a more fundamental agreement between this view and the standard DH thesis: whilst 
acting innocently is often deemed practically impossible - because, as DH theorists contend, 
in certain tragic circumstances the imperatives of politics and morality conflict - innocence, 
despite being momentarily lost, is still desirable and ought to be somehow restored and 
maintained. Differently put, there might exist a way out of the conflict between morality and 
politics; it might not be impossible to sanitize and clean up politics. Or, so we should hope 
says Walzer. It is to the exploration of this puzzling conviction I now turn.   
 
In his seminal article, Walzer identifies three strands of thinking about the DH prob-
lem and how this is resolved: i) the Neoclassical tradition, ii) the Protestant tradition, and iii) 
the Catholic tradition, which is thought by Walzer (1973) as the most effective in dealing 
with DH in the democratic context
55
. The neoclassical tradition is represented by Machia-
velli. Standard DH theorists, whilst acknowledging that Machiavelli was the first to argue 
that politicians ought to be allowed certain special moral permissions, suggest that his reso-
lution to the DH problem is unsatisfactory (Walzer, 1973; de Wijze, 2012). The problem 
with the neoclassical view is that the Machiavellian politician has no ‘inwardness’ - that is, 
no state of anguish or, what de Wijze (2004) terms as, ‘tragic remorse’ about his behavior. 
As Walzer suggests, “if the politician is the good man I am imagining him to be”, once he is 
confronted with a DH scenario, he will not merely acknowledge the moral force of the 
transgressed ought; he also will “believe himself to be guilty” (1973: 166). Machiavelli “is 
suspect”, Walzer says, “not because he tells political actors they must get their hands dirty, 
but because he does not specify the state of mind appropriate to a man with dirty hands. 
What he thinks of himself we don't know… he is the sort of man who is unlikely to keep a 
                                            
55 See also Griffin (1989) and Garrett (1996).   
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diary and so we cannot find out what he thinks.” Yet, “we do want to know” Walzer argues; 
and “above all, we want a record of his anguish”. (1973: 176). For this feeling, he maintains, 
is “a crucial feature of our moral life” (1973: 171). Thus, proponents of the standard DH 
thesis tell us, the intense feelings of anguish and pollution that are said to accompany acts of 
DH are not just an important feature of our moral reality. They also constitute one of the 
appropriate ways of responding to this problem
56
.  
 
This is acknowledged by the Protestant tradition, which is represented by Weber 
(1946). The Weberian tradition perceives the DH politician as a ‘suffering servant’; it posits 
the politician as a tragic hero, who is (and should be) inevitably subject to remorse as a re-
sponse to the DH acts he must perform or tolerate. In short, Weber’s politician accepts and 
suffers for the loss of his innocence. As Walzer states, “the self-awareness of the tragic hero 
is obviously of great value”, as “we want the politician to have an inner life”; yet, Weber’s 
attempt to “resolve the problem of DH entirely within the confines of the individual con-
science” is “neither possible nor desirable” (1973: 177). The punishment and anguish of the 
Weberian hero remain too individual and too self-inflicted; and in the context of democratic 
societies the ‘suffering servant’ is not accountable to the political community.  
 
For the Machiavellian politician there is no indication of his anguish; the Weberian 
politician has only himself. But the third account, whilst maintaining Weber’s view of poli-
tics as a tragic domain, is seen as capable of ameliorating the deficiencies of the first two: it 
suggests that “the hero's suffering needs to be socially expressed (for like punishment, it 
confirms and reinforces our sense that certain acts are wrong)”. This point is underpinned by 
Walzer’s conviction that “we don't want to be ruled by men who have lost their souls” 
(1973: 177). Hence, whilst the loss of innocence may sometimes be inescapable in politics, 
Walzer seems to echo the contention shared by the proponents of innocence: that it is also 
intolerable. “A politician with dirty hands”, Walzer tells us, “needs a soul” and “it is best for 
                                            
56 See in addition de Wijze (1994; 2005, 2009) and Griffin (1989). 
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us all if he has some hope of personal salvation, however that is conceived” (1973: 178). 
We need, therefore, to be able to hope that there is some prospect of ‘salvation’. Maintain-
ing this hope, according to Walzer, requires the moral politician to reveal the dirt on his 
hands to the democratic community: “if he were a politician and nothing else”, Walzer 
stresses, he would conceal such dirt and “pretend that his hands were clean” (1973: 168). 
Hence, “it is not the case that when (the politician) does bad in order to do good he surren-
ders himself forever to the demon of politics”. Rather, Walzer suggests that, the DH politi-
cian “commits a determinate crime, and he must pay a determinate penalty. When he has 
done so, his hands will be clean again.” (1973: 178; my emphasis).  
 
Walzer’s hopeful conviction is associated with Catholic theology: the sins of the po-
litical leader are redeemed through the effect of some external agency. This insight, he 
maintains, is aptly captured by Camus revolutionary protagonists in Les Justes, Janek and 
Stepan, who willingly submit to their executioner and are ready to pay the price for the 
blood on their hands. As Walzer argues: “the heroes are innocent criminals, just assassins”, 
because “they are prepared to die-and will die”. Having dirtied their hands, “only their exe-
cution, will complete the action in which they are engaged: dying, they need make no ex-
cuses. That is the end of their guilt and pain. The execution is not so much punishment as 
self-punishment and expiation. On the scaffold they wash their hands clean and, unlike the 
suffering servant, they die happy” (1973: 178). Just like Camus’ heroes then, the politician 
should reveal the dirt on his hands to the democratic community, which should ensure that 
he pays the price via some form of cathartic punishment: we should “punish him, for the 
same reasons we punish anyone else” (Walzer, 1973: 179).  
 
Similarly, in Just and Unjust Wars, Walzer argues that politicians acting in supreme 
emergencies must “acknowledge the burdens of criminality… that one has also been forced 
to kill the innocent” and publically admit that this is “a kind of blasphemy against our deep-
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est moral commitments” 57(1977: 260- 263). And so, whilst it may be the case that the poli-
tician has done what his office required, he should nonetheless, “bear a burden of responsi-
bility and guilt” (1977: 323). Even though punishing the politician who has revealed his DH 
is impossible “without getting our own hands dirty”, Walzer’s Catholic account postulates 
that, in the modern democratic context, closing the gulf opened by Machiavelli between mo-
rality and politics is conceivable. In other words, we should not lose hope that there could 
exist a resolution (albeit an imperfect one) to the conflict between morality and politics. The 
upshot of this is that, in Walzer’s account, it is not implausible to think that politics could be 
sanitized: there should be a way to remove the taint that polluted the politician’s otherwise 
innocent record. Simply put, it might not be the case that the problem of DH is insoluble 
after all. 
 
3. 6. Conclusion          
 
 
My aim in this chapter was to examine the standard DH thesis and explain how it 
provides an advance on the way we think about political morality vis-à-vis the view of inno-
cence. I began by providing a general outline of the idea of DH - the contention that inno-
cence and politics are incompatible - by briefly discussing (what its proponents perceive to 
be) its historical and terminological origins. Following Walzer (1973), I then offered a de-
tailed examination of the DH thesis. I conceived DH as a political problem and extrapolated 
its key objective features and conceptual components as a set of propositions. As demon-
strated, DH is premised on the recognition that in certain inescapable, tragic and dilemmatic 
scenarios, the demands of successful political action and the absolutist imperatives govern-
ing private or ordinary morality conflict and diverge. The political agent - through no fault 
of his own - is confronted with a paradox of action: he is moved by political reasons to em-
                                            
57 Walzer (1977) alludes to the example of Harris here, the commander of the Royal Air 
Force (RAF) in WWII, who was not honoured by his country after the war ended. I shall 
explore and criticize the way he presents this example in chapter 4.  
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ploy acts which are unacceptable from the viewpoint of ordinary morality and consequently 
lose his innocence.  
 
As I have additionally explained, the central philosophical premise of DH - the sug-
gestion that a political action can be all-things-considered morally right and justified yet 
somehow morally wrong - challenges the deeply hopeful insights of the view of innocence. 
Whilst the view of innocence solely concentrates on the question of ‘what should I do’ in 
such scenarios, and is underpinned by the assumption that our moral reality is harmonious, 
conventional DH analyses suggest that when the imperatives of ordinary and political mo-
rality conflict, a perfectly clean-handed solution is impossible. When the politician opts for 
one of the conflicting oughts - the ‘consequentialism of extremity’ (Walzer, 2004a) - the 
moral force of the competing ought, is not overridden: it is a moral remainder which still 
exerts influence and thereby blemishes both the act and the ex ante innocent political agent.  
The moral costs inherent in such tragic scenarios are (and should be) the objects of extreme 
regret, or ‘tragic remorse’ (de Wijze, 2005). And, as standard DH theorists suggest, these 
emotions are not only central to our moral experience of the world. They also constitute the 
appropriate way of responding to one’s DH. Nonetheless, Walzer additionally suggests that, 
in the context of democratic politics, the DH politician must also reveal his anguish and dirt 
to the community, which not only wants a record of his feelings but it also exists to inflict 
expiatory punishment. For despite the inescapable nature of the DH problem, the standard 
DH thesis also suggests that being governed by men who lost their innocence and soul is not 
desirable. Hence, Walzer et al leave considerable room for the hope that ordinary and politi-
cal morality might not be irreconcilable after all: the revelation and punishment of one’s 
dirty acts could lead to the restoration of one’s innocence and seemingly close the gap be-
tween ordinary and political morality. 
 
This puzzling conviction makes one wonder whether the conventional conceptual-
ization of DH as outlined in this chapter is adequate. Indeed, as I briefly suggested here, 
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Walzer’s hopeful claim that innocence could (and should) be regained, seems to reveal that 
the standard DH thesis and the view of innocence have much more in common than initially 
admitted. To put it differently, despite its prima facie Machiavellian affiliations, the stand-
ard DH thesis seems to displace and misrepresent Machiavelli’s insights on political morali-
ty, DH and conflict. It also collapses into the very idealism it seeks to evade. It is to the de-
velopment of this point I want to turn in the next chapter. 
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           4. A Critique of the Standard DH Thesis 
 
 
When a philosopher “solves” an ethical problem 
for one, one feels as if one had asked for a sub-
way token and been given a passenger ticket val-
id for the first interplanetary passenger- carry-
ing spaceship instead. 
     H. Putnam
58 
 
Here is the moral politician: it is by his dirty 
hands that we know him. If he were a moral man 
and nothing else, his hands would not be dirty; if 
he were a politician and nothing else, he would 
pretend that they were clean. 
                     M. Walzer
59 
 
It is necessary to a prince…to learn how not to be 
good. 
      N. Machiavelli
60 
4.1. Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, I provided an outline of the standard DH thesis, which is 
mostly owed to Michael Walzer (1973; 1977). In so doing, I sought to explain how that the-
sis provides an advance on the way we think about political morality vis-à-vis the hopeful 
insights of the view of innocence. The core insights and implications of the standard DH 
thesis, its proponents assure us, are quite perspicuous. The standard DH thesis acknowledg-
es that in certain tragic circumstances politicians may face a paradox of action: situations 
whereby an innocent course of action is unfeasible. In a similar vein to Hilary Putnam’s re-
mark in the title quote, standard DH theorists suggest that the vision of harmony and inno-
cence - especially in its Utilitarian or Kantian variant - is unsatisfactorily idealistic: its value 
                                            
58 How not to solve moral problems, 179 
59 Political Action: The problem of Dirty Hands, 168 
60 The Prince, 61 
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monism does justice neither to the practical demands of our messy morality nor to the reali-
ties of political action. 
 
On the face of it, the standard DH thesis has a strong Machiavellian flavour: it pur-
ports to take the complex nature of politics more seriously; it prima facie acknowledges that 
morality and politics are uneasy bedfellows. But, in the previous chapter, I also registered a 
doubt as to whether the standard DH thesis is satisfactory - or, indeed so very different from 
the view of innocence. For, (at least) one feature of that thesis immediately strikes us as odd. 
Walzer (1973) and Steve de Wijze (2012) are in agreement with proponents of innocence in 
this much: the loss of innocence is intolerable and should be, somehow, resisted. In connec-
tion to this, Walzer presents us with an image of the moral politician: the agent who is 
“good for politics” but not “good enough” (1973: 168) and embodies the morally appropri-
ate way of responding to the problem of DH in the context of democratic politics. Hence, 
standard DH theorists surprisingly tell us, innocence might not be irretrievably lost. Nor, by 
implication, need we lose hope in the possibility of sanitizing political life: a solution to the 
conflict between morality and politics could and should exist. Granted that such a solution 
may be an imperfect one - Walzer recognizes that by punishing the DH politician we “get 
our own hands dirty” (1973: 180) - but it does seem to be a solution nonetheless. If this is 
the case though, Putnam’s cautionary remark does not just apply to the view of innocence; it 
also penetrates the ranks of the standard DH thesis. To put it bluntly, something is amiss 
with the prevalent way of thinking about the problem of DH.  
 
It is to the pursuit of this suggestion I want to turn in this chapter. In short, my gen-
eral argument here is this: there are problems with the conventional DH thesis. Despite its 
purported capability to capture the complexity of our moral reality, the standard DH thesis 
fails to do so. What shall emerge from this chapter then is that we need to reconsider what it 
means to have DH in relation to certain on-going activities such as politics. To be clear, I 
do not wish to deny that (some of) the insights of the standard DH thesis - the Machiavellian 
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recognition that politics and ordinary morality are difficult to harmonize - better capture the 
fragmented nature of morality and the complexity of politics than the view of innocence. 
But, at the same time, it is precisely because these insights are more sophisticated vis-à-vis 
those of the view of innocence, that the point I want to pursue here is so striking: that, de-
spite its purported Machiavellian affiliations, the standard DH thesis fails to take Machiavel-
li’s insights seriously - it collapses into the very idealism it seeks to evade61.  
 
The discussion is advanced in three sections, each of which contributes to the gen-
eral worry I wish to register about the standard DH thesis. In the first section, I want to set 
the context for the subsequent discussion. In so doing, I shall turn to an aspect of Walzer’s 
Catholic account which has invited considerable criticism from more contemporary DH the-
orists: the question of the scope of the problem. I will suggest that the problem these theo-
rists identify - the narrowness of Walzer’s account - is, in some sense, beside the point. For, 
what is at issue in that debate is Walzer’s location of DH exclusively within the domain of 
politics, not the conceptual structure of the problem (which is what concerns me). So, whilst 
DH theorists have expended a lot of energy squabbling amongst themselves over the scope 
of DH, they are all, in some sense, missing the point: the orthodox conception of DH in 
politics, narrow or otherwise, does not suffice: it is unsatisfactorily ‘static’62. The upshot of 
this is that the static account misconceives the extent of the conflict between morality and 
politics. As I shall demonstrate, the problem of DH, if situated in the real context of certain 
                                            
61 I should emphasize that the argument I shall advance here also suggests that there exists a 
neglected rift in the DH tradition. For, as I shall explain in this chapter, in contrast to the 
static and idealistic account of political morality and DH presented by standard DH theorists 
(Michael Walzer, Steve de Wijze, Michael Stocker, Tom Goodwin, Christopher Gowans 
and Anthony Cunningham amongst others) political theorists who can be labelled as DH 
theorists (such as Stuart Hampshire, Bernard Williams, Sue Mendus, Martin Hollis, and 
Richard Bellamy) have a different and more nuanced understanding of DH - one which 
takes Machiavelli’s insights on political morality and conflict seriously. 
62 I employ the terms ‘static’, ‘snapshotty’ and ‘episodic’ to characterize the standard DH 
thesis interchangeably.  
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ongoing activities (most notably politics), is much more enduring and perverse than the stat-
ic account allows; it also has certain dimensions that are misrepresented by the standard DH 
thesis. I pursue this argument in the second section. In the third section, I argue that concep-
tualizing DH as a paradox of action is not enough. For, the static account also mischaracter-
izes the nature of the conflict between morality and politics: it neglects how moral character 
enters politics and might be responsible for political disaster. In connection to this, I scruti-
nize Walzer’s conception of an ex ante innocent, yet ex post DH moral politician. I surmise 
that the politician we are presented with may not be as “good for politics” as proponents of 
the standard DH thesis like to assume.  
 
4.2. The Question of Scope: Whose DH? 
 
 Walzer’s Catholic account of DH, I gestured in chapter 3, builds on “the conven-
tional wisdom” that “politicians are a good deal worse, morally worse than the rest of us” 
(1973: 162). One question which relates to this remark and which has preoccupied theorists 
working within the DH tradition, concerns the scope of the problem: for which agents does 
the problem of DH specifically arise
63
? Or, as Stephen Garrett puts it, given that there is a 
rift between ordinary or private morality and political or public morality, “on whom should 
we focus an accusing glare”? (1996: 13). A large portion of DH theorists suggest that 
Walzer’s (1973; 1977; 2004a; 2004b) conception of DH is unsatisfactorily narrow: they ar-
gue that, like Machiavelli, Walzer unsatisfactorily restricts DH only to political officials 
(c.f. Gowans, 2001: 228 -232; Parrish, 2007: 13-15; Allett, 2000: 51; Beiner, 2000: 45 -48; 
Stocker, 2000: 32; Shugarman, 2000b: 236 ; Coady, 2008: 84 -85; 2009: 1; Alexandra, 
                                            
63 For instance, this question is raised by Christopher Gowans (2001), Michael Stocker 
(1990; 2001), Steve de Wijze (1994), Stephen Garrett (1996), Andrew Alexandra (2000), 
John Parrish (2007) Tony Coady (2000; 2004; 2009), Dennis Thompson (1989), Virginia 
Held (1989), Ronald Beiner, (2000), Jonathan Allett (2000), David Shugarman (2000b), 
Gareth Cullity (2007) and David Archard (2007).    
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2000: 237 -240). In this section, I want to provide a brief outline of this debate. The purpose 
of so doing is to introduce the more encompassing and deeper philosophical problems which 
permeate contemporary conceptions of DH. For, as I shall explain, whilst most DH theorists 
take issue with the exclusive restriction of DH to professional politicians, they overlook 
crucial conceptual differences between Walzer’s and Machiavelli’s thought. They also take 
for granted the validity of Walzer’s conception of DH in politics (despite its narrowness). In 
other words, the broader accounts of DH which emerge from their critiques are, in terms of 
their conceptual structure, Walzerian still. And, as I shall demonstrate, it is this very concep-
tual structure which, if judged from Machiavelli’s standpoint, is unsatisfactorily idealistic 
and ‘static’ - especially if situated in the context of certain ongoing activities, such as poli-
tics. 
 
 So, the debate surrounding the scope of DH concerns the question of whether it is 
possible for agents other than public officials to be confronted with, and be morally polluted 
by, this problem. To put it differently, the question of the scope of the problem has invited 
two distinct and mutually exclusive answers or theses: a) DH confronts and pollutes only 
political leaders; b) DH is possible in any sphere of life, but is much more frequent and per-
verse in politics. In Bernard Williams’ frequently cited words, “it is a predictable and prob-
able hazard of public life that there will be situations in which something morally disagree-
able is clearly required” (1978: 62; my emphasis). At first glance, Walzer’s account leans 
towards the second thesis - he initially allows in passing that DH might have a place beyond 
professional politics (c.f. Walzer, 1973: 174). But, the way Walzer presents the problem - 
coupled with his more recent (re)formulations of it - suggest otherwise. Or, so his critics 
argue (c.f. Gowans, 2001; Coady, 2008; 2009; Shugarman, 2000b; Allett, 2000; Garret, 
1996).  
 
“There is”, Tony Coady pithily remarks, “a strong strand of political exceptionism 
inherent in the DH story” (2009: 1). This much also seems to be evident in Walzer’s 
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acknowledgement that the problem of DH refers to whether “those who govern us” can 
govern well, without losing their innocence: “the sort of actor I am considering”, he tells us, 
“acts in official capacity” (1973: 161 - 179). Walzer’s restriction of DH to professional poli-
ticians is also captured in his remark in the title quote - which advances the vision of the 
moral politician - but is even more explicit in Just and Unjust Wars. The crucial question 
pertinent to DH, Walzer says, is whether “soldiers and statesmen can override the rights of 
innocent people for the sake of their own political communities” (1977: 254). To which his 
own answer, as I have mentioned, is affirmative “though not without hesitation and worry” 
(1977: 254). This worry however, is coupled with the admission that individuals other than 
political officials should never attack others to aid their self-defence. In other words, abso-
lutist principles should not be overridden by agents other than public officials; whilst ‘in 
normality’, morality is deontological, in certain tragic circumstances the ‘consequentialism 
of extremity’ re-imposes itself so that only political leaders cannot (and should not) adhere 
to such a position. Or, as Walzer similarly emphasizes in Emergency Ethics, DH applies 
only to “political and military leaders”, who “may sometimes find themselves in situations 
where they cannot avoid acting immorally” (2004a: 46). Hence, the central claim of the 
‘narrow’ view of this problem: “inescapable moral wrongdoing is a common or pervasive 
feature of political life, but is either nonexistent or of negligible importance in the rest of 
life” (Gowans, 2001: 229). Whilst certain evil actions are necessary in politics, the privileg-
es of performing them should not be widely distributed. This assertion - which acknowledg-
es that, on certain tragic occasions, the demands of politics are discontinuous from those of 
ordinary morality or private and social life - is advanced via three interrelated arguments. 
These, Walzer tells us, constitute the reasons for singling out the politician and not the en-
trepreneur (1973: 162). In what follows, I want to outline these very briefly. For, it is these 
arguments which critics of the narrow view tend to target.    
 
First, it is typically thought that in politics it is necessary to deal with evil competi-
tors and institutions. As Walzer indicates, “even if moral politicians would like to act differ-
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ently”, and avoid getting DH, “they probably cannot” (1973: 163). Whilst some actions are 
categorically wrong, the overabundance of evil individuals in politics entails that “they may 
have to be contemplated in order to protect the rights and welfare of the many” (Cullity, 
2007: 57). This brings us to the second reason for thinking that DH may be reserved for po-
litical leaders: the state monopolizes the ‘right’ to use coercion. In Max Weber’s words, the 
‘vocation’ of politics requires politicians to let themselves in “for the diabolic forces lurking 
in all violence” (1946: 125; also cited in Walzer, 1973: 176 -177). As Walzer adds, on cer-
tain tragic occasions, political victory deems violence necessary, “not only against foreign 
nations in our defence but also against us … for our greater good” (1973: 162). Unlike pri-
vate or ordinary moral action, the demands of political action are such that those who gov-
ern us “should become killers” (Walzer, 1973: 162). The representative nature of democrat-
ic politics brings to the fore the third reason why the narrow view so compellingly grips us: 
this lies in the argument stipulating the greater importance we assign to claims of political 
responsibility (Bellamy, 2010; 2011). As suggested, it is only in politics that the stakes are 
so high that overwhelming consequentialist considerations should, on certain tragic occa-
sions, override deontological constraints (Nagel, 1978; Walzer, 1973; 2004a). The latter, 
whilst appropriate for private individuals, cannot always serve as a guide in politics, where 
vital interests of large numbers of people are at stake; a deontological or absolutist morality 
is incapable of accommodating the exigencies of politics: it leads to inactivity, compromis-
ing the very values it professes to serve.  
 
Walzer’s restriction of DH to professional politics has puzzled a number of philoso-
phers working within the DH tradition. It has also attracted considerable criticism. As Mi-
chael Stocker puts it: 
 
[Cases of DH], it might be remarked, all involve political, or at least in-
stitutional and public immoralities … DH are morally peculiar because 
they involve politics and, indeed, that they are morally peculiar in just 
the ways politics are… As Walzer reminds us, Machiavelli argued that 
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rulers must learn how not to be good, and Hoerderer, in Sartre’s play, 
holds that it is not possible to govern both well and innocently … 
However, the non-political, including the personal, also allows for dirty 
hands (2000: 32). 
 
Critics of the narrow account of DH suggest that, whilst the above arguments do signify that 
there is something special about politics, they do not decisively rule out the possibility of 
DH outside this domain. In other words, proponents of the narrow view seem to be rather 
complacent in the acceptance of the reasons which supposedly restrict DH only within the 
domain of professional politics (Coady, 1993; 2004; 2008). For, as Christopher Gowans 
(2001) and Steve de Wijze (1994; 2002) suggest, if the DH dilemma stems from one’s en-
counter with evil, it seems absurd to hold that only politicians are confronted by such evil 
‘forces’. In addition, if the confrontation with evil is possible outside the domain of profes-
sional politics, then the prospect of moral wrongdoing and the loss of innocence may, in 
some circumstances, be also inescapable in private life or ordinary morality. There is no 
shortage of examples in the DH literature illustrating this point
64
. For instance, de Wijze and 
Goodwin draw on Williams’ (1973a) Jim and the Indians: “an individual with no political 
role is given the unenviable choice of either killing one innocent person to let nine others 
free, or to refuse and condemn all ten to death” (2009: 531). Here, they say, “we have a DH 
                                            
64 Due to space limitations, I shall not discuss all of these examples. But, it is worth noting 
here that, this way of upsetting the narrow thesis is also utilized by Stocker (2000), Gowans 
(2001), Beiner (2000) and Allett (2000). For instance, Stocker (1990) draws on Styron’s 
Sophie’s Choice - the eponymous heroine’s tragic dilemma of being forced by a Nazi doctor 
to choose between saving one of her children or letting both to be killed. Gowans discusses 
Captain Vere’s dilemma in Melville’s Billy Budd. Beiner (2000) draws on O’Brien’s To 
Katanga and Back and shows how the missionaries’ cause to feed the population of Congo 
could only be achieved by cooperating with an army of mercenaries who provided 
protection by spreading terror. For Beiner this story illustrates that “it is at least worth 
asking whether dirty hands are as unique to ‘official’ political actors” (2000: 6). Finally, 
Allett (2000) advances this point by drawing on Bernard Shaw’s Mrs Warren’s Profession 
and Major Barbara. 
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scenario”: Jim’s case meets all the arguments forwarded by those who quarantine DH in 
professional politics. Not only does he deal with evil persons but he is also forced to violate 
the absolutist constraints that purportedly hold in private life or ordinary morality; and like 
Walzer’s politician, Jim “ought to feel ‘tragic-remorse’” (2009: 531). Hence, “it is important 
not to slip into a commonly held error” that only professional politicians face the problem of 
DH (de Wijze & Goodwin, 2009: 531). It is, they say, possible for agents - occupying no 
political office - to find themselves directly confronted with a stark paradox of action and 
the prospect of inescapable wrongdoing
65
.  
 
 Thus far I have sought to outline a critique of Walzer’s Catholic account which has 
been commonly advanced by more contemporary DH theorists: that Walzer’s restriction of 
DH only to professional politicians is unwarranted. What I want to emphasize here though, 
is that critics of the narrow view say nothing on the validity of the standard DH thesis. In 
fact, most such critiques do not depart from the standard Walzerian conceptual scheme of 
DH at all. This much was also gestured in the previous chapter: contemporary DH theorists 
such as Stocker (2000), de Wijze (1994; 2002; 2008), Cunningham (1992) and Gowans 
(2001) follow Walzer in framing DH as a single and momentary conflict between two im-
possible ‘oughts’ or reasons for action. The problem these theorists identify - the narrow-
ness of the Walzerian conception of DH - has little to do with the conceptual structure of the 
problem. What is disputed is Walzer’s exclusive location of the DH problem within the do-
main of politics - not the extent to which the standard DH thesis adequately captures Machi-
avelli’s insights nor, by implication, the extent to which the orthodox conception of DH suf-
fices. The Walzerian conceptual structure of this problem (and its affinities with Machiavel-
                                            
65 Whilst I do not share de Wijze’s and Goodwin’s predicament that Jim should 
unequivocally pick the act that yields the ‘lesser evil’ in consequentialist terms (I elaborate 
on this in chapter 5), this need not deny that: i) moral tragedy cannot occur outside politics 
and ii) whatever Jim does will carry a moral remainder. 
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li’s thought) is, more or less, taken for granted and then applied beyond the realm of poli-
tics. 
 
So, the problem I documented in the introduction of this chapter remains. Whilst de 
Wijze et al disagree with Walzer on the question of scope, the standard interpretation of DH 
as a momentous paradox of action- coupled with the image of the moral politician that 
emerges from their critique - remain unscathed: a solution to the problem should and does 
exist. But I am not convinced - neither of the adequacy of the standard DH thesis (narrow or 
otherwise) nor of the image of the ex ante innocent, yet ex post dirty politician which 
emerges from it. To be clear, I do not wish to deny either the possibility or the philosophical 
coherence of tragic dilemmas. My focus here is rather different: I contend that if there is 
something special about politics as DH theorists acknowledge, then the orthodox way of 
thinking about DH in this context does not suffice. The conception of DH as a momentous 
tragic dilemma fails to capture certain elements which deem politics special. And, despite its 
purported Machiavellian affiliations, the standard DH thesis is much more closely aligned to 
the idealistic vision it seeks to evade.  
 
I am therefore committed to two distinct, yet interlinked tasks - each of which ques-
tions whether the standard DH thesis adequately captures what it means to have DH in poli-
tics. The first is to scrutinize the conceptual structure of the traditional DH perspective. I 
want to suggest that the conventional DH thesis, despite its surface appeal, makes little 
sense if situated in the real context of certain on-going activities, such as politics. To put it 
simply, the DH thesis is unsatisfactorily ‘static’ or ‘snapshotty’: it misconceives the extent 
of the rupture between morality and politics. The second task is to suggest that interpreting 
DH solely as a paradox of action is not enough. For, this interpretation cannot fully capture 
the nature of the rupture between morality and politics. To be more specific, I shall argue 
that the standard DH thesis seems to be oblivious to the way in which moral character - in 
particular, innocence as a disposition - enters politics and jeopardizes political existence. 
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For, innocence as a disposition can bring about political disaster without one necessarily 
being confronted with a paradox of action; and it may persist even after one’s hands have 
been dirtied in the traditional way. I defer the latter task for the time being and turn immedi-
ately to the former.   
 
4.3. The Standard DH Thesis as ‘Static’ 
 
In The Crooked Timber of Humanity, Isaiah Berlin observes that a large portion of 
utopian political thought against which Machiavelli (amongst others) sounded the clarion 
call, is characterized by a vulgar theme:   
 
Once upon a time there was a perfect state, then some enor-
mous disaster took place … the pristine unity is shivered and 
the rest of human history is a continuous attempt to piece to-
gether the fragments in order to restore serenity, so that the per-
fect state can be realized again (1990: 23)   
 
Needless to say, the sting of Berlin’s charge was not directed against the standard DH thesis. 
Yet, the contemporary conceptual structure of the problem - Walzer’s encapsulation of the 
conflict between morality and politics as a tension between ‘the consequentialism of ex-
tremity’ and ‘the deontology of normality’- suggests that this is a theme which runs formi-
dably through its veins. So, too, do the allusions, popular amongst orthodox DH theorists, to 
‘innocence lost’: recall that the departing assumption of the standard DH thesis is an inno-
cent man who, once confronted with a paradox of action is no longer innocent. Even more 
telling is Walzer’s hopeful, albeit puzzling, conviction that: 
 
It is not the case that when [the politician] does bad in order to 
do good he surrenders himself forever to the demon of politics 
…he commits a determinate crime, and he must pay a determi-
nate penalty. When he has done so, his hands will be clean 
again (1973: 178).   
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The standard DH thesis assumes that politics and morality are (or should be) in harmony 
until a stark paradox of action is presented to the agent. A correlative of this is that, whilst 
the tension between morality and politics is prima facie acknowledged - hence the DH prob-
lem - such an acknowledgement is ingrained with a ‘static’ quality which is also evident in 
the scenarios DH theorists discuss. In Walzer’s original analysis for instance, a political 
candidate (let us call him Ned) is confronted with two undesirable options: a) make a deal 
with a dishonest ward boss, “involving the granting of school contracts for the next four 
years”, thereby getting DH for the sake of political success; or b) keep them clean, at the 
cost of staying out of politics (1973: 165). Similarly, in the TBS, the politician is faced with 
the prospect of either: a) issuing torture, and betraying his pre-election promises and princi-
ples, or b) refusing to torture the terrorist - let the ticking-bomb explode - and violate his 
political responsibilities
66
. Proponents of the standard DH thesis scrutinize the conflict be-
tween morality and politics from a ‘snapshot’ perspective: by focusing on a single, stark 
dilemma that confronts the ex-ante innocent agent at a specific moment of his life. The cru-
cial question pertinent to the static framework is whether, given some unfortunate circum-
stances, the action with the best direct effect bears a blameworthy feature and - if it has - 
whether it is permissible to employ it nonetheless. To be sure, standard DH theorists also 
suggest that in politics, the DH agent should publically reveal his ‘tragic remorse’ and dirt 
so as to regain his innocence through some form of cathartic punishment (though if inno-
cence can indeed be regained through such ‘cathartic rituals’ there is no reason to restrict the 
application of them to politics). Regardless of its adequacy though, this proviso constitutes 
yet another testament to the ‘static’ quality of the orthodox account of the problem: DH in-
volves one’s confrontation with a momentary and relatively rare episode - the conflict be-
tween morality and politics is a mere anomaly which disrupts the normality of past and fu-
ture serenity. 
 
                                            
66 I have discussed both examples in more detail in chapter 3. 
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Now, I should pause for a moment here so as to emphasize a crucial point - a con-
tradiction perhaps - which already looms large. As I have already indicated, proponents of 
the standard DH thesis (narrow or otherwise) do acknowledge that there is something moral-
ly special about politics. To put it differently, DH theorists do appear to appreciate the non-
static nature of political life. For instance, Walzer, de Wijze and Goodwin note that “the 
dilemma of dirty hands is a central feature of political life that arises not merely as an occa-
sional crisis … but systematically and frequently” (Walzer, 1973: 162; de Wijze & Good-
win, 2009: 531; my emphasis). The latter, following Williams, even stress that DH “is a 
predictable and probable hazard of public life” (de Wijze & Goodwin, 2009: 531; my em-
phasis). At the same time however, they assume that all the essential features of DH are dis-
coverable in such ‘static’ choices67. So, whilst such remarks do suggest that standard DH 
theorists are not oblivious to (some of) the issues I want to raise here, those issues are nei-
ther sufficiently acknowledged nor incorporated in the way they portray DH in politics - 
hence the static conception. For anything less than the most superficial consideration of 
such remarks is bound to reveal that the prevalent conception of DH needs to be drastically 
amended.  
 
So, my argument here is this: if the problem of DH in politics is predictable, sys-
tematic, frequent and probable, the static account - the framing of DH as a single, momen-
tous and tragic dilemma - does not suffice: the problem of DH is bound to have certain di-
mensions that cannot be adequately captured by the snapshot perspective. Taking a cue from 
Emrys Westacott (2008), I shall suggest that whilst hypothetical or ‘static’ scenarios are of-
ten invoked to clarify moral issues - by regularly pointing to how complex moral life can be 
- they tend to lose the complexity of real life. In advancing this claim, I shall highlight a set 
of interrelated - and more troubling - ‘symptoms’ which metastasize from the static concep-
tion of DH. In short, I argue that: a) the standard DH thesis is too abstract and devoid of the 
                                            
67 De Wijze (1994; 1996) and Stocker (1990) go so far as to propose a set of necessary and 
sufficient conditions for DH based on this static perspective. 
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real sociological context; b) it fails to capture certain issues that are related to time, which 
are special to politics (or the life of politicians) - it is, in short, melodramatic; c) its central 
insight -  the possibility of tragedy and conflict between politics and morality - is ultimately 
annihilated ; and d) it gives rise to a peculiar, if not inconsistent, view of certain vices. It is 
to these issues I now turn.  
 
4.3.1. An Ad Hoc Sociological Fantasy 
 
 Confusion, Wittgenstein (1958) tells us, arises when we let ourselves to be seduced 
by a picture. Whilst simplicity is often seen as a virtue - especially in philosophical inquiry - 
the complexity of real life is such that we often become bewitched by examples that seem 
compelling but mischaracterize the world we live in (Luban, 2008). But, in Henry Shue’s 
words, “we cannot simply imagine a tin-opener”68 (2009: 308). The comfort which the as-
sumption of a tin-opener creates renders philosophical inquiries (far more) abstract and de-
void of their sociological context. And, whilst the standard DH thesis purports to capture the 
complexities and nuances of moral life, such an assumption lurks in the background of most 
contemporary discussions of DH in general and the paradigm case of DH in particular: the 
TBS. As Shue suggests, the TBS assumes that:  
 
Whilst torture is rare because restricted to such appropriate 
cases, the torture is perfectly successful: suddenly someone 
with no experience or training, who has never tortured anyone 
before, quickly extracts vital information from someone dedi-
cated to withholding such information (2009: 314). 
 
This, however, is a ‘sociological fantasy’- the example we are presented with is underpinned 
by an impoverished and romanticized conception of real-world interrogations. For, whilst 
                                            
68 This refers to an old joke: a physicist and an economist are stranded on a desert with a tin 
of food. The physicist uses a rock to open the tin. The economist (in the spirit of assuming 
full information) says: ‘let’s imagine a tin-opener’.   
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the TBS assumes a single, ad hoc dilemma about whether or not to torture, by public offi-
cials who would only resort to the issuance of torture in a desperate emergency, the real 
world of interrogations “is a world of practices, not of ad hoc emergency measures” (Luban, 
2005: 1445). As Shue explains “we have abstracted from the social basis necessary for the 
practice of torture. For torture is a practice. Practitioners who do not practice will not be 
very good at what they do”69 (2006: 237 - 238). In short, TBS discussions focus on the pub-
lic official’s choice in abstraction from the real social and political context within which that 
choice – to issue torture or not - should be made.  
 
 Needless to say, this recognition does not eliminate the possibility of TBS
70
. Nor 
does it have to deny that a moral remainder in such instances does exist
71
. It does, however, 
suggest that the static account is paradoxically oblivious to Machiavelli’s infamous message 
when it comes to the practice of torture - that virtuous engagement in certain on-going activ-
ities necessitates not just the exhibition of certain vices but also their cultivation. I reserve 
extending this insight to political practice for now (I elaborate on this point in section 4 of 
this chapter and in chapter 5). What I want to emphasize here though, is that Shue’s 
acknowledgement that “torture takes skill, disposition and knowledge gained only from ex-
perience” (2009: 314) alters the structure of the DH dilemma. For if the dangers of instilling 
an official “culture of torture” deem “the legalization of torture ... a bad mistake”, as de 
Wijze (2006: 314) stresses, but the possibility of the TBS remains, then maintaining the ar-
                                            
69 The notion of practice should be highlighted here as it forms a key premise of the 
dynamic account of DH I develop in chapter 5. 
70 For instance, the recent case in Belgium of Marc Dutroux, a psychopath who was 
convicted of rape and murder comes close to the situation depicted by the TBS. While 
serving a prison sentence, Dutroux allowed two young girls that he had abducted to starve to 
death in a hidden room. The police had been tipped off that Dutroux was responsible for the 
abductions but failed to find the girls when they searched his house. See de Wijze (2006). 
71 This is Luban’s (2005; 2008) and Shue’s (2006; 2009) recent position. Whilst discussing 
this, de Wijze (2006) takes issue with their absolutism but ignores the sociological 
implications of their analysis and restates the standard DH thesis.  
 109 
 
gument for DH in this scenario requires, at least, this much: a covert cadre of trained tortur-
ers to ensure that the possibility of ‘doing wrong in order to do right’ remains open when, 
and if, needed. This, however, seems to suggest that the conception of DH as a momentary 
dilemma does not suffice; it reveals the existence of a second-order DH dilemma previously 
unaccounted for: if a cadre of professional torturers is necessary but must not be made pub-
lic, then the requirements of secrecy imply that the politician must get DH (at least) once 
more.   
 
4.3.2. An Ad Hoc Melodrama 
 
This brings to the fore an aspect of DH that static analyses struggle to confront: pol-
itics - democratic or otherwise - is a career for relatively long periods; and, throughout her 
or his career, a politician faces more than just one DH dilemma. But, as Janos Kis (2008) 
observes, the repetition of DH situations raises questions of a rather different kind. If DH 
does not constitute a momentary episode, it is bound to have certain implications that ines-
capably unfold over time but are nevertheless distorted by static analyses. One such issue 
concerns the contention that politicians are (and should be) crushed by ‘tragic remorse’, “the 
appropriate way of characterising the moral emotion that arises from getting DHs” (de 
Wijze & Goodwin, 2009: 537).  
 
As Judith Shklar eloquently points out, whilst this image appeals “to those engaged 
intellectuals who like to think of ‘dirty hands’ as a peculiarly shaking, personal and spectac-
ular crisis”, it is “a fantasy quite appropriate to the imaginary world” (1984: 243). To be 
sure, this recognition need not emerge only from the cracks of the TBS; it can be illustrated 
by examining less drastic cases of DH, such as Ned’s case72. Recall that Walzer is adamant 
that Ned must get DH. As he puts it:  
                                            
72 Ned’s example, I should add, does not constitute a ‘supreme emergency ‘- which, in 
Walzer’s (2004) and de Wijze’s (2009) more recent analyses, is synonymous to DH.  
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If the candidate didn't want to get his hands dirty, he should 
have stayed at home; if he can't stand the heat, he should 
get out of the kitchen. His decision to run was a commit-
ment to try to win, that is, to do within rational limits what-
ever is necessary to win (1973: 165).  
 
Up to this point, Ned’s dilemma roughly resembles Jim’s: both individuals are confronted 
with a single DH scenario and the prospect of inescapable wrongdoing. The purportedly 
universally experienced emotion of ‘tragic remorse’ already seems to be extravagant. How-
ever, if Ned’s case is scrutinized only through this ‘static’ perspective, we have no particular 
reason to dispute its plausibility. Or, so it would seem. But, in Ned’s case we might well 
want to ask this: suppose that Ned does win the election. Then what? Walzer et al do not 
say
73
. In the context of real political life though, it is almost certain that Ned will face new 
hard questions, most of which could be represented as second-order ‘static’ DH dilemmas. 
Should he keep his promise to grant the contracts to the ward boss? Should he make a simi-
lar deal when the next election approaches? 
 
 As the adage goes, the same thing repeated many times is not the same thing - Her-
aclitus tells us that things cannot stand still (Plato, Cratylus). Assuming that it is unprob-
lematic for an ex ante innocent politician to enter politics in the first place (Machiavelli’s 
infamous message and the logical extension of Shue’s argument to politics already suggest 
otherwise) the first DH act interferes with a history of clean hands; the distance between 
Ned’s clean moral record before and after he gets DH for the first time (that is before and 
after he strikes the deal) is immense. But, the distance between his moral record before and 
after he gets DH for a second time is considerably smaller. Besides, Ned lost his innocence 
before this second-order DH dilemma obtained. Hence, as time goes by, the marginal loss 
caused by the successive DH decisions diminishes and the DH politician moves even further 
                                            
73 They do however contend that Ned should publically reveal his DH. I examine this claim 
in the next subsection.  
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away from what he was before the first act of DH (Kis, 2008). On the other hand, the costs 
of refusing to carry out the DH act are likely to increase with time. For, in his first electoral 
campaign Ned “has no office to lose. Next time he has” (Kis, 2008: 198). This marginal 
(moral) cost would rise even if Ned were to seek office and power for the sake of promoting 
good ends, rather than anything else (I elaborate on this issue in the next subsection). In 
short, “while the marginal loss from acting with DH is likely to diminish over time, the 
marginal cost of keeping one’s hands clean are likely to increase” (Kis, 2008: 199).  
 
Pace Walzer et al, it should come as no surprise that Machiavelli has little to say 
about the inwardness of the politician (see chapter 3). For, given the recognition that DH is 
far from being a momentary episode, to think of the politician as a tragic hero who suffers 
more and more, as he sinks deeper into the dreary domain of politics seems melodramatic, 
to say the least. It is more plausible to see him as becoming accustomed to his dirt. And, we 
have no reason to expect this pathos even after the first DH dilemma obtains. For, this is the 
reaction of an innocent individual thrown to the messy world of politics not of an experi-
enced politician. I shall elaborate on this point in the next section, but it is worth mentioning 
here that this is the lesson Sartre’s Hoerderer (whose remarks are, like Machiavelli’s, fre-
quently cited by standard DH theorists but superficially acknowledged) forces upon us. Ho-
erderer, the embodiment of experience, is comfortable with his dirt - Hugo’s obsessiveness 
with purity is naïve. For, as Hoerderer tells us, in politics ‘one lies when one must’74  (1955: 
223 - 224).     
 
One may retort that these second-order DH dilemmas (and their implications) do 
not obtain. For, the standard DH thesis appears to resist them: the democratic DH politician 
should, soon after the first dilemma is posed, publically reveal his DH so as to regain his 
                                            
74 There is an irony here: the play from which the standard DH thesis takes its name makes 
no mention of tragic remorse. For Sartre, politics is an on-going activity and DH is 
enduring. Indeed, standard DH theorists’ description of the moral politician is closer to 
Hugo rather than Hoerderer. I say more on this on chapter 7. 
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innocence through some form of cathartic punishment. This point, as I have suggested, 
forms part of Walzer’s suggestion that the acceptance of punishment sustains the hope of 
salvation: it might enable the politician to regain his innocence. This, Walzer tells us, is 
“what the Catholic Church has always taught” (1973: 167 - 168). But, as I have already in-
dicated, this proviso succumbs to even further difficulties.   
 
4.3.3. Innocence Restored? From Pluralism and Conflict to Monism and 
 Harmony 
  
Central to the Catholic account is a paradoxical note of optimism: the hope of salva-
tion. Recall Walzer’s emphatic claim that “it is not the case that when [the politician] does 
bad in order to do good he surrenders himself forever to the demon of politics”; he “com-
mits a determinate crime, and he must pay a determinate penalty. When he has done so, his 
hands will be clean again” (1973: 178). The static account, whilst prima face acknowledg-
ing tragedy and conflict - hence the melodrama - leaves room for the hope of moving be-
yond them. This puzzling contention brings to mind Berlin’s remark on Marxist political 
thought and its view of conflict: “some nineteenth-century thinkers thought that [the quest 
for harmony] is not so simple … Yet, after inevitable setbacks, failures, relapses, returns to 
barbarism … the drama would have a happy ending” (1990a: 13). The similarities between 
the standard DH thesis and the Marxist view of conflict are profound: after all the drama has 
taken place, once the acts of revelation and punishment are instilled, the DH politician 
washes his hands clean. Innocence need not be irretrievably lost: a happy ending for the 
momentarily dirty politician might exist.  
 
This is a crucial point - it gives rise to a contradiction which needs to be better high-
lighted: whilst the Catholic account seems to embrace a Machiavellian view of morality, it 
finally lapses back into the very idealism it seeks to evade. In Walzer’s final synthesis, har-
mony could be re-established: politics and morality, despite being momentarily disrupted 
are not ultimately incombinable. The standard DH thesis seems to oscillate from a purport-
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edly value-pluralist perspective to a value-monist one
75
. On the standard account of DH, the 
transition from temporary conflict to final harmony, from dirt to innocence, seems to be 
smooth and unproblematic.  
 
What emerges from Walzer’s hopeful conviction is a reinstatement (albeit in a 
slightly different form) of the ‘order’ against which Machiavelli conveyed the idea that poli-
ticians ‘must learn how not to be good’. For, as Berlin notes, “Machiavelli conveyed the 
idea of two incompatible outlooks”, each “shaped by values, not means to ends but ultimate 
ends, ends in themselves” which are “in some profound, irreconcilable ways, not combina-
ble in any final synthesis” 76 (1990a: 10). Whilst this is a striking recognition, it should not 
surprise us. Walzer’s choice of the term ‘Catholic’ to capture his account of DH is not in-
significant.  The disavowal of tragedy and conflict is a central tenet of Christian providence 
(Scott, 1966; Barbour, 1983; Leech, 1963). Christianity ultimately turns evil into good, im-
perfection into perfection and conflict into harmony. As Karl Jaspers explains, the Christian 
                                            
75 I use the term purportedly here, not just because the standard DH thesis mischaracterizes 
the extent of the conflict between morality and politics but because it also mischaracterizes 
the nature of such a conflict. As I explain in the next section here and in chapter 5, pluralism 
does not merely entail the acceptance of conflict between different action-guiding 
prescriptions: it also entails the acceptance of a perpetual conflict between at least two entire 
ways of life, each with its own virtues and standards of excellence.     
76 I should highlight two intertwined issues here. First, whilst Berlin’s interpretation of 
Machiavelli might seem far from canonical, the point here is that whilst the standard DH 
thesis does appeal to pluralism and conflict it fails to take these into an earnest considera-
tion. Second, as I shall show here and in the next chapters, it is not the case that Berlin’s 
interpretation of Machiavelli cannot cohere with more canonical expositions of the Floren-
tine’s thought - those advanced by political realists and DH theorists who do not subscribe 
to the standard DH thesis (i.e. Martin Hollis, Richard Bellamy, Stuart Hampshire, Mark 
Philp). This is glimpsed by Philp who writes that the vision that “ethics and politics are ef-
fortlessly linked seems a utopian aspiration” (2001: 89). In a similar vein, William Galston, 
whilst outlining the key features of the tradition of political realism writes that “the basic 
point and structure of politics creates a qualitatively different set of challenges to which in-
dividual morality offers an inadequate guide” (2010: 392).       
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doctrine of salvation opposes tragic knowledge: “the chance of being saved destroys the 
tragic sense of being trapped without a chance of escape” (1953: 37- 38). Like most ac-
counts of religious faith, the Catholic account ends up disavowing its acknowledgement of 
conflict, imperfection and tragedy.  
 
But it is not just that the ‘static’ DH thesis ultimately negates the insight it advanc-
es. The final harmony between politics and morality it envisions is hardly conceivable. 
“Conflict”, Stuart Hampshire disquietingly notes, “is perpetual, why then should we be de-
ceived?” (2000: 51). And in Berlin’s eloquent words:   
 
If we are told that these contradictions will be solved in some perfect world 
in which all good things can be harmonized … then we must answer to 
those who say this, that … the world in which what we see as incompatible 
values are not in conflict is a world beyond our ken … But it is on earth on 
we live, and it is here we must believe ... The notion of a perfect whole, the 
ultimate solution, in which all good things coexist seems not merely unat-
tainable - that is truism - but conceptually incoherent (1990a: 13).   
 
The argument I advanced in the previous subsection already grants prima facie validity to 
Hampshire’s and Berlin’s claim - our discussion of Ned’s case revealed that DH is not a 
momentary ‘episode’. The point I wish to emphasize here builds on this recognition, but its 
focus is different: it emphasizes the issue of revelation of one’s dirt. For, even if the specific 
dilemmas I have mentioned above do not obtain, Ned’s decision of whether to reveal his 
DH and subject himself to expiatory punishment cannot be that simple: this question consti-
tutes a second-order DH dilemma in itself and is, therefore, not without a moral remainder. 
 
Pace Walzer and de Wijze, Ned’s decision to run for president is not merely “a 
commitment to try to win” (1973: 165). Gaining office is not in itself the ‘end’ of politics; 
office demands rule. “What must count as a political activity, anywhere”, Bernard Williams 
explains, “is trying to stay in office” (1978: 59). Williams’ remarks on resignation are sug-
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gestive here; as he says, “to view resignation as the mere equivalent of saying ‘I agree’ or ‘I 
disagree’ in a private and uncoerced conversation” is “an elementary misunderstanding” 
(1978: 58). Granted that proponents of the standard DH thesis do not talk about resignation 
(or removal from office) - indeed, they do not discuss what such cathartic rituals might be at 
all - but, if punishment is to be meaningful, it is difficult to imagine any sanction for the DH 
politician other than removal from office
77. If this is the case though, Ned’s decision to pub-
lically reveal his DH runs counter to one of the tele of politics: the demand to rule. So, at the 
very minimum, the DH politician is confronted with a second-order DH dilemma: a) either 
to publically reveal his DH so as to regain his innocence, at the cost of political ostracism or 
b) marshal on and fulfil his political commitment, at the cost of betraying our demand for 
innocent politicians again. As Hollis puts it “once a dilemma has been posed for a person in 
office, integrity does not demand that he keep his hands clean by stepping aside. It is too 
late for clean hands, whatever he does” (1982: 396). The point here is that Ned’s choice is 
inescapably bound to be dirty: the conflict between morality and politics does not evaporate 
as proponents of the Catholic account assume.  
 
To suggest otherwise, Williams tells us, is to neglect the difference “between com-
mitment to on-going political activity and a one-off example of political expression. It is also 
to neglect the point that for a politician such a decision is, in a substantial and relevant 
sense, part of his life” (1978: 58). Williams’ remark does not merely imply that standard DH 
theorists fail to capture Ned’s choice as a second-order DH dilemma. It also reveals the ex-
istence of an odd contradiction at the heart of the standard DH thesis - a by-product of the 
one-off conception of this problem: Why should Ned - just after he enters the political game 
by becoming dirty for the sake of political success - decide to revert to the mode of ordinary 
                                            
77 Garrett (1996) identifies several possible punishment types, all of which lead to the 
removal from office: i) resignation ii) electorate retaliation, by either demanding immediate 
removal from or by not supporting the politician’s re-election campaign; ii) ostracism iii) 
legal proceedings - such as the Nurnberg trials. 
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morality - by subjecting himself to punishment (and to the risk of political ostracism) so as 
to restore his forgone innocence? To put it bluntly, if Ned’s objective was to stay away from 
the enduring dirt of politics, he should not have bothered becoming dirty in the first place; 
as Truman’s motto goes “if he could not stand the heat he should have stayed out of the 
kitchen”. Hence, if Ned’s choice is situated within the context of real political life and its 
demands, the action-guiding prescription Walzer and de Wijze advocate makes little sense. 
It also gives rise to a rather odd view of certain vices.  
 
4.3.4. Innocence Restored? A Peculiar and Inconsistent view of the Vices 
 
The standard DH thesis, whilst purportedly advancing an argument on the necessity 
of immoral acts (or the practice of vices), grants the permission to behave immorally only in 
the first-order DH dilemma. Once hands are dirtied, the politician should refrain from en-
gaging in further immoralities; he must not publically “pretend that his hands are clean” and 
thereby conceal his dirt from us (Walzer, 1973: 168). This, however, seems awkward. The 
static account suddenly appears to be censorious over the practice of hypocrisy and dissimu-
lation - or, at least, of some manifestations of these: the pretence of clean hands and the art 
of concealing one’s vices or previous DH acts78. To be sure, adherents of the orthodox DH 
thesis are not alone in abhorring hypocrisy and deception. But a Kantian’s opposition to-
wards such vices would not strike us as odd - this is to be expected. For those who endorse 
the practise of almost every vice - including the advocacy of cruelty in scenarios such as the 
TBS - this seems to be prima facie inconsistent. One has reason to wonder whether for an 
                                            
78 This point, I should add here, also connects to the argument I advance in the next section: 
the static DH thesis fails to take into account the virtues conducive to a virtuous political 
life. In short, the standard DH thesis ignores that the conflict between morality and politics 
cuts deeper than a mere incompatibility of action guiding prescriptions. The upshot of this, 
as I explain, is that the politician the standard DH thesis presents us with is too innocent for 
politics. I say more on why the innocent are incapable of hypocrisy (or, at least, the 
hypocrisy advocated by Machiavelli) in chapter 6.  
 117 
 
account which purportedly advances a ‘lesser evil’ argument, the practice of cruelty consti-
tutes a ‘lesser evil’ vis-à-vis hypocrisy and dissimulation.  
 
And, irrespective of whether cruelty is a lesser vice vis-à-vis hypocrisy and dissimu-
lation
79, the contradiction I previously highlighted remains: the revelation of one’s dirt may 
well jeopardize one’s on-going political commitment. Democratic politics, Kis reminds us, 
involves a continuous struggle for power; “politicians know that their public statements are 
used in that context” (2008:199). A sincere revelation of their DH “may be misused against 
them” (Kis, 2008: 199). This insight is advanced by DH theorists who stay faithful to Mach-
iavelli’s teachings. In politics, Hollis says, “the extent of the dirt is hard for us to gauge be-
cause our agent's (political) duty is to conceal it from us” - “if we know”, the politician “has 
failed”. Hence, “a wise prince … preserves a moral front by seeming to keep faith and 
seeming to act with honour, while secretly breaking faith and ignoring honour when occa-
sion demands” (Hollis, 1982: 389; 396). Machiavelli’s message is clear: the politician must 
get his hands dirty once more; he must conceal his past DH acts and appear before us as an 
innocent man - he must wear clean gloves (Bellamy, 2010). Pace Walzer, no politician who 
takes the claims of politics seriously and who wants to sustain his tenure can allow himself 
to speak about his DH without paying attention to the strategic aspect of his statements. In 
short, the standard DH thesis not only underestimates the necessity of such vices (or dirty 
acts) but it also undermines the possibility of political failure stemming from the revelation 
of one’s DH - it overlooks how the uncritical pursuit of honesty may interfere with ongoing 
political commitment. 
 
I shall elaborate on the necessity of hypocrisy (and how the vice of hypocrisy con-
stitutes the ‘glue’ that holds together a virtuous life of politics) in chapters 5 and 6, but I 
want to press this point more here. I want to turn to a case discussed by Walzer (1977), 
which supposedly demonstrates the practical currency of the Catholic account: the Allied 
                                            
79 I say more on this point in chapter 6. 
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terror bombings during WWII and the subsequent dishonouring of Harris, the British Com-
mander who led the operations. This, Alex Bellamy tells us, is the sine qua non of DH rea-
soning “and a small forest has been lost to articles on this subject” (2009: 546). To cut a 
long story short, the first-order DH dilemma which confronted the British involved a choice 
of either: a) terror bombing the German cities at the cost of annihilating non-combatants or 
b) refuse to do so at the cost of possible defeat. As Walzer suggests, the decision to opt for 
(a) was justified, yet wrongful: whilst the Allies were “face-to-face not merely with defeat 
but with defeat likely to bring disaster to the political community … terror bombing is a 
criminal activity” (1977: 323). Yet, whilst the British got DH, their refusal to honour Harris 
constituted a form of atonement - “it re-established a commitment to … the rights they pro-
tect … the deepest meaning of all assignments of responsibility” (Walzer, 1977: 325). In 
short, Walzer takes this to be an admission to the public that such acts were dirty.       
 
Now, two questions merit further scrutiny here: Was Harris the only actor with DH 
in this case? And, if not, why was only he dishonoured? In relation to the first question, 
Walzer does acknowledge the DH of the British government - and Churchill’s: “if blame is 
to be distributed” he says “Churchill deserves full share” (1977: 324). To be sure, the orders 
issued to the RAF were clear: in a note to the Minister of War, Churchill remarked that 
“there is one thing that will bring [Hitler] down … an absolutely devastating attack by 
heavy bombers upon the Nazi homeland. We must overwhelm him by these means” (1949: 
567). But Walzer’s answer to the second question is less than satisfactory. As he says, 
“Churchill’s success in disassociating himself from the policy of terror bombing is not of 
great importance” (Walzer, 1977: 324). Pace Walzer, Churchill’s dissociation from such a 
policy is important in at least this much: it constitutes a testament to the practical inadequa-
cy of the Catholic model. The government did not publically reveal its DH; quite the contra-
ry: it pretended to hold the moral high ground. This mismatch between the government’s 
intentions and public avowals is reflected in a plethora of evidence (c.f. Parker, 1989; 
Overy, 2005). Churchill repeatedly declared that “this is a military and not a civilian war” 
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(Nicolson, 1967: 122). Even after the destruction of Dresden, the government continued to 
insist that the RAF was not conducting terror attacks. In response to criticism from a Labour 
MP, Sinclair opined, “we are not wasting time on terror tactics” (Garrett 1996: 119) 
 
Hence, in one of the most discussed cases of DH, the British government, whilst au-
thorizing the killing of non-combatants, publically denied doing so. “The reason why they 
did this” Bellamy tells us “is straightforward”: the public would not support a campaign of 
annihilation (2009: 546). This was reflected in various polls conducted during the war; no 
less than forty- six percent of the population opposed terror bombing (Connelly, 2002). So, 
the government employed a justificatory strategy based on dissimulation and hypocrisy; 
they concealed their DH because such acts would not have been endorsed by the people. 
Admitting the deliberate slaughter of non-combatants would cloud the war’s moral clarity 
and erode domestic support. The dishonouring of Harris was not, in any way, a form of ca-
tharsis. Not only did Harris not publically reveal his dirt to the community according to the 
dictates of the Catholic account - he breached government confidentiality and defended the 
terror bombings on utilitarian grounds (Hastings, 1979; Overy, 2005) - but also his open 
knavery deemed him an ideal scapegoat: the government wore clean gloves. 
 
So far I have sought to suggest that the conventional conception of DH as a single 
and momentary dilemma which brings about the ephemeral loss of innocence is inadequate-
ly static: it misconceives the extent of the conflict between morality and politics and does 
not sit well with the practical realities of certain on-going activities, most notably politics. In 
advancing this claim, I highlighted a number of puzzling issues which are entangled with 
the current ‘episodic’ conception of DH. Not only is the standard DH thesis unsatisfactorily 
abstract and melodramatic, but it also gives rise to an obscure and counter-intuitive view 
surrounding the practice of certain vices (or dirty acts as proponents of the standard DH the-
sis would put it). More importantly, the static account ultimately annihilates the purportedly 
value-pluralist vision it initially advances; Machiavelli’s (much cited by standard DH theo-
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rists) message that one ‘must learn how not to be good’ is ultimately supplanted by a deeply 
hopeful, yet unsatisfactory, vision of honesty, redemption and harmony. 
  
Now, one possible way to proceed from here is to reinterpret DH as involving a se-
ries of paradoxes of action which bring about the loss of innocence. This could make for a 
more nuanced account of this problem in politics, but it would nonetheless overlook a cru-
cial feature of the snapshot approach which merits more scrutiny: the assumption of an ex 
ante innocent man (which is the starting point of the standard DH thesis). Innocence, 
Walzer tells us, is tested and tarnished only when one is confronted with a paradox of ac-
tion; it is only when certain tragic circumstances obtain and compel the political agent to act 
immorally that Machiavelli’s message of ‘learning how not to be good’ materializes. Until 
then, there are no particular problems with innocence venturing freely in politics (given 
standard DH theorists’ perception of lost innocence as intolerable we may add that this is 
also desirable). 
 
But Machiavelli’s frequently cited advice is not that one must merely ‘learn how not 
to act well’. Machiavelli is adamant that ‘one must learn how not to be good’. For, moral 
character displays identity, not merely a spasmodic and sporadic collection of actions. This 
much also follows by extending Shue’s argument to politics - that ‘static’ analyses ignore 
that the virtuous engagement in the practice of torture is conditioned upon the cultivation of 
certain vices. In short, the standard DH thesis’ overemphasis on action misrepresents Mach-
iavelli’s infamous message. And this recognition can be explained with reference to the fact 
that the static DH thesis has inherited from the Enlightenment (in particular, the Kantians 
and Utilitarians) a non-teleological worldview - the product of the Enlightenment’s rejection 
of Aristotelian ethics of which Machiavelli’s account on political morality constituted an 
integral part. I shall say more on this in chapter 5. For now, I want to clarify the way the 
standard DH thesis displaces Machiavelli’s insights. In what follows, I argue that the static 
account does not merely misconceive the extent of the conflict between morality and poli-
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tics. It also fails to capture the precise nature of the conflict: politics does not require its 
practitioners to merely act in certain ways which conflict with ordinary morality; an expedi-
ent politics also requires its practitioners to cultivate and continuously exhibit certain dispo-
sitions which are at odds with an admirable moral life. Differently put, the standard DH the-
sis fails to acknowledge the way in which moral character enters politics and jeopardizes 
political existence. To be more specific, I shall suggest that there exists a discrepancy be-
tween acting in an abominable manner, as a result of one’s confrontation with a paradox of 
action - so that innocence, conceived as the absence of wrongdoing, is lost - and one’s abil-
ity to take Machiavelli’s advice to heart and learn how not to be good - so that innocence, 
conceived as a disposition, is irretrievably relinquished. The latter, can result in political 
failure in ways unanticipated by the standard DH thesis: without necessarily one being con-
fronted with a paradox of action and even after one’s hands have been dirtied in the tradi-
tional way. In connection to this, I contend that this discrepancy captures a concern which 
looms in the background of the discussion I have advanced so far: that Walzer’s moral poli-
tician may not be as good for politics as it is sometimes assumed. 
 
4.4. On ex ante Innocence and Walzer’s politician: Which Innocence?  
 
 In Shakespeare’s Henry VI, just after the eponymous character is defeated, Queen 
Margaret exclaims:  
                               Henry, your sovereign,  
                                                        is prisoner to the foe; his state usurp’d 
       His realm, a slaughter house, his subjects slain (V. vi, 31 - 33). 
 
What Margaret graphically describes here is a political disaster: the tragic disintegration of 
Henry’s kingdom. For Henry nonetheless, this turn of events seems hard to grasp. Like 
Walzer’s politician, Henry is an innocent man and not worthy of such an end. He enters pol-
itics motivated by the ideals of peace and love of his country and his rule constitutes an ex-
pression of them: it is altruistic and compassionate. Now, were we to utilize the standard 
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DH thesis as a means of diagnosing Henry’s failure, we would be equally puzzled by his 
tragedy. Henry’s demise is not located in an explicit refusal to get DH in the traditional 
sense. For, Henry is not confronted with a ‘static’ DH dilemma- a stark choice between two 
‘impossible oughts’. Scrutinized through the lens of the standard DH thesis, Henry’s inno-
cence is yet to be tested; his failure is inexplicable. But, as Peter Johnson points out, whilst 
Henry’s “actions do not take the form of explicit choices … at least in the manner required 
by the resolution of a specific dilemma” they do “stem from the disposition which charac-
terizes his life” (1993: 245). And it is precisely this disposition - Henry’s innocence - which 
proves fatal for the political community he is supposed to rule; “Henry”, Margaret explains 
“is too full of foolish pity” (V.  iv, 80). Henry spreads his compassion evenly across his po-
litical relationships: his unconditional trust and generosity towards his enemies is a signal of 
political infancy and an impaired understanding of politics. 
 
Needless to say, this insight has an intense Machiavellian flavour: innocent inten-
tions fail because they neglect the realities of power. It also signifies a disharmony between 
morality and politics which remains elusive for the standard DH thesis: the incongruence 
between the two does not involve a mere incompatibility of action but, as Machiavelli’s 
motto suggests, it cuts much deeper: it involves an incompatibility of character. When 
Warwick accuses Henry of being capable neither of ‘shrouding himself from his enemies’ 
nor of ‘recognizing the secret treasons of the world’, the sting of his accusation is not di-
rected against Henry’s unwillingness to act in a particular way in a situation of extremity but 
against his character which constitutes an expression of his actions in normality (IV. iii, 34 - 
38). Henry points out that as a child he was innocent of such matters and thus cannot be held 
responsible: “When I was crown’d I was but nine months old” (I. i, 110 - 111). Richard, 
who sees the irony of his remark, drives Machiavelli’s message home even more forcefully: 
“You are old enough now … yet, methinks, you lose” (I. i, 112 - 113). Henry has reached an 
age and a position where innocence is a culpable deficiency. 
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This is clear in the two main occasions of collision between Henry’s character and 
politics. First, Henry unnaturally gives up the succession to York. “The events which follow 
this”, Johnson suggests, “have the same logic which governs the consequences of a mistake 
in a chess game” (1993: 193). Henry alienates his supporters, betrays his oath and unleashes 
the forces which bring about a devastating war. The pivotal connection between the dissolu-
tion of order and the outbreak of civil war is traced to Henry’s ‘easy-melting’ character: his 
unwillingness ‘to learn how not to be good’ is directly translated into political ineffective-
ness. As the pace of events increases, so does Henry’s unwillingness and ineffectiveness. 
These culminate to the second notable expression of his innocence: his decision to withdraw 
from politics. As Henry says:  
 
I may conquer Fortune’s spite 
     By living low, where fortune cannot hurt me… 
    Although my head still wear the crown …. 
I myself will lead a private life (IV.vi, 19 - 44). 
        
Whilst Henry’s innocence finds initial expression in the creation of havoc, it then prompts 
nostalgia and guarantees his political isolation. Henry fails to realize that withdrawal from 
politics is not open to him. A crucial “aspect of his innocence”, Johnson points out, “is his 
belief that he can easily divest himself from public office” (1993: 196). Henry’s “attempt to 
escape politics for reasons of scruple leaves him naked in the face of predatory assaults” 
(Johnson, 1993: 196) and precedes his assassination - the final reward for his innocence.  
 
 It is important to elucidate more clearly here the crucial insight of Shakespeare’s 
play which is, nonetheless, overlooked by the orthodox way of thinking about DH. The con-
tention advanced by the standard DH thesis - that ex ante innocence should be ex post lost 
only once one is confronted with a static paradox of action - cannot fully account for what 
Machiavelli’s infamous motto entails: it leaves unexamined how moral character - in partic-
ular, innocence as a disposition - constitutes a severe obstacle towards effective political 
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engagement. For, there exists a discrepancy between innocence, as the absence of wrongdo-
ing - which is lost following one’s confrontation with a ‘static’ choice between two ‘impos-
sible oughts’ and innocence as a disposition - which is forfeited when one learns how not to 
be good. In Herbert Morris’ words “there is innocent conduct that is simply not wrong” and 
“there are innocent persons, persons who are absent of a certain kind of knowledge” and 
experience
80
 (1976: 141). Henry’s innocence epitomizes the latter: his “ignorance of the 
mediacies of politics, its conciliations, confrontations and duplicities, of when to trust and 
when not to places him half in and half out of the political world” (Johnson, 1993: 196 -
197). Innocence, in short, is not merely passive - something which is only acted upon or 
awaits to be tragically tainted upon one’s confrontation with a dilemma, as standard DH 
theorists maintain. Rather, it has an active sense: it is itself responsible for tragedy and dis-
aster. Differently put, whilst the standard DH thesis prima facie challenges the Platonic Ide-
al with respect to action (it postulates that moral and political action conflict) it maintains 
the Platonic Ideal with respect to character: it is oblivious to how certain dispositions con-
ducive to an admirable moral life conflict with a virtuous life of politics . 
  
 To further clarify the distinction between innocence as a disposition and innocence 
as the absence of wrongdoing, it might be worth adding that it is not just that moral charac-
ter may jeopardize political existence in the absence of a ‘static’ dilemma. Simply put, it is 
not the case that when one becomes (or is capable of becoming) guilty of wrongdoing he 
possesses the experience and qualities necessary for virtuous political rule. The discrepancy 
between innocence as a disposition and innocence as the absence of wrongdoing is such 
that the former may persist even after the latter has been lost - that is, after hands are dirtied 
in the traditional way. “Young children”, Morris points out, are often in this condition, for 
“they are guilty of wrongdoing; indeed they may feel guilty, while still retaining their inno-
                                            
80 This point is also raised by Stuart Hampshire (1989) and Elizabeth Wolgast (1993). 
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cence” (1976: 141). To illustrate how this insight applies to politics we might want to look 
at the character of Brutus in Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar.  
 
Despite the bad press he historically had, in Shakespeare’s tragedy Brutus is a noble 
man: he enters politics to protect the republic from tyranny. In order to do so nonetheless, he 
must get his hands dirty (in the conventional use of the word): he must join a group of con-
spirators - led by Cassius - and assassinate his friend, Caesar. The terms of his political en-
gagement are thus severe: they involve the dirty acts of assassination and betrayal. When 
Brutus contemplates on the path laid before him, he quickly acknowledges that his loyalty to 
Caesar and his political commitment to the Roman Empire cannot be reconciled:           
                    
  If that friend asks, why Brutus rose against Caesar, this is my answer:  
                          Not that I loved Caesar less, but that I loved Rome more (III. ii, 51).  
 
Brutus’ remarks capture the existence of a paradox of action. Despite his nobility, Brutus is 
not prepared to will the political good only by acting innocently: he is prepared to overcome 
his scruples and forfeit his innocence - as the absence of wrongdoing - to serve the commu-
nity. But, does Brutus’ capacity to dirty his hands mean that he learns how not to be good? 
Does this render Brutus ‘good for politics’ as proponents of the static DH thesis suggest?  
 
Shakespeare’s answer is negative: Brutus’ engagement in (what seems to be) a dirty 
act is a prelude to political chaos and his own demise. The lesson which Shakespeare forces 
upon us is not how an innocent man overcomes his scruples by engaging in a heinous act, 
but how moral character can be easily vulnerable to deception
81
. This is implicit in Mark 
Anthony’s speech in Caesar’s funeral:                                                             
 
         Brutus says Ceasar was ambitious, 
And Brutus is an honourable man… 
When the poor have cried, Caesar has wept. 
                                            
81 See Gowans’ (1990) analysis of Brutus dilemma in ‘static’ terms. 
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Ambition should be made of sterner stuff… 
Three times I presented him a kingly crown, 
Which he three times refused. Was this ambition? 
Oh judgment, you have fled to brutish beasts, 
And men have lost their reason! (III. ii, 56). 
 
Anthony suggests that Brutus has been deceived (at least) once: the momentous dilemma 
which Brutus thinks he was confronted with was a façade: a carefully devised scheme by 
Cassius to involve him in the conspiracy so as to accumulate political capital from his un-
tarnished reputation. Cassius edited a number of letters supposedly written by the public, 
which expressed concern for Caesar’s rule. In so doing, he convinced Brutus of Caesar’s 
ambitions and of the growing tide of public support for the conspiracy. What is worth em-
phasizing here is that the disharmony between morality and politics is (once again) not 
marked by Brutus’ dirty act. Rather, it is Brutus’ innocent character which compromises his 
political judgement and disqualifies him from expedient political engagement. “Sincere 
people are guileless”, Clive Lewis tells us, “and those who have no guile themselves are not 
quick to suspect it in others” (1960: 171). Whilst most of the evidence pointed against the 
justifiability of such a conspiracy, Brutus’ ignorance of politics precludes him from ap-
proaching Cassius’ plan with caution. His guilelessness deems him an easy prey to decep-
tion. What is striking here is that the loss of Brutus’ innocence - conceived as the absence of 
wrongdoing - is the product of his innocent character.  
 
But Brutus’ innocence does not evaporate following his engagement in a dirty act. 
The conflict between moral character and politics remains - it leads to a second instance 
where the former jeopardizes the latter: Brutus’ disastrous misjudgement in allowing An-
thony to deliver the above speech at Caesar’s funeral. Unlike Cassius, Brutus fails to realize 
that granting Anthony a rhetorical stand might be a politically risky permission: it reveals 
his “lack of insight into the motives of those less disinterested than himself, his attenuated 
political sense, and his patrician assumption that an open, rational account of his conduct is 
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sufficient to guarantee political success” (Johnson, 1993: 30). Even after Brutus’ hands are 
sullied and his innocence - as the absence of wrongdoing - is lost, his ignorance of political 
realities remains unaltered. His language signals a naïve honesty and simplicity uncongenial 
to the deception and duplicity of his interlocutors:  
 
We will deliver you the cause; Why I, that did love Caesar 
when I struck him, have thus proceeded? Our reasons are full 
of good regard; you, Anthony … should be satisfied … I will 
myself into the pulpit first, and show the reason for Caesar’s 
death. What Anthony shall speak, I will protest he speaks by 
leave and by permission” (III. i, 55). 
 
This is the conviction of a guileless man, confident of the righteousness of his intentions and 
acts. Brutus is unaware that others might disagree with him. Nor is he aware that his honesty 
can be turned against him. His innocence ultimately compels him to turn his back to the 
community: his belief that his engagement in politics ends with Caesar’s assassination con-
stitutes a prelude to Anthony’s manipulation of the public and Brutus’ ensuing death.  
 
But it is not just that the standard DH thesis is oblivious to the incompatibility of 
moral character and politics. There is more to be said here. The striking similarities between 
Walzer’s ex ante innocent, yet ex post DH politician and Brutus and Henry suggest that it is 
not just Shakespeare’s tragic heroes who constitute paradigms of innocence as a disposition. 
Recall that Walzer’s politician enters politics confident that his innocence is sufficient - he 
“wants to do good only by doing good … he is certain that he can stop short of the most cor-
rupting and brutal uses of political power” (1973: 168). Once confronted with the messy 
requirements of politics his immediate reaction is one of ‘tragic remorse’ - akin to an indi-
vidual who feels struck by an unanticipated misfortune. His goodness and obsession with 
innocence deems him incapable of hypocrisy and dissimulation - it prompts him to seek sol-
ace in a private life of contentment by washing his hands clean through an honest revelation 
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of his dirt, confident that evading public office is easy and devoid of moral loss and unaware 
how such acts may be exploited by his opponents.  
 
These sorts of beliefs and reactions are not only politically suicidal (for the reasons 
I documented earlier). They also constitute a mark of such an individual’s ignorance - an 
expression of innocence. As Williams remarks, since the problem of DH in politics “is eve-
ryday part of the business”, the politician who wants to take the claims of politics seriously 
“has to face the probability” of such conflicts (1978: 62). In other words, the politician 
should “know in advance that politics will produce these sorts of dilemma”. For, “in choos-
ing politics”, he “has chosen a life which will predictably bring these conflicts with it” 
(Mendus, 1988: 340 - 343). As Constantine Cavafy tells us: 
 
As one long prepared, and graced with courage 
             say goodbye to her, the Alexandria that is leaving … 
        don’t degrade yourself with empty hopes like these. 
       As one long prepared, and graced with courage … 
listen with deep emotion, but not 
    with the whining, the pleas of a coward … 
      and say goodbye to her, to the Alexandria you are losing. (1992: 33). 
  
Resentment does not make for an erudite reaction to an expected course of events; if one is 
‘long prepared’, ‘whining’ is hardly necessary. But this knowledge is crucially lacking in 
Walzer’s innocent politician; for, it is intertwined with the antithetical disposition of experi-
ence. In Hampshire’s words, experience involves “the expectation of unavoidable squalor 
and imperfection, of necessary disappointments and mixed results, of half success and half 
failure”. In short, “a person of experience has come to expect that his usual choice will be 
the lesser of two or more evils” (1989: 170). An experienced political agent is aware that the 
realm in which he willingly chose to operate cannot ever be free from conflict. Nor can it 
ever be clean.  
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 4.5. Conclusion   
 
Throughout this chapter I sought to demonstrate that something is amiss with the 
standard DH thesis. I have argued that, despite its purported Machiavellian affiliations, the 
standard DH thesis is much more closely aligned to the vision of innocence it seeks to re-
ject. For, the account of political ethics that emerges from the standard DH thesis is unsatis-
factorily static and idealistic. In particular, I illustrated that orthodox accounts of DH dis-
place the Machiavellian vision in, at least, two ways. First, the conventional conception of 
DH underestimates the extent of the conflict between morality and politics. Differently put, 
the standard DH thesis fails to capture the problem of DH (the continuous necessity for im-
moral actions) in its full magnitude in the context of certain ongoing activities, most notably 
politics. Machiavelli’s vision of perpetual conflict between morality and politics is sup-
planted by an abstract, melodramatic and hopeful vision of harmony and redemption. This, I 
have illustrated, is not just unwarranted. It also leads to a counterintuitive view of certain 
vices: it ignores the importance of hypocrisy and dissimulation and overlooks how the un-
critical pursuit of honesty may interfere with, and jeopardize, ongoing political commit-
ment.  Second, the orthodox conception of DH as a paradox of action cannot fully capture 
what Machiavelli’s infamous motto of learning how not to be good entails. The standard DH 
thesis - by virtue of its conception of the incongruence between morality and politics as an 
ephemeral and rare incompatibility of action-guiding prescriptions - fails to capture the pre-
cise nature of the conflict between morality and politics: it ignores how certain dispositions 
of character may enter politics and jeopardize political existence in the absence of a ‘static’ 
DH dilemma or even after hands have been dirtied in their traditional way.  
 
The way to proceed from here seems clear enough: if we are to capture DH in all its 
complexity, we should develop an account of the problem which can help break away from 
contemporary static accounts. We are, in other words, compelled to develop a ‘dynamic’ 
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account of DH so as to capture the problem of DH in all its complexity and restore Machia-
velli’s lost insights on political morality and conflict. This is the task of the next chapter. 
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     5.  The Dynamic Account of DH 
 
 
I have said nothing here with a view to lessen that infinite distance  
which must ever be between virtue and vice.  
I would only make my readers comprehend that all political are not all 
moral vices; and that all moral are not political vices. 
  Baron de Montesquieu 
82 
 
Great men are almost always bad men. 
                     Lord Acton 
83 
5.1. Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, I suggested that the orthodox way of thinking about DH in 
politics is unsatisfactorily ‘static’ and idealistic: it mischaracterizes both the extent and the 
precise nature of the conflict between morality and politics. In connection to this, I demon-
strated that despite its purported Machiavellian lineage, the standard DH thesis fails to take 
Machiavelli’s insights on political ethics seriously. In particular, I argued that Machiavelli 
advances two intertwined suggestions which are ignored by or, at best, difficult to reconcile 
with conventional DH approaches: the rupture between morality and politics is: i) much 
more enduring and ii) much deeper than static accounts allow. For, there exists a discrepan-
cy between acting in a morally abominable manner, as a result of one’s confrontation with a 
paradox of action, so that innocence - as the absence of wrongdoing- is lost - and one’s abil-
ity to take Machiavelli’s advice to heart and learn how not to be virtuous, so that innocence 
- as a disposition - is irretrievably relinquished.  
 
Implicit in both points is the suggestion that Machiavelli’s conception of agency 
and politics is underpinned by an approach that has received little attention by, and remains 
elusive for, standard DH theorists: a theory of virtues. Yet, as Mark Philp laments, “Machi-
                                            
82 The Spirit of Laws, 19 
83 Letter to Bishop Mandell Creighton, 1  
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avelli makes no attempt to offer a theory of virtues per se, as a contribution to an under-
standing of the good or the good life” (2001: 44). This recognition leaves in its wake a re-
sidual problem: how are we now to proceed? Philp (2001) advocates a turn to virtue ethics. 
This tradition might enable us to develop a framework that grasps DH in all its complexity: 
it shall help us conceive certain on-going activities, such as politics, on their own terms - 
these concern “the political virtues and qualities of actors involved” (Philp, 2001: 4). Thus, 
a turn to virtue ethics might enable us to fill the lacuna left open by Machiavelli, and to ef-
fectively retrieve elements that have been long lost from the DH perspective. My overall 
aim in this chapter is to pursue this suggestion. I will set the foundations of a richer account 
of DH by locating it within virtue ethics.  
 
Before saying more on how the discussion is advanced however, it is worth stress-
ing a crucial issue I briefly touched on in chapter 2. This concerns the extent to which virtue 
ethics, both classical and contemporary, can account for moral conflict in the first place. 
Whilst virtue ethics has received heightened philosophical interest lately, one of the most 
salient features of this approach is the contention that an action is justified iff it is what a 
virtuous person would do in the circumstances (Athanasoulis, 2010; Hursthouse, 1999; Oak-
ley & Cocking, 2001; Foot, 1978; 1983; Plato, The Republic; Aristotle, Nicomachean Eth-
ics; Aquinas, Summa Theologiae). This claim nonetheless, seems troubling in at least two 
interrelated ways. First, conventional virtue ethics seems resistant to DH (as traditionally 
understood) and its insights: the recognition that in certain tragic situations a morally inno-
cent course of action is unfeasible. This much is evident in Rosalind Hursthouse’s (1999) 
postulation that it is virtuous tout court to reveal a harmful truth, because this is what a per-
son with the virtue of honesty would do
84; “we are not forced”, she stresses, “to say that 
‘virtuous agents faced with dilemmas act badly … They don’t” (1999: 74). It seems unintel-
                                            
84 Whist elsewhere Hursthouse (1999) seems to embrace a view which comes close to the 
idea of DH, her account only applies to ‘static’ DH scenarios and does not capture the 
discrepancy between moral and political virtue.  
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ligible and contradictory, Hursthouse argues, to entertain the thought that the virtuous indi-
vidual who lies acts dishonestly or unjustly. In connection to this, most theories of virtue 
suggest that what is good qua human being is indistinguishable from what is good qua poli-
tician. This, however, is Plato’s view on political morality (see chapter 1), not Machiavelli’s 
and, in light of our discussion of Brutus and Henry, it seems less than satisfactory.  
 
On the face of it, conventional theories of virtue are replete with certain assump-
tions that have been previously deemed less than adequate: the Platonic ideal or the doctrine 
of final harmony. In short, virtue ethicists’ inheritance of Plato’s ‘unity of virtue thesis’ and 
his denial of moral conflict, poses serious issues which cannot be evaded whilst attempting 
to situate DH within this philosophical tradition. Yet, the thesis’ resistance to such assump-
tions also justifies this chapter’s choice of, and emphasis on Alasdair MacIntyre’s neo-
Aristotelian framework. Although this may appear as a bold claim, I contend that Mac-
Intyre’s thesis, as presented in his earlier works (in particular, in After Virtue which preced-
ed his Thomist-Aristotelian turn), resists the Platonic Ideal and can serve as a theoretical 
premise upon which we can develop a more nuanced account of DH. Indeed, MacIntyre’s 
later repudiation of the suggestion that “the virtues of one ideal character bring about the 
vices of the other” which implies the development of “an inescapably defective character” 
(1990: 369), is precisely the claim I shall advance here, and which, I suggest, follows by 
drawing on his account in After Virtue. It is therefore to the development of this point I want 
to turn here: to the provision of the foundations of a ‘dynamic’ account of DH by integrating 
elements of MacIntyre’s framework with Machiavelli’s conception of politics and political 
virtue (virtù).  
 
 My inquiry is organized into three stages. In the first section, I shall outline Mac-
Intyre’s ‘negative thesis’ so as to set the context for the subsequent sections. I illustrate 
some of the key objections MacIntyre levels against modern philosophy and demonstrate 
why Aristotle, the protagonist against whom he matches the voices of modern philosophy, is 
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so crucial to his argument. By examining the implications of MacIntyre’s ‘negative’ thesis, I 
suggest that his concerns surrounding the status of modern philosophy: i) add new insights 
to the inadequacy of the standard DH thesis and ii) provide a historical explanation as to 
why standard DH theorists displace Machiavelli’s thought. In the second section, I spell out 
MacIntyre’s ‘positive’ thesis. In so doing, I suggest that in contrast to conventional theories 
of virtue, MacIntyre’s account allows for moral conflict and tragedy and provides for a rich-
er account of DH (as traditionally conceived). I then utilize elements of his thesis to break 
away from the contemporary ‘static’ conception of this problem - its interpretation as a sin-
gle, rare and momentary tragic episode - in politics. In developing a dynamic account of 
DH, I conceive politics as a practice and way of life, and draw on Machiavelli’s discussion 
of political agency and virtù in order to sketch some of the virtues conducive to virtuous 
political conduct. As I demonstrate, the richer DH perspective which emerges, acknowledg-
es that virtuous engagement in politics, requires one to become partially vicious and partial-
ly virtuous, yet no longer innocent (dynamic DH). That is to say, the problem of DH, under-
stood in dynamic terms, involves a paradox of character, not just a paradox of action: lead-
ing a virtuous political life requires one to become partially vicious and no longer innocent. 
 
5.2. MacIntyre’s Negative Thesis: The Call to Rejuvenate the Virtues 
  
 MacIntyre’s “profoundly pessimistic” magnum opus (Schneewind, 1982: 662) be-
gins with a disquieting suggestion: contemporary philosophical discourse is “in state of 
grave disorder” (2007: 2). The “most striking feature of such moral utterance” is that it is 
used to express interminable disagreements
85
 (2007: 6). To the naked eye however, the lan-
guage in which these debates are conducted paradoxically implies that a rational solution to 
such disagreements can and should exist; moral discourse appears and claims to be charac-
terized by objectivity, rationality, absolute truth and universal applicability. But our moral 
                                            
85 See also Horton’s and Mendus’ (1994) introduction in After MacIntyre. 
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concepts are useless, MacIntyre argues. What is more, the extent of this disorder is so im-
mense that we lack the resources to recognize it, much less to extricate ourselves from it. In 
other words, contemporary philosophy is composed by mere simulacra of morality: a mass 
of incoherent conceptual fragments that have survived from the past, detached from the 
wider viewpoint from which they derived their meaning. 
 
The culprit for our current philosophical malaise, MacIntyre suggests, is the ‘En-
lightenment project’ (Kant, Hume and Diderot being its main representatives), and its suc-
cessors (Bentham’s and Mill’s utilitarianism for instance). To cut a long story short, Mac-
Intyre argues that the ‘Enlightenment project’ was both foundationalist and nihilistic- or, 
that it led to nihilism because of its flawed foundations: its aspiration to discover “an inde-
pendent, universal and systematic rational justification of morality” (2005: 39). Whilst the 
philosophes agreed on the character of morality, and what a rational justification of morality 
might be, they could not “agree among themselves either on what the character of rationality 
is or on the substance of morality to be founded on that rationality” (MacIntyre, 2005: 21). 
Since those who purported to derive uniquely justifiable moral principles on which rational 
agents ought to embrace could not secure agreement on the derivation of these from those 
who espoused their basic philosophical purpose and method, then the entire project failed to 
deliver its promise. Hence, what Brandon Harnish (2010: 180) calls “rationalism run amok”: 
the failure of the ‘Enlightenment project’ is partially rooted to an overestimation of the 
power of reason - or, in reverse, to a failure to acknowledge its limits. But it is not just that 
the Enlightenment project failed. MacIntyre (2005) suggests that it was doomed to fail since 
its inception - because of what the philosophes took morality to be and what they rejected as 
philosophically undesirable. In short, the project’s miscalculated overestimation of the au-
thority of reason was the product of the repudiation of Aristotelian ethics.  
 
On the face of it, MacIntyre’s ‘negative thesis’ shares much with a theme which I 
have, following Isaiah Berlin (and Machiavelli), resisted: that once upon a time, there exist-
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ed a perfect state which was shivered by a disaster and which must be, somehow, restored. 
In light of my critique of the standard DH thesis then, MacIntyre’s bleak language prima 
facie seems less than satisfactory. And so, too, does his chronology of the disaster. Granted 
that philosophy is in a state of disorder, MacIntyre’s charge does not reach far enough; phi-
losophy seems to have been in such a state long before the Enlightenment project (Berlin, 
1990; Hampshire, 1989; Edyvane, 2013). This much also follows from my discussion of the 
Platonic Ideal: the way in which philosophers approach Dmitri’s last torment in The Broth-
ers Karamazov - their attempt to specify a tidy and universal morality “to which fully ra-
tional agents could not fail to assent” (MacIntyre, 2005: 271) - has been prevalent since Pla-
to’s Republic (see chapters 1 and 2). Even worse, it also permeates Aristotle’s thought, Mac-
Intyre’s hero.  
 
This, however, need not render MacIntyre’s destructive account unintelligible. For, 
as I suggest in the next section, MacIntyre’s account does seem to accommodate the above 
concerns. Nor does the admission that Aristotle endorses the Platonic Ideal necessarily ren-
der MacIntyre’s ‘negative thesis’ obsolete. Simply put, this recognition does not exonerate 
the Enlightenment project from MacIntyre’s indictment. For post-Enlightenment philosophy 
did lose something of significant value by repudiating Aristotelian ethics. To suggest other-
wise would be to overlook the “great contrasts”, to use Elizabeth Anscombe’s (1958: 1) 
words, between these approaches. A crucial difference between these approaches is that, for 
the Aristotle the good life is the life lived in accordance with virtue (arête), understood 
against the background of a teleological conception. For Aristotle, there exists a contrast 
between ‘man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realized-his-essential-nature’ (let us call it point B for 
the sake of simplicity), with ‘man-as-he-happens-to-be’ (let us call it point A) (MacIntyre, 
2005). Hence, for Aristotle the good was functionally defined and the virtues constituted an 
essential means which enable the transition from point A to point B. Aristotle’s teleological 
appeal enabled us to discern which virtues and actions are necessary for the good life, and 
brought with it the possibility of ethical failure, if one acted in ways which negate his telos. 
 137 
 
The rejection of Aristotelian teleology nonetheless, obliterated the distinction be-
tween point A and point B and brought with it a denial that we have any specific purpose 
beyond what we chose; post-Enlightenment man was no longer governed by a telos external 
to him but merely by the dictates of his own internal reason. In short, post-Enlightenment 
philosophy evolved into a modern Croesus, neglecting that a reference to a telos is neces-
sary to evaluate one’s life86. The impossibility to discern between ‘man-as-he-happens-to-
be’ and ‘man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realized-his-essential-nature’, left in its wake “a moral 
scheme composed by elements whose relationship was unclear” (MacIntyre, 2005: 55). Our 
understanding of the virtues became deformed: morality degenerated into an incoherent set 
of abstract principles deprived of the teleological background which gave them meaning. 
The emergent post-Enlightenment self was a criterionless and ‘static’ chooser, starting at 
every moment from tabula rasa and operating in a vacuum, lacking any social identity and 
attachments. Thus, in the absence of a teleological background, philosophy was premised on 
‘a view from nowhere’, to borrow Nagel’s (1986) phrase.  
 
To recap, MacIntyre’s ‘negative thesis’ is underpinned by two crucial features: i) 
his insistence on the need for a teleology, so as to restore the meaningful distinction be-
tween what we are and what we ought to be and ii) his insistence on the social embed-
dedness of our telos. The implications of MacIntyre’s charge against modernity are pro-
found. In a vein reminiscent of Bernard Williams’ discussion in Ethics and The Limits of 
Philosophy, MacIntyre suggests that post-Enlightenment philosophy is devoid of the re-
sources to deliver one of its promises: it is no longer capable of reflecting adequately on one 
of the central questions of ethical inquiry -“the question of what sort of person am I to be-
come?” (MacIntyre, 2005: 118). From the post-Enlightenment standpoint, this question is 
approached only by indirection - it is overshadowed by an otiose obsessiveness with deriv-
ing abstract rules and meaningless principles.  
                                            
86 See Herodotus (The Histories) and Plutarch (Nine Greek Lives). 
 138 
 
But MacIntyre’s despair does not merely strike at the heart of our prevalent moral 
theories, such as Kantianism and Utilitarianism (and the covering law of morality). Besides, 
as we saw, these are also deemed unsatisfactory by proponents of the standard DH thesis. 
Rather, MacIntyre’s indictment is levelled against contemporary philosophy as a whole of 
which the standard DH thesis constitutes an integral part. Simply put, MacIntyre’s historical 
analysis is capable of explaining much of the current status of the standard DH thesis. Re-
call that, whilst standard DH theorists correctly identify certain problems with Kantianism 
and Utilitarianism (and the vision of innocence that emerges from them), they do not neces-
sarily reject the overall validity and premises of such theories. Walzer’s portrayal of DH as 
a conflict between deontological dictums upheld in ordinary morality and consequentialist 
imperatives which momentarily re-impose themselves in politics, is suggestive here. Whilst 
orthodox DH analyses seek to mend some of the insights of post-Enlightenment moral theo-
ries - by pointing to the messiness of our moral reality - their discussion of DH proceeds via 
an a priori commitment to the very abstract principles propounded by these theories. In 
short, whilst DH theorists seek to unsettle the view of innocence by alluding to the existence 
of plural and conflicting values or ‘oughts’, these very values are couched on a view from 
nowhere. Simply put, standard DH theorists too have inherited mere simulacra of morality. 
 
What follows from this, is that standard DH analyses are also bound to be inescapa-
bly devoid of the resources to reflect on the question of ‘what sort of person should I be-
come’. De Wijze and Goodwin’s (2009) discussion of Williams’ Jim and the Indians is sug-
gestive of this. To be clear, I do not deny that this example reveals the possibility of moral 
tragedy outside professional politics. But, to steadfastly contend that Jim should pick the act 
that yields the ‘lesser evil’ (in consequentialist terms), and murder one of the Indians, is to 
miss a crucial aspect of Williams’ critique of consequentialism. For, it is not just that the 
consequentialist vision of harmony, and its overconcentration on the question of how one 
should act, fails to capture the existence of a moral remainder. To wholeheartedly endorse 
the consequentialist action-guiding prescription, as de Wijze and Goodwin seem to do, is to 
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neglect that Jim’s actions have to be seen as the actions “which flow from the projects and 
attitudes with which he is most closely identified. It is thus, in the most literal sense, an at-
tack on his integrity” (Williams, 1973a: 116 -117; my emphasis). Simply put, de Wijze and 
Goodwin’s agent is, to borrow Martin Hollis’ (1985) words, a philosophical nobody: an in-
dividual who comes to his choices ethically naked. Much like the Utilitarians then, de Wijze 
and Goodwin comfortably ignore that Jim has a particular history, identity and a sense of 
telos - and that it is his particular history, identity and sense of telos that shape the pattern of 
his experiences and inform the choice of his actions.  
 
This point however, becomes particularly profound in contemporary and standard 
discussions of DH in politics. Recall that, in the previous chapter, I demonstrated that the 
standard DH thesis is unsatisfactorily ‘static’ and fails to sufficiently capture what it means 
to have DH in the context of certain on-going activities such as politics: it mischaracterizes 
both the extent and the nature of the conflict between morality and politics. And, in light of 
MacIntyre’s account, the deficiencies of the standard DH thesis should come as no surprise. 
For, what lurks in the background of the static DH thesis and some of the problems which 
metastasize from this (for instance, the assumption that an individual with no experience in 
torture suddenly becomes an efficient interrogator or the suspiciously abstract contention 
that the politician ought to experience tragic remorse and publically reveal his dirt so as to 
regain his innocence) is the post- Enlightenment portrayal of the self as a ‘static’ chooser, 
who starts at every moment de novo. In short, the standard DH thesis - by virtue of its static 
nature - fails to fully grasp what it means to lead a virtuous political life. This much is also 
evident in the orthodox interpretation of DH as a mere paradox of action which is oblivious 
to the way moral character enters politics and jeopardizes political existence. In short, Mac-
Intyre’s ‘negative thesis’ reaffirms, and provides a historical explanation to, my suggestion 
that Machiavelli’s inception of DH - his recognition that the conflict between morality and 
politics is much more enduring and cuts deeper than a mere incompatibility of action guid-
ing prescriptions - has been displaced by conventional DH analyses. Put simply, standard 
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DH theorists’ insufficient reflection on the question of ‘what sort of person should a politi-
cian become’ can be explained with reference to the fact that they have inherited a non-
teleological worldview from the Enlightenment project - the product of the Enlightenment’s 
rejection of Aristotelian ethics of which Machiavelli’s account on political morality consti-
tuted an integral part. 
 
MacIntyre’s dissatisfaction with modern philosophy echoes the suggestion I made 
in the introduction of this chapter: to grasp political ethics and the problem of DH in all its 
complexity, a theory of virtues is necessary. I am therefore committed to two interrelated 
tasks. The first is to provide an exposition of MacIntyre’s ‘positive account’. I will illustrate 
that, in contrast to standard virtue ethics’ accounts, MacIntyre’s core conception of the vir-
tues allows for moral conflict and tragedy. It also provides for a more nuanced account of 
DH (as conventionally conceived) as it enables us to resist framing this problem in terms of 
abstract utilitarian or deontological prescriptions. The second task is to utilize some ele-
ments of MacIntyre’s positive account and develop a ‘dynamic’ DH framework that cap-
tures the problem of DH in politics in all its complexity and restores Machiavelli’s lost in-
sights. I defer the second task for now (this is addressed in section 4 of this chapter), and 
turn to the first immediately. 
 
5.3. MacIntyre’s Positive Thesis: Tragedy, Conflict and DH 
 
MacIntyre’s ‘negative thesis’ urges us to start afresh: to “put Aristotelianism to the 
question all over again” (2005: 119). The restoration of a teleological approach implies that 
morality must be primarily understood in terms of the virtues rather than abstract rules. 
These refer to:  
 
dispositions which will not only sustain practices and enable 
us to achieve goods internal to practices, but which will also 
sustain us in the relevant kind of the quest for the good, by 
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enabling us to overcome the harms, dangers, temptations and 
distractions … and which will furnish us with increasing 
self-knowledge (2005: 207).  
 
In place of the criterionless modern self which lacks any telos, MacIntyre (2005) proposes a 
narrative conception of the self; in place of the post-Enlightenment’s obsession with abstract 
rules he appeals to practice-based virtues; and, in place of the ‘undersocialized’ contempo-
rary conceptions of the individual, he turns to traditions. Hence, MacIntyre’s account is de-
veloped in three phases, each with its own conceptual background: i) practice, ii) narrative 
unity of human life, iii) moral tradition.  
 
Before scrutinizing these elements though, I should emphasize that whilst Mac-
Intyre’s account constitutes an expression of Aristotelian virtue ethics, this label may mis-
lead us for a number of reasons. What demarcates MacIntyre’s account from other neo-
Aristotelian accounts is that Aristotle is not treated as an individual theorist but as “the rep-
resentative of a long tradition, someone who articulates what a number of predecessors and 
successors also articulate with varying degrees of success” (2005: 146). And, as I shall illus-
trate, MacIntyre’s account embodies commitments antithetical to conventional virtue ethics: 
it contains elements stemming partially from the pre-Aristotelian tradition and from con-
temporary ideas which share much in common with Berlin’s (1990), Stuart Hampshire’s 
(1989) and Bernard Williams’ (1981) emphasis on pluralism and moral conflict87. This is 
also acknowledged by William Galston who writes:  
 
Berlin and MacIntyre seem to agree on a number of essential 
points. Both argue that it is possible to speak of the human 
good in a way that is not simply arbitrary, subjective or rela-
tive. Both insist that the good is radically heterogeneous. 
There is no Platonic- monistic idea of the Good from which 
all particular goods can be deduced or through which they 
                                            
87 This point is also made by Alex Bavister-Gould (2008). 
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can be justified. Nor is there any rational principle for rank-
ing all goods… Genuine goods conflict with one another 
(1998: 71).  
 
It is these elements I want to emphasize here, whilst outlining MacIntyre’s ‘positive thesis’. 
For, it is precisely these elements - MacIntyre’s rejection of the Platonic Ideal (the unity of 
the virtues thesis and Aristotle’s metaphysical biology) and his emphasis on a plurality of 
values, moral conflict and the unity of life as a dramatic narrative - which create the concep-
tual space to capture the possibility of moral tragedy (or DH as conventionally understood) 
but also develop a dynamic account of DH in politics. 
 
According to MacIntyre (2005), the virtues must first be understood in terms of 
‘practices’.  This concept is retrieved from the Homeric account of the virtues. In heroic 
societies, a man is defined by ‘the mask he wears’, to use Hollis’s (1996) metaphor. In The 
Iliad, for instance, the virtuous agent excels at a particular activity, in his social role (Finley, 
2002). The Homeric perception that the virtues stem from practices, provides MacIntyre 
with an arena in which the virtues are identified. As MacIntyre explains, a practice implies 
standards of excellence and goods internal to itself. These are distinguished from external 
goods by the fact that the former can only be achieved by engaging in the practice in ques-
tion. For instance, the goods that consist in playing chess well (i.e. strategic capacity), are 
goods internal to such a practice; material rewards, such as money and status are external 
goods
88
. The latter are contingently attached to such practices and “are objects of competi-
tion from which winners and losers emerge” (Macintyre, 2005: 188- 190); when such goods 
are achieved, they become the property of a specific individual. In contrast, internal goods 
can only be specified in terms of a practice and can only be identified through the experi-
ence of participating in the practice in question (Murphy, 2003; Miller, 1994; Mela, 2011). 
Whilst internal goods are also the outcome of competition to excel, their achievement is a 
                                            
88 As I suggest later on however, MacIntyre’s characterization of external goods is rather 
problematic when it comes to political power. 
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good for the entire community, as opposed to merely being possessed by and benefiting on-
ly a particular individual.  
 
Therefore, the criteria for virtuous conduct are determined by the practice one is en-
gaged in. This concept highlights the importance of the wider social context: entering into a 
practice requires one “to heed and accept the authority of those standards and the inadequa-
cy of one’s own performance as judged by them” (MacIntyre, 2005: 199). To virtuously 
engage in a practice, one has to absorb the standards of such a practice, to identify oneself 
with the ends served by it, and to grasp and cultivate through experience the intrinsic goods 
and virtues secured by it. In short, the concept of a practice provides us with objective 
standards of excellence, reasons for striving to cultivate the virtues and a kind of ‘substitute’ 
telos.  
 
The term ‘substitute’ should be highlighted here, since the ends produced by prac-
tices do not amount to a satisfactory telos. For anyone not living as a Homeric character, a 
life informed by a conception of virtue solely derived from practices would be excessively 
fractured and arbitrary: “the modern self with its criterionless choices” would reappear “in 
the alien context of what was claimed to be an Aristotelian world” (MacIntyre, 2005: 202). 
A crucial problem then, is how to rationally adjudicate between the competing ends of the 
various practices which compose one’s life. To do so however, we need an account of a te-
los for one’s whole life in light of which these can be adjudicated. Thus, casting a concep-
tion of virtue solely in terms of practices will always be insufficient: in the absence of a tel-
eological approach our conception of certain virtues remains “partial and incomplete” (Mac-
Intyre, 2005: 202). But, in Aristotle’s account, ethics is conceived as a “science” and “pre-
supposes his metaphysical biology”: human beings have a specific nature, so that we have 
certain aims and goals and move towards a specific telos (MacIntyre, 2005: 162). This is the 
part of Aristotle’s theory which MacIntyre completely rejects. And this rejection invites an 
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alternative account of the telos of man - it is here that MacIntyre’s new teleology, which 
allows for the possibility of moral tragedy and conflict, emerges.  
 
This alternative account is, as suggested, partly retrieved from a pre-Aristotelian 
standpoint - MacIntyre supplies the Homeric concept of a practice in which the virtues are 
identified. But, in addition to Homer’s epen, MacIntyre draws insights from the tragedians. 
This underpins, perhaps the most crucial dissatisfaction MacIntyre has with Aristotle’s 
thought. Aristotle’s thought, MacIntyre observes, is replete with “a hostility to and denial of 
conflict either within the life of individual good man or in that of the city” (2005: 157). 
What MacIntyre detects here, is the more ancient belief, “descending unashamed”, to use 
Stuart Hampshire’s (1993: 43) words, to Aristotle from Plato’s Republic: the Platonic Ideal 
or the doctrine of final rational harmony. Like Plato, Aristotle held that since conflict in the 
polis is ‘the worst of evils’, the good life should be unitary, composed of a hierarchy of 
goods: “there exists a cosmic order which dictates the place of each virtue in a total harmo-
nious scheme of human life”. Consequently, “conflict and virtue are mutually incompatible 
and exclusive” - a situation whereby “rival goods at war with each other” is deemed incon-
ceivable (MacIntyre, 2005: 141- 142). Central to this vision, MacIntyre reminds us, is the 
belief that conflict is “the result of flaws of character” or of irrational and “unintelligible 
political arrangements” (2005: 157). But does this postulation “cover Antigone and Creon, 
Odysseus and Philoctetes or, even Oedipus”? (MacIntyre, 2005: 179).   
 
Herein lies MacIntyre’s dissatisfaction with Aristotle: he “offers too simple and uni-
fied a view of the complexities of the human good” (2005: 157). In short, Aristotle’s em-
phasis on “coherence and unity” is an impossible “idealization” (2005: 157). For, “we do 
not live in a universe of great moral coherence”. Philosophical conceptions of the coherence 
and homogeneity of goods and virtues perhaps “win logical elegance” but “at the cost of 
sacrificing our grasp of the tragic nature of moral reality” (MacIntyre, 1972: 334). This, 
MacIntyre notes, is a point which “a spokesman of the modern liberal view”, presumably 
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Berlin, Hampshire and Williams, “might argue with a good deal of cogency and with 
which” it is “difficult to disagree”89 (2005: 156 - 157). In a similar line with Berlin’s (1990) 
and Hampshire’s (1989; 1993) contention that historical experience suggests that moral con-
flict is ineliminable, MacIntyre suggests that “if we look at the realities of the Athenian so-
ciety, let alone Greek society as a whole or the ancient world, what we find is a recognition 
of a diversity of values, of conflicts between goods, of the virtues not forming a simple, co-
herent and hierarchical unity” (2005: 157). What Aristotle takes to be impossible then, is 
precisely that which makes drama possible; hence, MacIntyre’s turn to Homer and Sopho-
clean tragedy constitutes an attempt to correct Aristotle’s dismissal of the messy nature of 
our ethical reality. 
 
What emerges from MacIntyre’s account is a point I gestured at in the previous sec-
tion: MacIntyre concludes about Aristotle the same thing he concluded about the philoso-
phes: Aristotle claims a “universal rational authority” which cannot be sustained90 (2005: 
232). In so doing, MacIntyre makes room for the Berlinian (and Hampshirian) recognition 
that the malaise of philosophy began long before the Enlightenment project. Of course, the 
crucial difference is that unlike the philosophes, Aristotle’s ethical approach was teleologi-
cal - a conception which MacIntyre maintains. This leads us to the second ingredient of 
MacIntyre’s scheme, the narrative unity of human life.  
 
This element integrates Aristotle’s contention that we should approach the ethical 
life of an individual as a whole and in functional terms, with “the kind of thesis about the 
interrelationship between virtues and forms of narratives which is present in epic and tragic 
writers” (MacIntyre, 2005: 147). This gives rise to a conception of life as an enacted dra-
matic narrative within which the central characters are also authors. MacIntyre’s narrative 
                                            
89 I should note here that whilst Berlin, Hampshire and Williams are spokesmen of the 
modern liberal view, their thought should be distinguished from the prevalent Rawlsian 
version of liberalism. I say more on this in chapter 7. 
90 See Kulenovic (2007). 
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conception furnishes his account with a non-Aristotelian teleological conception, which 
avoids the problem of arbitrary adjudication between different practices whilst simultane-
ously allowing for tragedy and conflict. What emerges from this concept is an alternative 
conception of the self, “whose unity resides in the unity of a narrative which links birth to 
life to death”; thus, “I am”, MacIntyre says, “what I may justifiably be taken by others to be 
in the course of living out a story that runs from my birth to my death” (2005: 217).  
 
MacIntyre’s concept of the narrative unity of life, is underpinned by two interrelated 
claims: i) that “man is in his actions and practice, essentially a story telling animal” and that 
ii) in order to understand one’s actions and virtues, we must place these in a narrative se-
quence; in short, the virtues stemming from our engagement in practices should be seen as 
“contributing to the good of the whole life” (2005: 273). MacIntyre’s first claim reflects 
much of our ordinary experience: in order to identify “what someone else is doing we al-
ways move towards placing a particular episode in the context of narrative histories … both 
of the individuals concerned and of the settings they act and suffer” (2005: 211). That this 
activity constitutes an integral part of our experience seems uncontroversial
91
. However, 
MacIntyre additionally contends that, in the absence of a narrative approach to ethics “there 
is no way to fully understand any individual life, including our own” (MacIntyre, 2005: 
216). We will miss much, as contemporary philosophy does, of the virtues and of the signif-
icance of our attachments.  
 
This point becomes particularly compelling when we consider Antoine Saint-
Exupery’s Little Prince. Saint-Exupery’s novel is centred on the relationship between the 
innocent little prince and his rose. One day, the prince discovers a garden of roses, identical 
to his rose: “I thought I was rich, with a flower that was unique … all I had was a common 
rose” (2002: 60 - 62). Had the story ended here, with the little prince presumably throwing 
                                            
91 A testament of how common the activity of narrating individual lives is found in 
autobiographies. See Edyvane (2007). 
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away his rose, the modern criterionless and ‘static’ self would regain in ascendancy. But the 
prince finds meaning in the virtues of friendship and love by reflecting on the narrative of 
his life:  
 
To all other roses he says this: ‘you are not at all like my 
rose… An ordinary passer-by would think that my rose 
looked just like you …. But in herself alone she is more im-
portant than all the hundreds of other roses: because it is she 
that I have watered; because it is she that I have put under 
the glass globe … Because she is my rose (2002: 68).  
 
Thus, the prince’s rose “is not perceptually unique, but unique she is, made unique by the 
history of their love” (Raz, 2001: 22). The bond the prince has with his rose stems from 
their common history: “the prince grew her” (Edyvane, 2007: 44). And it is via a reflection 
and appreciation of their common history that the prince finds meaning and value in his at-
tachment. 
 
 Hence, “I can only answer the question ‘what I am to do?’ if I can answer the prior 
question ‘Of what story or stories do I find myself part?’” (MacIntyre, 2005: 201). To un-
derstand what I ought to do and choose between conflicting practices, goods and values I 
must recognize that the story of my life has a narrative structure: “the notion of a history”, 
MacIntyre says, “is as fundamental a notion as the notion of action: each requires the other” 
(2005: 214). In the absence of any understanding of the roles which we occupy, Sue Mendus 
(2009a) and Martin Hollis (1996) add, we cannot have an adequate sense of ‘the self’, and 
thus discern which course of action to employ. Hence, the way I define myself now, flows 
from what I was in the past; the search of what I am, ought to do and become is a journey 
that connects our past, present and future; consequently, the virtuous life is a quest for the 
good. This brings us to the final element of MacIntyre’s account.    
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 Each individual quest for the good is conducted under different circumstances and 
contexts. Consequently, the narrative of an individual’s life should be understood against 
the background of the wider context within which that individual is placed
92
. And, these 
differences not only stem from the different practices one engages in, but also from the “tra-
ditions of which the individual’s life is a part” (MacIntyre, 2005: 220). Traditions give to 
one’s life its own moral starting point and, partially, its distinctiveness: “I am someone’s 
son, someone else’s cousin or uncle; I am a citizen of this city, a member of this guild or 
profession; I belong to this clan, that tribe, that nation” (MacIntyre, 2005: 220). Therefore, it 
is from our social and historical embeddedness which we partially derive our social identi-
ties and initial set of practices. This thought, I should note here, runs contrary not only to 
Aristotle, who lacks a sense “of the specifically historical” (MacIntyre, 2005: 147), but also 
to the post-Enlightenment conception of the self. From the standpoint of the post-
Enlightenment conception of the self, “I am what I myself choose to be”, so that “I can al-
ways, if I wish to, put in question what are taken to be the merely contingent social features 
of my existence” (2005: 220). Yet, just as Saint- Exupery’s little prince finds meaning in his 
attachment by reflecting on its narrative history, so do we - to cut ourselves off from such 
traditions, is to distort our present relationships and identity
93
; we find ourselves part of a 
community and a past and “whether we like it or not, whether we recognize it or not, the 
bearers of tradition” (2005: 221).  
    
Let me now bring together the various elements of MacIntyre’s positive account 
and consider how it departs from conventional virtue ethics frameworks so that it allows us 
to capture the possibility of moral tragedy and conflict - ergo the problem of DH, as conven-
tionally understood. MacIntyre’s account is expounded in terms of the notions of a practice, 
                                            
92 “What is to live the good life” MacIntyre notes “varies from circumstance to 
circumstance, even when it is the same conception of the good life and the same set of 
virtues” (2005: 212). 
93 See also Mendus (2009a).   
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the narrative unity of a human life and tradition. It departs from Aristotelian virtue ethics in 
two significant respects: i) it rejects Aristotle’s metaphysical biology and replaces it with a 
narrative conception of life and ii) it rejects the unity of virtue thesis and its dismissal of 
conflict and tragedy. As noted, MacIntyre gleans insights from epic and tragedy: his account 
is formulated in terms of the multiplicity, plurality and heterogeneity of principles and 
goods and, as such, “it allows for the possibility of tragic conflict” (MacIntyre, 2005: 201). 
This creates the conceptual space to capture and reinterpret the DH problem, as it recognizes 
that the messy nature of our moral reality renders innocence - as the absence of wrongdoing 
- fragile. MacIntyre’s account captures the central insight of the standard DH thesis, what I 
termed the Moral Remainders Thesis (see chapter 3). This is explicitly stated in the follow-
ing passage: in tragic conflicts, MacIntyre says, “by choosing one [course of action], I do 
nothing to diminish or derogate from the claim upon me of the other”; rather, “whatever I 
do, I shall have left undone what I ought to have done”94 (2005: 224). Hence, in line with 
DH theorists, MacIntyre suggests that once we are confronted with a moral conflict, there 
exists a moral remainder. The human condition is such, according to MacIntyre, that tragedy 
and the loss of innocence as the absence of wrongdoing are an ever present possibility. This 
is also implied in his narrative conception of life; as he says, “at any point in an enacted 
dramatic narrative we do not know what will happen next” (2005: 215). The permanence of 
circumstantial moral luck, or what MacIntyre calls unpredictability, deems this type of in-
nocence far from guaranteed. This, he emphasizes, is precisely why quests and human lives 
sometimes fail.  
 
I should, however, emphasize here that a number of differences exist between the 
way MacIntyre captures tragic conflicts vis-à-vis the orthodox DH thesis. For, these differ-
ences suggest that MacIntyre’s account is capable of providing a more nuanced account of 
moral tragedy than the standard DH thesis. For instance, Macintyre’s conception enables us 
                                            
94 MacIntyre thus rejects the covering law model of morality. 
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to resist framing DH in a vacuum - by interpreting it as a clash between abstract deontologi-
cal and utilitarian rules. Instead of assuming that ordinary morality is deontological or utili-
tarian and thereby ask the question ‘by what principles am I, as a rational person bound?’ 
we have to ask this: ‘by what principles are we as potentially rational persons bound in our 
relationships?’ (MacIntyre, 2006). For, it is only from our social relationships and practices 
that we can discover our principles and achieve the goods internal to these relationships and 
practices
95. In short, MacIntyre’s positive thesis equips us with a concrete arena upon which 
we can ground and account for the plurality of goods and values. In so doing, it provides us 
with a theoretical framework upon which we can premise the standard conception of DH as 
a momentous and tragic conflict between two ‘incompossible oughts’. As Peter Johnson 
notes, reinterpreting DH in light of MacIntyre’s account can make for “a richer perspective 
on the dirty hands problem than that provided by utility or rights-based philosophies which 
depend on abstract starting points” (1994: 57). 
 
Reinterpreted in MacIntyrean terms then, DH involves “a choice between rival and 
incompatible goods” and values, which stem from one’s engagement in different practices 
and one’s situation in a wider social context. In such instances, “both alternative courses of 
action which confront the individual” lead to “some authentic and substantial good” (Mac-
Intyre, 2005: 224). What constitutes “tragic opposition and conflict”, ergo DH (as conven-
tionally understood), “is the conflict of good with good” (MacIntyre, 2005: 163). In Sopho-
cles Antigone for example, there is an irreconcilable rivalry between demands and goods of 
the family and those of the polis. Yet, as mentioned, “to choose (between such competing 
claims) does not exempt Antigone from the authority of the claim she chose to go against” 
(MacIntyre, 2005: 143). Thus DH, statically conceived, involves “crucial conflicts in which 
different virtues appear as making rival and incompatible claims upon us” so that “we can-
not bring rival moral truths into complete harmony with each other” (MacIntyre, 2005: 143). 
                                            
95 See also MacIntyre (2006). 
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In such tragic situations, there exists an irreducible conflict between two or more principles 
and goods; “one virtue is temporarily at war with another”, so that the “possession of one 
virtue might exclude the possession of another” (MacIntyre, 2005: 142; my emphasis). Con-
sequently, MacIntyre says, the agent “may behave heroically or unheroically, generously or 
ungenerously, gracefully or gracelessly, prudently or imprudently” (2005: 224). In The An-
tigone, doing what is virtuous qua sister becomes momentarily incompatible with doing 
what is required qua citizen; allegiance to both such goods can no longer be maintained. In 
short, Antigone dirties her hands (in the conventional use of the word), as she “cannot do 
everything she ought to do” (MacIntyre, 2005: 224); she is bound to act virtuously qua sis-
ter, but viciously qua citizen or vice versa.   
 
So far I have shown how MacIntyre’s conception allows for tragic conflict and for a 
richer and more nuanced interpretation of DH (as conventionally understood by standard 
DH theorists) vis-à-vis the standard DH thesis. Reinterpreted in MacIntyrean terms, the 
problem of DH involves a temporary conflict of good with good, value with value, and sub-
sequently, the tragic but momentary renunciation of one value or virtue, and the practice of 
a vice; in such instances innocence, conceived as the absence of moral wrongdoing is lost. 
But, I have said nothing of politics and of the virtues necessary for engaging in such a prac-
tice. And it is at this point, which the ghost of Machiavelli reappears and re-imposes on us 
the unavoidable question of ‘What sort of person should the politician become?’  
 
As I have suggested in chapter 4, to frame DH in politics as a temporary tragic 
choice - the strict outcome of moral luck - is unsatisfactory. For, the nature of politics is 
such that DH dilemmas are systematic, predictable and enduring. Whilst it is our moral 
world as a whole which is irredeemably tragic, for the individual who has decided to lead a 
political life, conflicts and DH acts are far from forced. They are also far from unexpected. 
What is more, there exists, as we saw, a discrepancy between the loss of innocence as the 
absence of wrongdoing and the loss of innocence as a disposition: innocence as a disposi-
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tion may remain as a feature of one’s character, even after one becomes guilty of moral 
wrongdoing. Any reinterpretation of DH as a single and stark choice can get us only this far.  
 
To be sure, both ‘static’ and ‘dynamic’ DH, have in common at least this much: the 
agent ‘must resolve and decide’, as Hollis puts it, ‘not merely what to do but who to be and 
become’ (1996: 104). But, some of the points I advanced in the previous chapter suggest 
that the practice of politics requires the virtuous politician to repudiate his innocence - con-
ceived as a disposition at the time such an individual voluntarily decides to become a politi-
cian. And this may occur long before he becomes guilty of any kind of wrongdoing- and 
before he becomes dirty-handed in the conventional use of the term. This much also follows 
from the cases of Brutus and Henry: these individuals fail in politics not because of their 
unwillingness to momentarily act viciously. They fail because of their ignorance of the po-
litical world, their inability to cultivate certain distinct political virtues, which would per-
manently stain their ‘beautiful souls’. It is to the conception of DH in politics in dynamic 
terms I shall now turn. I contend that MacIntyre’s account not only allows us to capture the 
possibility of momentary moral tragedy and conflict, but that some of its core elements also 
compel us to move beyond the mere snapshotty and static conceptualization of DH in poli-
tics.  
 
5.4. Towards a Dynamic Account of DH: The Virtue of Vice 
 
What sort of person should the virtuous politician become? Addressing this ques-
tion, and thereby capturing DH in ‘dynamic terms’, requires us to approach political morali-
ty as a whole. And this involves approaching politics as a practice - an activity with goods 
and values internal to itself. As indicated, this approach yields two interrelated benefits: i) a 
concrete approach for grounding ethics contra to the abstract rules advanced by contempo-
rary philosophy; and ii) the provision of dynamic ethical standards, as it will enable us to 
identify certain distinct dispositions of character conducive to political excellence. Howev-
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er, since our conception of certain virtues is bound to be partial and incomplete without ref-
erence to a telos, MacIntyre’s conception of life as a dramatic narrative is also necessary. In 
short, capturing DH in dynamic terms also requires us to approach politics as a way of life. 
Which kinds of goods and virtues are integral to politics nonetheless, MacIntyre does not 
say. This is the point at which we should turn to Machiavelli.   
 
Whilst MacIntyre does not mention the political virtues, his concept of a practice 
provides us with the ground to premise Machiavelli’s insights. That the Florentine ap-
proaches politics in this way was highlighted in chapter 4. This is also acknowledged by 
Quentin Skinner who observes that Machiavelli focuses on “the right qualities of princely 
leadership” (2000: 24). This suggests that Machiavelli departs from Aristotle in a similar 
way to MacIntyre: by rejecting his metaphysical biology. As Machiavelli tells us, discussing 
political virtue (virtù) by imagining “republics and principalities that have never been seen 
or known to exist in truth” is fruitless. For, conventional virtue ethicists - Plato, Aristotle, 
and Augustine for instance - fail to grasp that “it is so far from how one lives to how one 
should live that he who lets go of what is done for what should be done learns his ruin rather 
than his preservation” (Prince: 15). Hence, political virtue cannot aim at anything outside 
itself: whereas “for Aristotle virtue is shown in politics”, for Machiavelli, “virtue is defined 
there” (Mansfield, 1996: 22). Simply put, the standards of political excellence arise from 
within politics as opposed to any external moral standpoint. 
 
Needless to say, the above remarks do not merely suggest that Machiavelli’s philos-
ophy sits comfortably with MacIntyre - at least with his conception of practice and the nar-
rative of human life. Besides, in light of MacIntyre’s ‘negative thesis’ and my critique of the 
standard DH thesis, this is to be expected. Machiavelli’s warning that failure to cultivate 
political virtue brings one’s “ruin rather than his preservation” additionally suggests what 
the purpose of virtù should be - or, what (some of) the ends and goods of politics are (some 
of which I mentioned en passant in chapters 3 and 4). Machiavelli’s teachings, Whelan ob-
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serves, are primarily “put negatively” 96 (2004: 141). Whilst considering the ends of politics, 
Machiavelli urges us to pay attention to how Rome was burned - “its citizens destroyed”, its 
“ancient temples desolate” and its “ceremonies corrupted” (Discourses: 143). Starting from 
this position, one recognizes that to achieve anything of additional value there needs to be a 
degree of order and security, a relatively stable framework within which more subtle rela-
tionships and practices can develop. As Berlin puts it: 
 
Men need rulers because they require someone to order 
human groups governed by diverse interests and bring 
them security, stability, above all protection against ene-
mies, to establish social institutions which enable men to 
satisfy their needs and aspirations (1981:  40). 
 
In this sense, virtù encompasses certain qualities of character which are conducive to the 
establishment and maintenance of a political community. Differently put, political virtue 
involves certain dispositions which help one to address what Williams terms the first ques-
tion of politics: “the securing of order, protection, safety, trust, and the conditions of coop-
eration” (2002a: 3).  
 
 In connection to this, two intertwined issues merit clarification here. First, the vari-
ous (pejorative) connotations Machiavelli’s name bears aside, the Florentine did not think 
that practitioners of politics should address this question by bringing about a reign of terror: 
the whole point of politics was to save people from this. Second, this need not preclude the 
recognition that the practice of politics is related to more ‘positive ends’. The pursuit of pos-
itive ends however, is conditional on Machiavelli’s recognition that “the people have a neg-
ative desire not to be dominated” (McCormick, 2001: 300). It is also conditional on his cau-
tionary warning that inflexibility and the pursuit of utopian fantasies are bound to be disas-
                                            
96 For a distinction between positive or aspirational and negative or preventive politics see 
Edyvane (2013).  
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trous. I shall say more on this later on, but what I wish to note here is that whilst political 
rule also involves a quest to secure other positive values, these values cannot act as categor-
ical constraints on political stability (Philp, 2001). The first question of politics, Williams 
explains, bears this adjective precisely because it “is a condition for solving, indeed posing, 
any others” (2002a: 3).  
 
 Politics for Machiavelli is thus a complex activity: its practitioners operate within a 
context which “is unstable and subject to flux” (Wolin, 2004: 202). And, since “society is 
normally a battlefield in which there are conflicts between and within groups” (Berlin, 
1981: 41), politics is always bound to involve a struggle to secure and exercise political 
power
97
. This external good needs to be underlined here. For, political power - the owner-
ship of various resources (Philp, 2001) and the dexterity to get people do things which they 
otherwise would not do (Dahl, 1957; Wolin, 2004) - renders MacIntyre’s characterization of 
external goods somewhat problematic. For, power is not just contingently attached to politi-
cal practice: it forms a necessary precondition for the satisfaction of political ends and bene-
fits both the community and the individual practitioner of politics. Differently put, failure to 
accumulate and exercise political power (or lacking in knowledge on how to effectively do 
so) is bound to bring about the demise of both the political leader and the community (this is 
also suggested by Machiavelli’s and Shakespeare’s discussions of Soderini and Henry re-
spectively).  
 
Virtuous political practice is additionally intertwined with an external good Machi-
avelli prizes the most: glory. This good is, perhaps, best illustrated by bringing into mind: 
 
 
 
                                            
97 In chapters 6 and 7, I say more on how the recognition that politicians operate in a 
context of competing and incompatible traditions, each with its own aspirations, conceptions 
of the good and interests relates to Machiavelli’s understanding of political relationships.  
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the Vatican, a storehouse of works of art and monuments 
from the Church’s often turbulent history … In the Vati-
can, the weight and splendour of the institution, and the 
continuity of its story seem to overwhelm the single indi-
viduals who have played, and are playing, a glorious part 
within the institution (Hampshire, 1989: 174). 
 
Whilst in the long-run practitioners of politics are dead, glory is the plaudit of history. It 
forms an authoritative criterion for, and an appropriate tribute to, political virtue.  
 
So, the prince demonstrates virtù by appreciating the challenges inherent in the es-
tablishment and maintenance of political rule. But what are the specific virtues Machiavelli 
recognizes as being necessary for the sustainment of political practice then? Machiavelli’s 
infamous advice that the prince must ‘learn how not to be good, and to use this and not use 
it according to necessity’ is already suggestive here. Again, I should emphasize that Machi-
avelli does not merely indicate that a politician should only learn how not to momentarily 
act in an innocent manner, as the static DH thesis indicates. While Machiavelli does 
acknowledge that “to adopt safe courses” in politics, by refusing to get DH once confronted 
with a static paradox of action would be disastrous, the way he unveils the problem goes 
beyond this recognition (Prince: 91). Since politics is an on-going practice, Machiavelli’s 
advice is that once the individual chooses to pursue such a path, he must paradoxically learn 
how not to be perfectly virtuous. As Machiavelli puts it, political virtue partially rests on 
“those vices without which it is difficult to save one’s state” (Prince: 62). As he says “if one 
considers everything well, one will find to be virtue, which if pursued would be one’s ruin”, 
and “something else appears to be vice, which if pursued results in one’s security and well-
being” (Prince: 62). Machiavelli’s recognition that political virtue is inextricably inter-
twined with the cultivation and practice of the vices may initially strike us as odd, if not ob-
fuscatory. This much is suggested by de Wijze’s endorsement of Senator Goldwater’s re-
mark that “extremism in the defence of liberty is no vice” (2005: 456) - and his postulation 
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that this remark is expressive of the standard DH thesis. Yet, it is precisely this idea which 
lies at the core of Machiavelli’s notion of virtù: the nature of politics is such that, one should 
not be innocent and tout court virtuous as conventionally understood.  
 
This point brings to the fore a crucial insight I acknowledged in chapter 4. In addi-
tion to the paradox of action, acknowledged by standard DH theorists - the contention that 
DH involves an action that is justified yet abominable - Machiavelli recognizes that the con-
flict between morality and politics cuts much deeper: the problem of DH involves an addi-
tional, more dynamic paradox: the paradox of character - and this, as I explain in due 
course, stems from Machiavelli’s recognition that the conflict between morality and politics 
involves a clash between two entire and exhaustive ways of life. The paradox of character is 
explicitly raised in chapter XV of The Prince, where he sounds the clarion call of one who 
“departs from the orders of others” (61). As indicated, Machiavelli rejects Aristotle’s meta-
physical biology and conceives the virtues as practice-based. But in delineating political 
virtue Machiavelli also notes that “virtue is in need of its contrary”, as “it does not shine on 
its own”. In short, political virtue needs “the added brightness that comes from contrast with 
and through the cultivation and occasional practice of vice” (Mansfield, 1996: 18). Pace 
Galston (2005), for Machiavelli political virtue is not a mean between two vices as Aristotle 
indicates. Machiavelli’s aversion to Aristotelian ethics is betrayed in his indication that virtù 
is not necessarily located at the extremity of virtue but of vice (Discourses, 19 - 34). Con-
sider for example his discussion of Agathocles of Syracuse, who rose to power via “a thou-
sand hardships and dangers” (Prince: 35). And though “one cannot call it virtue to kill one’s 
citizens, betray one’s friends, to be without faith, without mercy, without religion”, Machia-
velli holds that Agathocles did possess political virtue: for “if one considers the virtue of 
Agathocles in entering into and escaping from dangers, and the greatness of his spirit in en-
during and overcoming adversities, one does not see why he has to be judged inferior to any 
most excellent captain” (Prince: 35). In chapter XV of The Prince, Machiavelli lists the vic-
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es and the virtues in pairs, as if they go together
98
 - virtue and vice are complementary and 
both necessary for the virtuous politician. It is this unproblematic coexistence of virtue and 
vice, which brings to mind the image of yin and yang, which forms the essence of Machia-
velli’s virtù. In short, virtù involves a complex ethical schizophrenia: the virtuous politician 
should know “how to use the beast and the man”99 (Machiavelli, Prince: 69). What are the 
beastly characteristics a prince must learn to cultivate and practice politics? Berlin has a 
short answer: the over-abundance of conflict, force, guile and evil in politics, implies that 
these can only be met “with force and guile” (1981: 51). Since politics is impossible without 
the vices of cruelty, dissimulation and fraud, the politician should learn how to emulate the 
“the fox and the lion” (Prince: 69).  
 
The qualities of the lion, Machiavelli tells us, are particularly necessary during the 
founding moments of a political community: “of all princes, it is impossible for the new 
prince to escape the name of cruelty, because new states are full of dangers” (Prince: 66). 
This much is also suggested in Machiavelli’s discussion of Cesare Borgia’s cruelty. Whilst 
“Cesare Borgia was cruel”, Machiavelli emphasizes, “one will see that he was much more 
merciful than the Florentine people, who as to escape a name for cruelty, allowed Pistoia to 
be destroyed” (Prince: 65). But the qualities of the lion are not enough in themselves. Both 
the lion and the fox are necessary, as “the one without the other is not lasting”. The former 
“does not defend itself from the snares of politics” whilst “the latter does not defend itself 
from wolves” (Machiavelli, Prince: 69). In short, if one cultivates only the vices of cruelty 
and toughness, he would be deficient; he would not only be inflexible but he would also 
observe too much unwarranted faith in others. To possess virtù, “one needs” the perceptive 
                                            
98 For example, liberality is paired cruelty, whilst faithfulness is paired with unfaithfulness. 
See Mansfield (1996). 
99 The process of developing virtù can be explained by turning to the tutelage of the ancient 
leaders. The ancients taught that leaders like Achilles were raised by the half-man, half-
beast Chiron; and “to have as teacher a half-beast, half-man”, Machiavelli indicates, means 
that “a prince needs to know how to use both natures” (Prince: 69). 
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qualities and cunningness of the fox. A successful politician, Hampshire tells us, should re-
semble “a burglar in the dark, who is ready to change direction when he runs up against an 
obstacle” (1989: 163). For, the greatest political successes, have been produced by those 
who knew how to handle adroitly matters of truth and falsehood; the practice of politics 
deems it necessary to know how to “colour” one’s appearance and nature and to be “a great 
pretender and dissembler” (Machiavelli, Discourses: 68- 70).  
 
With the integration of MacIntyre’s notion of practice with Machiavelli’s concep-
tion of virtù, we are also in a better position to explain why Henry VI and Brutus not only 
tragically failed, but also why they were doomed to fail in politics. Henry’s innocence is 
completely antithetical to virtù. Henry’s calamity resembles the story of Scipio, “whose ar-
mies rebelled against him” (Prince: 68). Like Shakespeare, Machiavelli attributes this fail-
ure to Scipio’s innocence, his merciful nature (Prince: 68). In short, both Scipio and Henry 
lacked the qualities of the fox and the lion. In contrast to Henry, Brutus does seem to display 
(some of) the qualities which Machiavelli lists, such as love for patria and the excellences of 
the lion. Yet, he crucially lacks the wiliness of the fox, what Homer terms as polymechanos 
to describe the virtues of Odysseus (Odyssey: 486). This rendered him too innocent and 
dangerous for politics. Quite paradoxically, had Brutus’ dirtied his soul first, by expunging 
his innocence, he would have been able to better recognize the ‘snares’ of politics; the dirty 
act he employed would not have been necessary
100
 (at least in that incident). 
 
 
I should emphasize here that Machiavelli does not condemn innocence as a disposi-
tion, and the classical virtues expounded by conventional virtue ethics as defective in them-
selves. Nor does he reject the Aristotelian or Christian conception of the good man as inco-
                                            
100  In this sense, Brutus’ lack of the qualities of the fox in general and political experience 
in particular led to the exhibition “cruelty bad used” to use Machiavelli’s terminology 
(Prince: 37). I say more on Machiavelli’s distinction between cruelty well used and cruelty 
bad used in chapters 6 and 7.  
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herent: “he does not say that saints are not saints, or that honourable behaviour is not hon-
ourable or to be admired” (Berlin, 1981: 49). Innocence as a disposition, which is closely 
aligned with the practice of religious obedience and the virtues of Christianity - such as 
‘charity, ozio, mercy, and a belief in salvation of individual soul’ - should still be counted as 
leading towards one particular conception of the good; these virtues can be fully pursued by 
a purely private individual, someone who seeks some corner of his own, a martyr or an an-
chorite perhaps (Berlin, 1981). With respect to this mode of life then, these are still to be 
counted as virtues - otherwise Machiavelli would not have indicated that the qualities of 
Agathocles and Borgia are vices. But, as John Casey points out, the problem “lies precisely 
at that point where certain morally good qualities … pass over into something else” (1983: 
137). What Machiavelli condemns is the contention that such virtues are compatible with 
politics and that they constitute desirable qualities for a politician to possess
101
. As Berlin 
points out, “absolute generosity” for example “is a virtue, but not in princes” (1981: 59). To 
choose a life of innocence or, for Machiavelli, a life of religious obedience, whilst simulta-
neously aspiring to practice politics, is to condemn oneself to impotence and have the fate of 
Henry VI and Brutus: “to being used and crushed by powerful and ambitious, clever, un-
scrupulous men” (Berlin, 1981: 47). Innocence as a disposition in politics is not a virtue but 
a vice.  
 
For the individual who considers entering politics then, the dynamic dilemma of DH 
does not merely involve two incompossible ways of acting. As Berlin notes, Machiavelli 
“does not say that while in normal situations ordinary morality - that is the Christian, semi-
Christian”, or the deontological, as standard DH theorists contend - “should prevail, yet ab-
normal conditions can occur, in which the entire social structure in which alone this code 
can function becomes jeopardized, and that in emergencies of this kind, acts which are re-
garded as wicked and rightly forbidden, are justified” (1981: 65). Rather, for Machiavelli 
                                            
101  See also Mansfield (1996) and Hampshire (1989).  
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the problem of DH involves an intractable conflict between (at least) two incompatible and 
exhaustive ways of life. What is so disturbing (or erschreckend, to use Berlin’s word) is 
Machiavelli’s recognition that “there are at least two worlds” each with its own set of vir-
tues and values. And “each of them has much, indeed everything, to be said for it; but they 
are two and not one” (Berlin, 1981: 59). 
 
Viewed in dynamic terms then, DH concerns a conflict between, at least, two in-
compatible and exhaustive practices and ways of life, each with its own goods and standards 
of excellence. To be sure, once such a question is posed, this phenomenon may be initially 
painful as, in Berlin’s words, “one must choose” (1981: 59). But, as suggested, this problem 
cuts much deeper than standard DH theorists allow. The real tragedy of DH, viewed from 
such a dynamic perspective, lies precisely in the recognition that “having chosen” one must 
“never look back” (Berlin, 1981: 59). Pace Walzer et al, what Machiavelli realized is that 
“one can save one's soul, or one can found or maintain or serve a … state; but not always 
both at once” (Berlin, 1981: 50). Machiavelli’s virtuous politician then, does pay a price. At 
the time such an individual chooses to practice politics, he completely rejects the prospect of 
an otherworldly salvation; his own telos involves only worldly achievements. As Mendus 
points out:  
The important point to be noted here is that since it is im-
possible to reconcile all values, when we decide in favour 
of one world and against another it is certain that we will 
lose something of value. In choosing the life of religious 
obedience one forfeits the possibility of cultivating the 
virtues associated with the life of politics (2009a: 88).  
 
Once one opts for a life of politics, one should commit oneself towards the cultivation of 
virtù and relinquish the moral virtue of innocence. The moral loss in such a dynamic inter-
pretation of DH is understood as not only a temporary loss of a value or good, but of values 
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and goods which correspond to an entire way of life - and this is why such a choice may be 
initially discomforting. 
 
Beyond the point at which this question is posed nonetheless, and the initial fretting 
one may experience, the individual who chooses politics and heeds its demands is aware of 
the harsh realities of such a way of life. As suggested in chapter 4, this individual resembles 
Hampshire’s (1989) ‘man of experience’ who expects that whilst engaging in such a practice 
his choices will frequently be between two incompatible values and ‘oughts’ - and thus in-
volve ‘static’ DH. Unlike Walzer’s politician and Brutus, the politician who possesses virtù 
relinquishes his innocence (as a disposition) and any hope of absolution, as soon as he de-
cides to submit himself to the demands of politics. And it is precisely because there exist at 
least two exhaustive and irreconcilable worlds, one of which must be relinquished, that 
Machiavelli highlights that “one should not be troubled about becoming notorious for those 
vices without which it is difficult to preserve one’s power” (Prince, XV: 61). With respect 
to the practice and life he has chosen, these ordinary vices are political virtues. As Berlin 
explains, the conflict which situations of DH raise “will be acute and extreme only for those 
who are not prepared to abandon either course”: those, such as Walzer et al, “who assume 
that the two incompatible lives are in fact, after all, reconcilable” (Berlin, 1981: 66). The 
virtuous politician embraces Cavafy’s advice to Anthony: once confronted with a paradox 
of action he is already “prepared, and graced with courage” to engage in an act of wrongdo-
ing (1992: 33). For, his soul and innocence, have been lost at the time he decided to enter 
politics, long before his innocence - as the absence of wrongdoing - is forfeited.  
 
But, if the virtuous engagement in the practice of politics inescapably requires one 
to unlearn the dispositions of a good man and become partially vicious at the time he de-
cides to enter political life, then this creates an obvious problem for the virtuous politician. 
This relates to the antithetical expectations of most members of the political community, 
often expressed in despair, and usually accompanied by demands to purify politics (see 
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chapter 1). “Our fascination with the grubby integrity of secret-service men” Hollis points 
out “is evidence that we grudgingly accept this much”; but we have a “preference for find-
ing it through fiction”, not through politics (1982: 396). Whilst “we tolerate wiretapping of 
terrorists and spying on unfriendly powers”, we “prefer not to be told” (Bellamy, 2010: 
426). As Martin Jay similarly notes, we may laugh about the costs of “the decay of the art of 
lying”, but when it comes to politics we remain far less indulgent (2008: 9). Grasping the 
roots of this problem is of secondary importance for now - though the claim that there exists 
more than one conception of the good, and MacIntyre’s (2005) postulation that those who 
lack experience in a practice are incapable of discerning its virtues may be suggestive - but 
all we have to do to grasp its extent is to just recall standard DH theorists’ emphatic insist-
ence that we need ‘morally good’ and ‘innocent’ politicians.  
 
So the question here is ‘what should the virtuous politician do given such antithet-
ical expectations’? If he does not lose his innocence by cultivating the vices - if he enters 
politics as a good man - he will not be a virtuous politician: he will fail - just like Walzer’s 
politician, Henry and Brutus. If he becomes partially vicious and the disapproving commu-
nity becomes aware of this, he will, as suggested in chapter 4, fail again. Since “human con-
ditions do not permit” the politician to be fully virtuous, and since “most people cannot ac-
cept the truth about virtù” it is necessary for him to “know how to avoid incurring infamy of 
those vices which may bring his demise” (Prince: 62). The qualities of the fox seem to have 
an additional role to play here: political success demands from the no longer innocent, yet 
virtuous politician to conceal his vices and to be perceived as being “all mercy, all faith, all 
honesty, all humanity, all religion” (Prince: 70- 71). The prince finds himself under a fur-
ther necessity to employ fraud in his dealings: he must conceal wherever possible those ac-
tions and dispositions that are at odds with the traditional notion of virtue. He should, in 
Philp’s words, be able “to manipulate his own character and counterfeit aspects of his char-
acter to mimic the virtues” (2001: 41). Pace Walzer, in light of the dynamic account of DH, 
not only should the politician conceal his dirt after engaging in acts of DH, but the task of 
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hypocritical concealment should commence by the time this individual enters politics. In this 
sense, it should come as no surprise that the ‘static’ DH thesis leads to a counterintuitive and 
odd view of hypocrisy (see chapter 4). For, hypocrisy constitutes a character trait that only 
fully makes sense in dynamic terms: it functions as a kind of glue that holds together a vir-
tuous political life. 
 
I shall say more on this vice in the next chapters, but what is worth adding here is 
that the question of deception and of hypocritical concealment cannot be evaded even if one 
remains unconvinced by the central claim of the dynamic account of DH - the paradox of 
character. To illustrate this point, let us return to the claim I advanced in chapter 4, whilst 
considering the politician’s life as a whole. As suggested, once the politician gets his hands 
dirty once, there exists a second-order DH dilemma: this concerns the question of whether 
he should publically reveal his dirt, so as to reclaim his soul, following some form of expia-
tory punishment. The question of choosing between the ends of politics and religious obedi-
ence is re-imposed. And, as indicated, because this question presupposes a second-order DH 
dilemma, the politician is not immune from some form of moral wrongdoing as the static 
thesis suggests. Nor is the action-guiding answer to this question likely to be the one Walzer 
(1973) and de Wijze (2012) provide. Following MacIntyre, sufficiently answering the ques-
tion posed by such a second-order DH dilemma presupposes that one answers the question 
of ‘what stories or story do I find myself a part of?’ If the politician reflects on his life, as St 
Exupery’s Little Prince does, he will realize that since his innocence has been forfeited, and 
his telos is antithetical to the salvation of his soul, there is, to repeat Berlin’s words, no way 
back: the politician cannot start from tabula rasa, by abruptly disassociating himself from 
politics. But the rejection of politics and the obligations one has incurred will not only result 
in a moral remainder; this individual’s life would also suddenly seem much less coherent. 
As MacIntyre says, one virtue which cannot be captured except with reference to the whole-
ness of human life is integrity. Without reference to integrity, “all the other virtues to some 
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degree lose their point” (2005: 242). This virtue is also implicitly captured by Berlin’s 
Machiavelli:  
 
To fumble, to retreat, to be overcome by scruples, is to betray your chosen 
cause. To be a physician is to be a professional, ready to burn, to cauterise, 
to amputate; if that is what the disease requires, then to stop half-way be-
cause of personal qualms, or some rule unrelated to your art and its tech-
nique, is a sign of muddle and weakness and will always give you the worst 
of both worlds (1981: 59).  
 
Integrity in one’s life and chosen practices requires the politician to ‘never look back’ once 
his choice is made. Hence, once confronted with such a second-order static DH dilemma, 
the politician must wear clean gloves. To be sure, the perversity of moral conflicts in poli-
tics brings to the fore a recognition I explore in more detail in chapter 7: that political integ-
rity is fundamentally different from moral integrity. This much also follows from my sug-
gestion that hypocrisy is inextricably intertwined with political integrity. What I want to 
emphasize here though, is that to approach political life as a whole does not push us back to 
an undesirable value-monism. Rather, since our moral reality is messy, composed by plural 
values and diverse ways of life, “if we allow that Great Goods can collide, that some of 
them cannot live together”, then the central claim of the dynamic account of DH reappears 
and cannot be evaded by any ‘static’ account, truly committed to taking moral conflict and 
pluralism seriously: we “cannot have everything, in principle as well as in practice” (Berlin, 
1988: 6). Once again, the point here is that the virtues of one ideal character are or bring 
about the vices of the other.  
 
5. 5. Conclusion 
 
My aim throughout this chapter was to locate DH within virtue ethics - and in par-
ticular MacIntyre’s neo-Aristotelian approach - so as to restore Machiavelli’s lost insights 
and set the foundations for a richer account of DH in politics. Having demonstrated that 
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MacIntyre allows for the possibility of tragic conflict and for a more nuanced account of DH 
(as conventionally understood), I suggested that MacIntyre’s account also enables us to 
move beyond the static DH thesis (the conception of this problem as tragic and as a momen-
tous paradox of action). I sought to develop a ‘dynamic’ account of DH in politics by utiliz-
ing elements of MacIntyre’s core conception as a ground for premising Machiavelli’s no-
tions of political activity and virtù. The dynamic account captures the existence of an inex-
haustible tension between (at least) two ways of life: the practice of politics requires the ir-
retrievable relinquishment of innocence - conceived as a disposition- and any hope one has 
for the salvation of his soul. Hence, such an account captures an additional and deeper para-
dox – the paradox of character: leading a virtuous political life requires one to become par-
tially vicious and no longer innocent. It is this recognition which lies at the core of Machia-
velli’s notion of virtù and which remains elusive for proponents of the standard DH thesis.  
 
I should emphasize here two unavoidable objections to the dynamic account of DH. 
The first concerns the possibility that Machiavelli’s conception of politics and virtù may be 
prone to the charge of historical specificity. This objection was also acknowledged in chap-
ter 3 but is more explicitly stated by Maureen Ramsay who writes that Machiavelli’s teach-
ings “are inappropriate to and outdated in the non-Machiavellian political context of rela-
tionships between and within liberal democratic states” (2000a: 159). The second related 
objection often voiced alongside this postulation is that the vices (the qualities of the lion 
and the fox) are entirely antithetical and threatening to the values and virtues modern demo-
cratic societies purport to serve and foster (Oborne, 2005; Dovi, 2001; 2007; Shapiro, 2003; 
Davidson, 2004). This much is also echoed in some of the contemporary cries of exaspera-
tion I documented in chapter 1; recall Phillip Pullman’s citing of William Blake’s The Au-
guries of Innocence and his emphasis “on the dangers posed by vice when it comes to public 
virtue” (2010: 1). What both of these objections imply then is that the core insight of the 
dynamic account of DH - the virtue of vice - is only of an abstract, historical interest and 
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irrelevant to our ordinary democratic politics. Challenging this claim in light of the fox-like 
vice of hypocrisy is the task of the next chapter. 
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6. Dynamic DH and Democratic Politics: The Virtue of 
Hypocrisy 
 
The hypocrite-villain, has become marginal, 
      even alien, to the modern imagination. 
           L. Trilling
102 
 
  Particularly in contemporary liberal democracies, most 
politicians practice most of what they preach. 
                    P. A. Furia
103 
      
     6. 1. Introduction  
                  
In the previous chapter I located DH within the tradition of virtue ethics in an at-
tempt to capture the problem in all its complexity and restore Machiavelli’s lost insights on 
political morality. DH, understood in dynamic terms, involves a paradox of character, not 
just a paradox of action (or a series of these): leading a virtuous political life requires one to 
become partially vicious and no longer innocent.  
 
My general aims in this chapter are two-fold. First, I want to argue that the paradox 
identified is not merely of an abstract, historical interest but that it constitutes a real and in-
escapable issue for democratic politics today. Second, I shall suggest that liberal democratic 
societies are somehow implicated in promoting and exacerbating the vices (or at least some 
manifestations of them). To put it differently, democratic politicians operate in a context 
which renders the cultivation and continuous exhibition of some of the vices necessary. I 
pursue both of these tasks by turning my attention to the explicit examination of the vices - 
and, in particular, to a vice I briefly touched on in previous chapters: hypocrisy. Whilst it is 
not my intention to produce a simple list of our virtues and vices - given the complexity of 
                                            
102 Sincerity and Authenticity,  16 
103 Democratic Citizenship and the Hypocrisy of Leaders, 126  
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our moral reality and the diversity of our practices and traditions, I am, like Judith Shklar 
(1984) and Andy Sabl (2002), not persuaded that this is possible - my emphasis on hypocri-
sy is not accidental. This boils down to two general reasons which should be emphasized 
here. First, as I have indicated in chapters 4 and 5, hypocrisy forms an integral part of politi-
cal integrity: it constitutes one of the strings that hold together a virtuous political life. Sec-
ond, the way in which hypocrisy is typically portrayed by political theorists and public pun-
dits sits neatly with the idealistic account of political morality which this thesis seeks to 
challenge (see chapter 1). After all, a liberal democratic polity is thought to be premised on 
transparency and accountability, not on hypocrisy and manipulation (Calhoun, 2002; 
Thompson, 2005). Furia’s and Trilling’s remarks in the title quote, as well as Michael Gil-
more’s (2003: 12) insistence on a democratic “cult of truth-telling” are prima facie indica-
tive of this. The desire to wriggle free from hypocrisy, David Runciman writes, “is a recur-
ring feature of even the most sophisticated discussions of its role in liberal politics” (2008: 
196). This longing for an escape from hypocrisy still exerts its pull today and is even shared 
by proponents of the standard DH thesis (see chapter 4). 
 
The discussion is organized into four sections. First, I shall provide a preliminary 
consideration of hypocrisy so as to set the context for the subsequent sections. In particular, 
I examine how it differs from the similar fox-like vice of lying. In the second section, I con-
sider how hypocrisy is typically received in the context of liberal democratic politics. As I 
show, a considerable portion of political theorists and public pundits are adamant that hy-
pocrisy i) is tout court unnecessary and undesirable in democratic politics and ii) ought to be 
avoided and unmasked. In the ensuing sections I seek to upset both claims.  In the third sec-
tion, I argue that whilst there are good reasons to conceive hypocrisy as a dangerous quality, 
it is paradoxically necessary and valuable for our ordinary politics. In so doing, I shall draw 
on Machiavelli’s insights on political relationships and project these on to the practice of 
contemporary democratic politics. Political relationships are relationships of dependence as 
much as they are relationships of power: they are forged amongst practitioners of politics 
 170 
 
who may despise one another and whose interests and aspirations are plural, conflicting and 
incompatible. In light of this recognition, I suggest that hypocrisy constitutes a ‘lesser vice’ 
and an inevitable by-product of ordinary democratic politics. For, its alternatives - truthful-
ness and open knavery - are neither always possible nor necessarily desirable.  In the final 
section, I suggest that attempts to find an escape route from hypocrisy are an innocent and 
perilous delusion: the more one tries to unmask hypocrisy and to extricate oneself from its 
practice, the more hypocritical, unfit for and dangerous to democratic life one becomes. 
 
6. 2.  Hypocrisy: A Preliminary Consideration  
 
‘Hypocrite’ is an epithet, never a term of praise. No doubt, pace Furia (2009) and 
Trilling (1972), there is a lot of this vice in our contemporary world. “No criticism of politi-
cians in liberal democracies”, Dennis Thompson observes, “is more common than the 
charge of hypocrisy” (2005: 209). The problem with this, as with any vice, however, is not 
just that its practitioners abound - when it comes to hypocrisy we all have our favourite ex-
amples: from Stark’s (1997) ‘limousine liberal’ and Cohen’s (2001) ‘billionaire egalitarian’ 
to the more commonplace cases of flip-flopping politicians who misrepresent themselves as 
paragons of virtue. Whilst it seems easy to point at all these hypocrisies ex post, it is much 
harder to grasp the elusive nature of the vice. Even more difficult is to discern what to do 
with it and with those who practice it.  
 
For some political theorists, this question welcomes a pithy answer. “Hypocrisy”, 
Shklar tells us, “remains the only unforgivable sin, especially among those who can over-
look and explain almost every vice” (1984: 45). Shklar’s comment, one could retort, is in-
flated with exaggeration. Yet, standard DH theorists’ endorsement of cruelty but not of hy-
pocrisy suggests otherwise. So, too, do the recent public reactions to the hypocrisies of poli-
ticians. For instance, when politicians like Bill Clinton were reported having illicit sex, 
much of the public outrage was directed neither against the fornication nor at the cheating of 
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their spouses: “it was the hypocrisy that bothered them” (Waldron, 2011: 1). Similar cries of 
exasperation were heard against the mismatch between Obama’s and Clegg’s pre-election 
promises and post-election policies (Gregory, 2012; Miller, 2012; Mitchell, 2012; Peirce, 
2012). I shall say more on these cases later on, but what is important to note here is that 
these examples already suggest that hypocrisy is typically thought to be repulsive not just in 
private life (or with regards to ordinary morality) but also in public affairs. Before turning to 
this issue though, let me start with the question of how we are to capture this vice and its 
distinct characteristics. Doing so shall help us explain some of the charges so often levelled 
against it.  
 
The idea of hypocrisy originates in theatre, whereby an orator (hypocrites), spoke 
under (hypo) and separate from (krinein) the otherwise homogenous chorus (Robinson, 
1977). The literal meaning of this term was ‘to act a part’ and ‘to pretend to be something 
one is not’. Despite its ethical neutrality, the ancient usage of the term has striking links 
with our contemporary understanding of the notion, insofar as the language of the theatre 
occupies a place in our discourse about hypocrisy. It also prima facie explains some of the 
negative connotations the term has acquired. Individuals who play a part tend to be untrust-
worthy, because they hide behind the mask they wear: “they have”, in Runciman’s words, 
“more than one face they can display” (2008: 8). The theatre however, imposes limits to 
such theatrics by its own conventions - the audience is aware that what is being witnessed is 
a charade - whilst untrustworthiness and unreliability are hardly an issue. The problem with 
actors encountered in real life though, is that the audience is often unaware of what is being 
witnessed. Simply put, playing a part whilst the audience is unaware of one’s acting is al-
ways bound to involve some form of deception. This is also affirmed by the Oxford English 
Dictionary (OED): hypocrisy is associated with “insincerity, fraud, dissimulation and sham” 
(1901). Leaving aside for now the question of ‘who is the victim of deception’ (which I ad-
dress in the fourth section), the question which merits more scrutiny here - especially if we 
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are to discern how hypocrisy differs from lying - is ‘What the object of deception is’. In 
other words, if hypocrisy is understood as mask-wearing, what is being masked?  
 
The prevalent conception of hypocrisy - which stems from the extension of the term 
from the theatre to public professions of religious faith by individuals who failed to practice 
what they preached (Hazlitt, 1964; Maloyed, 2011; Batson et al, 1997) - is suggestive here. 
Hypocrisy, the OED adds, involves “a false appearance of virtue or goodness, with dissimu-
lation of real character or inclination” (1901). The hypocrite, Shklar explains, “pretends that 
his motives, intentions and character are irreproachable” when they are not (1984: 47). It is 
this type of hypocrisy I touched on in chapters 4 and 5. Recall Machiavelli’s contention that 
the experienced and partially vicious politician should “appear all mercy, all honesty, all 
humanity and all religion” before the community (Prince: 62). What the hypocrite conceals 
behind his mask is his vices and dirty acts: he appears before his audience as perfectly vir-
tuous and innocent. 
 
To be sure, once hypocrisy is not bound by the conventions of the stage, it can take 
many forms. Hypocritical deception, Runciman indicates, can include “claims to consisten-
cy that one cannot sustain, claims to loyalty that one does not possess, claims to identity that 
one does not hold” (2008: 8). What unites these manifestations of hypocrisy though is that 
its practitioners construct a persona which helps them to amass certain external goods, to 
use MacIntyre’s (2005) terminology. This is roughly captured by Bela Szabados and Eldon 
Soifer, who highlight that the hypocrite’s aim is to “gain an unmerited self-interested re-
ward” (2004: 166). The contention that such rewards are self-interested or unmerited aside 
(which already suggests, however, that the literature perceives hypocrisy as unacceptable 
tout court) this recognition brings to the fore a Machiavellian insight I acknowledged in 
chapter 5 and which I shall explore in more detail here: satisfying the ends and realising the 
goods of politics becomes impossible if the politician does not wear a mask of virtue. “The 
hypocrite”, Eva Kittay notes, “pretends to be better than she is, given a set of expectations, 
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within a domain in which sincerity really matters” (1982: 277). Likewise, if one is not (or 
can never be) virtuous, trustworthy and loyal in a domain in which these matter, the accu-
mulation of certain goods may be impossible without some dissimulation. 
 
 But how, then, does hypocrisy differ from lying? Insofar as both such vices encom-
pass aspects of deception, it might appear that hypocrisy does not differ from lying that 
much: the former manifests an extravagant form of the latter. Yet, if we are to maintain the 
language of the theatre as central to our understanding of hypocrisy, a differentiation be-
tween these two vices does exist. For, in its commonest form a lie is just a lie: a false, short 
and dry statement advanced with an intention to deceive (Mahon, 2008; Kupfer, 1982; Pri-
moratz, 1984; Frankfurt, 1986). It certainly need not involve the construction of a persona or 
the putting on of a theatrical act. “An act”, Runciman explains, “involves the attempt to 
convey an impression beyond the instant of the lie itself” (2008: 9). In short, hypocrisy does 
not merely involve incongruence with the truth; the acting involved in the creation of a false 
impression, turns on questions of character and is much more enduring. The enduring nature 
of hypocrisy can also be glimpsed by highlighting its relationship with consistency. Whilst 
hypocrisy does encompass some sort of inconsistency (c.f. Barden et al, 2005; Stone & Fer-
nandez, 2008; Maloyed, 2011) inconsistency in itself does not necessarily constitute evi-
dence of hypocrisy. For, it is the commitment not to be inconsistent rather than inconsisten-
cy per se, that generates the conditions of this vice - and this, as I explain in due course, 
constitutes one of the reasons why hypocrisy is bound to be inescapable in politics. 
 
 Viewed from this perspective, it should come as no surprise that hypocrisy is re-
garded as a more vicious form of deception than lying. Nor is it surprising that hypocrisy is 
often derided as the ultimate vice. For, the rest of vices - such as lying and cruelty for in-
stance- are much easier to detect (Shklar, 1984; Arendt, 1990). Hypocrisy, in contrast, oper-
ates in two layers. As Machiavelli recognizes, it is not just one of the necessary vices that 
politicians cultivate whilst unlearning a portion of their virtue and exhibit for strategic pur-
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poses. It also forms a coping mechanism for concealing the rest of the vices (see chapters 4 
and 5). Hypocrisy, in La Rouchefoucauld’s timeless phrase, constitutes “the tribute vice 
pays to virtue” (quoted in Runciman, 2008: 10). And whilst it is precisely this function 
which holds together a virtuous political life, the dressing up of vice as virtue seems to make 
things considerably worse: it piles vice on top of vice and limits our capacity to detect injus-
tice. 
 
And because hypocrisy involves a theatrical performance, the acts of the virtuoso of 
hypocrisy may be far more wide-ranging than those of the liar, whose repertoire of deceitful 
acts is rather limited. Whilst veracity and hypocrisy tend to be schematically conceived as 
opposites (especially by critics of the latter), the pretence of virtue may even include vera-
cious statements. This paradoxical feature of hypocrisy is captured well by one of its great 
connoisseurs, Moliere. In Moliere’s Tartuffe, the eponymous character pretends to be a 
model of religious faith and works his way into Orgon’s estate, where he is sheltered and 
fawned upon. The discrepancy between hypocrisy and lying is evident in Tartuffe’s reaction 
to Damis’ (Orgon’s son) accusation that he is a conman: 
 
Yes, brother, I am wicked, I am guilty … 
No, no; you let appearances deceive you … 
The simple truth is, I’m a worthless creature (Tartuffe, III: 6). 
 
What is striking here is that Tartuffe does not lie; he tells Orgon that he is a scoundrel - 
which is true. But Tartuffe’s truthfulness does not amount to a genuine confession; he does 
not remove his mask, and he does not bring his act to an end. Orgon’s reaction, who takes 
this confession as another indication of Tartuffe’s virtue, is suggestive: he gets angry at 
Damis for accusing this saintly man and tries to earn Tartuffe’s forgiveness by offering him 
his fortune. Tartuffe’s truthfulness forms an essential part of his attempt to appropriate Or-
gon’s wealth; the appearance of remorse and humility constitutes an integral aspect of his 
‘performance’, even though his speech is literally veracious.  
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  Let us now pause for a moment and extrapolate the distinct features of hypocrisy as 
a set of propositions: a) hypocrisy involves an enduring and vicious form of deception: the 
playing of a part and the wearing of a mask; b) the hypocrite conceals behind his mask his 
vices, intentions and commitments which he cannot honour; the audience is given the false 
impression that the character of this individual is irreproachable and trustworthy; c) the 
hypocrite’s intention is to exploit the sensitivities of the audience so as to accumulate cer-
tain external goods.  
 
If we understand hypocrisy as a theatrical form of deception, it is not only possible 
to discern how it differs from lying, but it is also not hard to see why it constitutes an antith-
esis to innocence. “In the end”, Shklar tells us, “we learn that the virtuoso of hypocrisy is an 
experienced crook with a long criminal record” (1984: 51). To be clear, I do not wish to de-
ny that hypocrisy comes in different guises. In the last section of this chapter I shall suggest 
that there are, at least, two types of hypocrisy: the hypocrisy of experience (the clear-eyed 
and self-conscious hypocrite advocated by Machiavelli which I defend in this chapter) and 
the hypocrisy of innocence (the unconscious and self-deceived hypocrite). As I shall ex-
plain, the crucial difference between these two types of hypocrites is that the experienced 
hypocrite knows himself for what he is: his mask is worn deliberately to deceive others. 
This knowledge is lacking in the latter: his mask is so compelling that he deceives himself. 
And whilst contemporary commentators often scorn hypocrisy tout court, failure to distin-
guish between these two types of hypocrisy has serious, indeed potentially disastrous, polit-
ical implications. For, it is the hypocrisy of innocence that is particularly dangerous for poli-
tics. What I merely want to emphasize here though, is that the virtuoso of hypocrisy is nei-
ther inexperienced nor ignorant of evil: what lies beneath his mask is clear-eyed. The ex-
ploitation of others’ trust requires considerable skill - something which innocent individuals 
lack. As Wittgenstein emphatically remarks, “a child has much to learn before it can pre-
tend” (1958: 249). Innocent individuals are unable to deceive their audience; this requires a 
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capacity for manipulation, for speaking improperly and for what the ancient Greeks termed 
poneria
104
 (wickedness).  
 
So perhaps we must concede this much: with respect to a moral or purely private 
life, hypocrisy (or, to be more specific, the hypocrisy of experience) is obnoxious. Hypocri-
sy, Maugham stresses, is a “nerve-racking vice”; it requires “an unceasing vigilance” (2010: 
1). This recognition is, perhaps, best captured in the works of the Christian tradition
105
 
which are replete with scorn for this vice. Consider for instance the ninth commandment - 
“Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour” - as well as the New Testament’s 
dictum - “The mouth that belieth killed the soul” (St Augustine, 1952a: 67- 71). Similarly, 
in Dante’s Inferno there can be no salvation for the hypocrite’s soul. Hypocrisy is a malady 
which makes for morally “weary and defeated humans”. It is those who possess the qualities 
of the fox, who are doomed to occupy the “lowest level of lower hell” (2005: 80 - 83). 
These accounts - iff restricted to a purely private or (Christian) moral life - are not incompat-
ible with the Machiavellian insights of the dynamic account. Recall Machiavelli’s recogni-
tion that the qualities of the fox, despite being necessary for politics, are incongruent with an 
amiable private life or a life of religious obedience. Contemporary reflections on hypocrisy 
nonetheless, typically go beyond the contention that it is abominable only with respect to 
ordinary (Christian) morality. What Jonas Barish (1985) calls “the anti-theatrical prejudice” 
in Western culture is largely sustained in the modern era and extended to the practice of 
democratic politics. 
 
 
 
                                            
104 See Sultan (1999) and Crisp and Cowton (1994). 
105 See also Crisp and Cowton (1994), Jay (2008), Augustine (1952b) and Szabados and 
Soifer (2004). 
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6. 3. Hypocrisy and Democratic Politics: Some Contemporary Reflec-
tions  
 
  The criticism of politicians for “playing politics”, as if this is somehow a betrayal 
of their practice, is far too common in the literature dealing with hypocrisy. At the core of 
most philosophical repudiations of hypocrisy seems to lie an assumption which I have ardu-
ously resisted and which I intend to challenge even further in this chapter: the Platonic ideal 
- the contention that the virtues or standards of excellence that apply to a private or moral 
life can and should be reconciled with those of politics (c.f. Trilling, 1955; 1972; Hollinger, 
1977; Jowett & O’ Donnell, 1999; Boswell, 1952; Robinson, 1977). Here I wish to focus on 
a more specific way in which this assumption is advanced. I want to outline in more detail a 
position which I have briefly acknowledged in chapter 3 and which reinvigorates the Platon-
ic ideal in the context of democratic politics.  
 
The position I have in mind here reaches no less moralistic conclusions than those 
of moralists who postulate that “to begin to take morality seriously is to take the first step 
away from hypocrisy” (Crisp & Cowton, 1994: 347). It does, however, seem to take demo-
cratic politics more seriously - or, at least it claims to do so. In short, proponents of this po-
sition tend to perceive liberal democratic politics as more ethical than any other alternative, 
partly because it is said to render hypocrisy unnecessary and undesirable (c.f. Audi, 2000; 
Davidson, 2004; Furia, 2009; Ramsay, 2000a; 2000b; Dovi, 2001; 2007; Shapiro, 2003). As 
Ruth Grant writes:  
 
One of the most important moral claims for democratic poli-
tics is that … politics can be conducted openly without ma-
nipulation. The facts and the arguments will be put before the 
public or representative body and a decision will be made.  
Ideally each individual chooses on the basis of his own best 
judgement and each choice carries equal weight (1997: 53).   
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This ideal vision of liberal democratic politics is far from uncommon. It occupies a promi-
nent place in examinations of political hypocrisy. As Szabados and Soifer (2004: 181) and 
McKinnon (1991: 227) emphasize, the hypocrite subverts “our system of morality by delib-
erately misrepresenting the arguments upon which we base our judgements”. Hypocrisy, 
they suggest, is unacceptable: it undercuts the basis of democratic politics.  
 
 This point also emerges from the writings of theorists of democracy: duplicity and 
hypocritical deception are democratically unacceptable; or, in reverse, transparency and 
truthfulness are synonymous with democracy
106
 (Stiglitz, 2002; Sen, 1999; Dahl, 1971). In 
Peter Oborne’s words:  
 
Citizens … are entitled to be informed about their political 
choices. This includes a right not to be deceived ... Politicians 
who lie to voters deprive them of the ability to come to a 
well-informed decision about how to cast their vote. In so do-
ing, they convert them into dupes (2005: 120). 
 
What is worth adding here is that these claims are often accompanied by an explicit side-
note that the shenanigans advocated by Machiavelli are not just undemocratic; they are also 
anachronistic and inapplicable to contemporary politics. Even those who prima facie con-
cede that truthfulness and transparency might not be always possible are quick to 
acknowledge that this concession applies only to rare, unusual and ‘episodic’ acts of lying, 
not to hypocritical deception
107
 (which is, as I suggested, much more enduring and condi-
tional on the existence of ex ante or ex post dirty acts or viciousness). In any case, hypocrisy 
                                            
106 This postulation is also shared by John Rawls, whose position I discuss in chapter 7. See 
Reidy (2000), Kang (2003) and Weithman (2010).  
107 Standard DH theorists are the obvious example here but this point is also made by 
Sissela Bok (1989) and is advanced in the earlier writings of Dennis Thompson (1989; 
2005). For an exploration of this point see Mendus (2009b).    
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and deception are thought to be incompatible with ordinary politics and with the lives dem-
ocratic politicians should lead. Or, so it is thought. 
 
 In other words, this position sits neatly with Suzanne Dovi’s remark that politicians 
are “good democratic representatives only if they avoid hypocrisy” (2007: 221). To grasp 
how common this conviction is, we could just reflect on how frequently the lack of truthful-
ness and transparency is accompanied with notions (and accusations) of totalitarianism on 
the one hand and with ‘democratic deficit’, ‘illegitimacy’ and ‘lack of accountability’ on the 
other. In addition to the recent charges levelled against Obama’s and Clegg’s failures to ma-
terialize their pre-election commitments, the ‘big lie’, introduced in Mein Kampf - which 
became the favoured technique of totalitarian systems - constitutes a clichéd example of the 
former, whilst EU politics is the most obvious example that comes to mind in relation to the 
latter. The point here is that these examples are frequently used as a means to support the 
rather widespread conviction that democratic politics is not (and should not be) a home for 
hypocrisy. Or, in reverse, that “democratic leaders”, to use Ian Shapiro’s words, “can never 
be free from a commitment to truth-telling” (2003ː 200). 
 
What is worth emphasizing here is that the above remarks and examples seem to 
appeal to three interrelated arguments which sit well with our contemporary understanding 
of democracy and its value
108
. The first points to the recognition that, in democracies, gov-
ernmental power - and temptations for its misuse - needs to be controlled via the provision 
of accurate and relevant information. Hypocrisy, by virtue of its close relationship with the 
notions of concealment and dissimulation, severely compromises these values. The second 
argument postulates that democratic government is a trust: since the people are the source of 
a democratic government’s authority, the latter should be accountable to the former who 
must therefore know what politicians are doing or intend to do. In this sense, hypocrisy vio-
                                            
108 These points are also discussed by Williams (2002a), Mendus (2009b) and Thompson 
(1989). 
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lates this relationship between the trustee and people. Finally, such arguments appeal to our 
ordinary democratic practices and, in particular, to the rituals of elections. The whole point 
of such rituals is, as argued, to enable citizens to cast their vote, but not before they have 
reached an informed judgement; hypocrisy, especially during political campaigns, consti-
tutes a mockery of such practices and of the equal value of each citizen’s vote.  
 
But the contention that hypocrisy and dissimulation are incompatible with demo-
cratic politics extends beyond the rather limited confines of philosophical analysis. After all, 
“no one enjoys being played for a fool” (Runciman, 2008: 2). Nor is it a secret that we tend 
to be sceptical of public ‘actors’, and prefer ‘straight-shooters’ instead (Markovits, 2008). 
Evidence that the quest for truthfulness and transparency is of an unimpeachable value 
abounds. For example, the 2002 issue of Ms. Magazine headlined ‘The Best of 30 years of 
Reporting, Rebelling and Truth-telling’; MSNBC’s Matthews (2001) promises to ‘Tell you 
what I really think’. Promoting Beck’s show, CNN indicated that ‘this guy says it like he 
means it’. So, we glorify truthfulness, making bestsellers out of Paine’s Common Sense in 
1776 and O’Reilly’s The No Spin Zone in 2001 (Markovits, 2008). Our intolerance of mask-
wearing compels us to seek earnest public speakers we feel we can trust. 
 
Finally, critics of hypocrisy suggest that it is not undemocratic or undesirable only 
in the sense that it may veil corruption, abuses of power and jeopardize our democratic prac-
tices. Hypocrisy, its critics argue, breeds “self-destructive consequences” (Alterman, 2005: 
22). If there is an etymological link between truthfulness and trust (Williams, 2002b), then it 
seems to logically follow that the practice of hypocrisy is an anathema for contemporary 
societies: it deteriorates trust, a value which is conducive to political stability and funda-
mental for the functioning of our complex societies
109
 (Williams, 2002a; Simmel, 1906). As 
Dovi puts it, hypocrisy has malignant effects in contemporary public life: it gives rise to “an 
                                            
109 For a more detailed elaboration on this point see chapter 5. 
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unhealthy form of suspicion towards people’s professed moral standards and principles” and 
can lead to cynicism, if not paranoia (2001: 15).  
 
To recap, in this section I sought to provide an outline of how hypocrisy is com-
monly conceptualized in contemporary democratic politics. As indicated, the way this vice 
is conventionally received epitomizes the rather popular and idealistic way of thinking about 
political morality which is also shared by the standard DH thesis (see chapters 3 and 4) and 
which this thesis seeks to upset: hypocrisy is neither necessary nor desirable in democratic 
societies. Apologists of hypocrisy, its critics suggest, have in mind a different conception of 
politics, one which is anachronistic and threatening to our public arrangements. And, if hy-
pocrisy is an anathema to democracy, its practice should and can be avoided and unmasked. 
In Michael Walzer’s words, “the exposure of hypocrisy” is a fundamental requirement of 
public life: it constitutes “the most important form of moral criticism” (1977: xxiii). Not 
only should we try to move away from hypocrisy and the vices, but when the theatrics of 
public figures are spotted, the cry of ‘hypocrite’ should be heard loud and clear.     
 
  To be sure, I do not wish to deny that some forms of hypocrisy are dangerous for 
our politics. But this does not entail that the purified vision of democratic life which emerg-
es from critiques of this vice and of our current condition is warranted - or, indeed, desira-
ble. Nor is this to suggest that hypocrisy is tout court uncongenial to democratic politics. As 
Rebecca West nicely puts it, “because hypocrisy stinks in the nostrils, one is likely to rate it 
as a more powerful agent for destruction than it is” (1928: 307). In what follows I shall pur-
sue these points in more detail. I want to suggest that vilifications of hypocrisy tend to mis-
construe the lives modern public officials lead. They also misconstrue and over-idealize the 
context in which democratic politicians operate and the nature of political relationships. In 
advancing these claims, I examine Machiavelli’s insights surrounding the necessity of hy-
pocrisy more carefully, and project these on to the practice of democratic politics. In so do-
ing, I seek to illustrate: i) the contemporary relevance of the dynamic account of DH and ii) 
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that democratic societies, by virtue of some of the very values critics of hypocrisy invoke to 
condemn its practice, are implicated in promoting and exacerbating its necessity. Second, I 
suggest that the quest for anti-hypocrisy is self-defeating. For, the more one tries to extir-
pate hypocrisy, the more hypocritical and dangerous for democratic life one becomes. I de-
fer the latter issue for now, and turn to the former immediately. 
 
6. 4. The Political Virtue of Hypocrisy 
 
Machiavelli’s defence of hypocrisy is premised on the recognition that this vice is 
crucial in sustaining a virtuous political life. To put it differently, hypocrisy enables practi-
tioners of politics to secure certain goods which are intrinsic to politics as a practice and 
politics as a way of life
110
. It is on this general point, which I briefly acknowledged in chap-
ters 4 and 5, I want to build here. What I seek to emphasize more clearly, however, is that 
Machiavelli’s case for hypocrisy goes to the heart of the nature of political relationships. If 
Machiavelli’s insights on political relationships are applicable to democratic societies - if it 
can be shown that transparency and honesty are not always possible or conducive to the vir-
tuous practice of ordinary democratic politics- then no further justification surrounding the 
necessity to cultivate and, in certain instances exhibit, this vice is needed. For, as I shall il-
lustrate, Machiavelli’s defence of hypocrisy is also premised on the recognition that politi-
cians are trapped between Scylla and Charybdis: when the alternatives to truthfulness - 
which is not always possible or desirable - are the lion and the fox, then the duplicity and 
hypocrisy of the fox has more appeal than the cruelty of the lion. The necessity of hypocri-
sy, however, depends on the impossibility of honest political relations in liberal democratic 
politics in the first place - something which idealistic accounts of political morality in gen-
                                            
110 This point, I should add, is premised on Machiavelli’s assertion that the standards of 
political excellence arise from within politics rather than from an external, abstract moral 
standpoint. 
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eral and critics of hypocrisy in particular contest. And, the question of whether openness 
and transparency are either viable or desirable depends in turn on a certain understanding of 
the context in which politicians operate and political relations per se. It is on Machiavelli’s 
insights surrounding the nature of political relations and, subsequently, on their projection 
on to the contemporary democratic context that I focus here.  
 
6. 4. 1. Machiavelli’s Defence of Hypocrisy 
 
Machiavelli’s defence of hypocrisy is advanced in chapter XV of The Prince, where 
the Florentine discusses the prince’s relations with subjects and friends (“con sudditi o con 
li amici”). This follows the section that deals with offence and defence in warfare. The dis-
tinction drawn between these two sections is not one of domestic and foreign affairs. The 
crucial distinction is between warfare and politics - between relationships amongst enemies 
and friends (amici), both domestic and otherwise. The term amici is analogous to political 
allies and as distinct from open enmities or true friendships (Musa, 1964; Grant, 1997). In 
short, Machiavelli suggests that in true friendships and open enmities hypocrisy is rarely 
necessary. Such relationships are voluntarily maintained and forged. They are also transpar-
ently intimate or hostile - the wearing of a mask or the playing of a part is not required. But 
political friendships, despite being necessary for the virtuous practice of politics, are quite 
different. And, as Machiavelli suggests, it is these differences which generate the necessity 
for hypocrisy. 
 
The necessity to forge and sustain political relationships is couched in Machiavelli’s 
conception of politics as a domain which is ridden with instability, uncertainty and perpetual 
power struggles. The prince, as I suggested in chapters 4 and 5, operates in a Heraclitian 
atmosphere of perpetual conflict, where “it is impossible to remove one inconvenience 
without another emerging,” and where “one never finds any issue that is clear-cut.” (Machi-
avelli, Prince: 91). In such conditions, leading a virtuous political life by solely relying on 
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“good arms” is neither always possible nor necessarily desirable; “good friends” are also 
necessary (Machiavelli, Prince: 96). What distinguishes political relationships from true 
friendships or open enmities though is that the former are forged out of necessity between 
actors with conflicting interests and conceptions of the good. “Political alliances”, Grant 
points out, are “not like family ties”: the former are about creating useful partnerships with 
people whose aims and aspirations do not coincide with your own - “with people who are 
ultimately your competitors” (1997: 21). The oxymoron of political relationships is that 
whilst such individuals are one’s competitors - and, as it is often the case, relationships 
forged between individuals with conflicting interests and conceptions of the good are also 
characterized by mutual suspicion and contempt (Machiavelli, Prince; Hampshire, 1989; 
1993; Spicer, 2010; Edyvane, 2007) - even the most successful prince cannot embark on the 
quest for politics without any allies.  
 
Political relationships then, are not just relationships of power; they are also rela-
tionships of dependence (Grant, 1997). This recognition - which flies in the face of the Pla-
tonic and post- Enlightenment conception of man as an independent, autonomous and self-
sufficient agent - is also touched on by MacIntyre in After Virtue
111
. As MacIntyre tells us, 
whilst the agent is both the actor and the author of his dramatic narrative, “what the agent is 
able to do, and say intelligibly as an actor is deeply affected by the fact that we are never 
more (and sometimes less) than co-authors of our own narratives. Only in fantasy do we live 
what story we please”. Leading a life - in particular a public life- places one under con-
straints: “each of us being a main character in his own drama plays subordinate parts in the 
dramas of others, and each drama constraints the others” (2005: 213). Just as we do not 
begin where we please, we cannot go on exactly as we please either: “each character is con-
strained by the actions of others and by the social settings presupposed in his and their ac-
tions” (2005: 215). Likewise, Machiavelli recognizes that to conceive politics as an uncon-
                                            
111 See Mendus’ (1989) account of liberal man and Nussbaum’s (2007) discussion of 
agency in Plato.  
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strained practice is unsatisfactory; politics takes place within a complex web of dependen-
cies, dependencies which virtù entails a capacity to recognize and exploit.  
 
So, in contrast to true friendships- which, according to Machiavelli, are based on 
“greatness and nobility of spirit” - Machiavelli instructs the prince to approach his political 
‘friends’ with suspicion and with the knowledge that political friendships cannot be always 
sustained and honoured: such alliances, he tells us, “are acquired at a price and bought, but 
they are not owned and when the time comes cannot be spent” (Prince: 66). To be clear, I 
do not wish to suggest that Machiavelli’s account on friendship exhausts the range of rela-
tionships we might observe, either in politics or in private life. Nor does Machiavelli rule 
out the possibility of true friendships in politics tout court. Rather, the point here is that the 
rarity and fragility of, what Machiavelli terms, true friendships often deems them unattrac-
tive models for the prince’s relations. As Stuart Hampshire tells us, the virtues we tend to 
associate with “an admirable private life, such as loyal friendships”, have “their cost in po-
litical powerlessness” (1989: 165). Only a naïve or innocent prince would rely on lifelong 
friendships and unconditional loyalties. For, a prince “must come to ruin among so many 
who are not good”. Machiavelli’s cautionary warning to the prince is clear: one’s political 
fellows are “ungrateful, fickle, pretenders and dissemblers, evaders of danger and eager for 
gain” (Prince: 66). And because “other men are wicked and do not observe faith in you, you 
also do not have to observe faith in them” (Prince: 61). In short, it is the very features of 
political life which necessitate political relationships in the first place - the precariousness of 
order and stability, the struggle to amass power and the recognition that conflict is perpetual 
- which often render such relationships inherently fragile. And it is these very features 
which render hypocrisy necessary. This is glimpsed in Leo Strauss’ take on the Florentine’s 
ideas: “Machiavelli”, he writes, “contends that the same needs which make man dependent 
on other men compel him to form political societies the very preservation of which requires 
the practice of those virtues no less than that of their opposites” (1978: 264 - 265).   
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Hence, it is the twofold recognition that i) virtuous politics requires the formation of 
friendships with individuals or groups which one may despise and ii) that these friendships 
cannot be honoured, which renders hypocrisy necessary in politics. Whilst the prince is in 
need of the voluntary cooperation of others whose interests and aspirations do not necessari-
ly coincide with his, such cooperation is not always forthcoming. Nor should one expect 
others to adhere to an altruistic behaviour; at the very minimum, both parties compete for 
the same, scarce good: power (Kis, 2008). A façade of moral idealism is thus necessary 
even for the most cynical political realism: the politician’s dependence on political allies 
makes it necessary for him to flatter them and to appear before them as virtuous and trust-
worthy. And, if trust constitutes a necessary ingredient for such relationships, then forging 
and sustaining them becomes impossible if one openly expresses his disdain or honestly 
declares his intention to betray them when the time comes. Building and sustaining political 
relationships involves the necessity of making “false promises” (Machiavelli, Prince: 68 - 
71). The term ‘false’ should be underlined here. For, even the least vicious but experienced 
politician, whilst making such promises or commitments is aware that their honouring is 
impossible. 
 
To be sure, Machiavelli’s argument is not restricted to relations between states or 
princes. It also applies to the prince’s subjects as a whole. Since politics - princely or other-
wise - involves a competition for power, a “civil war carried on by other means”, as Mac-
Intyre (2005: 253) puts it, one cannot engage in this practice without some support from the 
community. Machiavelli “would criticise anyone who, relying on his fortresses, thought it 
unimportant that his people hated him” (Prince: 67). Yet, we may wonder whether cultivat-
ing support through openness is possible or desirable; as indicated in chapters 4 and 5, 
Machiavelli and his heirs are clear that the community would be less appreciative if the 
prince openly reveals his vices and intentions, throwing its support to one’s competitors 
who might know better how to conceal them (Hollis, 1982; Grant, 1997; Bellamy, 2010). 
And given that the peoples’ interests and aspirations cannot be fully realized - for they need 
 187 
 
not always coincide with those of the prince, nor, as I suggest in due course, with each other 
- the demos must be persuaded that the prince is virtuous, trustworthy and has their best in-
terests at heart. This demands rhetoric, flattery and deceptive claims to an imaginary con-
sistency and harmony of conflicting and incompatible interests and aspirations. Simply put, 
political relationships are relationships of dependence and require trust but since politicians 
cannot be always trustworthy or virtuous, hypocritical deception is inevitable. And because 
the virtuous practice of politics requires (the appearance of) morality and, at the same time, 
neither our moral aspirations nor moral and political life can be reconciled in a harmonious 
and perfect whole, hypocrisy is inevitable.   
 
Thus, for Machiavelli, hypocrisy is a ‘lesser vice’.  On the one hand, the nature of 
political relations renders perfectly honest politics undesirable. On the other hand “to act as 
a roving bandit is not prudent nor is it politically or ethically intelligible” (Philp, 2001: 43). 
This point dovetails with a recognition I have advanced in chapter 5: for Machiavelli, the 
point of politics is not to reproduce “a war of all against all”, to use Hobbes’ term (Levia-
than, 15.1). The Florentine’s chief concern is how to secure the ends and goods of politics 
“with an economy of violence” (Whelan, 2004: 141; Wolin, 2004: 199). Machiavelli, Wolin 
tells us, “grasped the fact that popular consent represented a form of social power which, if 
properly exploited reduced the amount of violence” (2004: 199). This need not deny the 
necessity of cruelty and coercion altogether, especially when what Williams (2002a) terms 
‘the first question of politics’ - that is, political stability, order and the provision of security, 
amongst others - is jeopardized. But it is not a mistake that Machiavelli is careful to distin-
guish between “cruelty well used” and “cruelty bad used” either (Prince: 37). “Cruelty bad 
used” or, what I shall alternatively term as, abstract cruelty entails the exhibition of brutality 
for the sake of certain utopian ideals at the expense of the realities of politics
112
. And, pre-
                                            
112 I should add that Machiavelli’s distinction between “cruelty well used” and “cruelty bad 
used” also relates to the distinction I draw in the final section between the hypocrisy of 
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cisely because this type of cruelty ends up displacing politics it does not only deprive the 
Prince of ‘glory’. Abstract cruelty and open knavery are also unlikely to allow for a stable 
rule and to help one to remain in power. Nor, by implication, is the continuous exhibition of 
these vices capable of sustaining political friendships. To act as a roving bandit would be to 
turn a blind eye to the subjects’ negative desire to be protected and not to be perpetually 
oppressed. In so doing, one would run the danger of provoking the greatest threat for any 
government: hatred (Machiavelli, Prince, XIX; McCormick, 2001; Wolin, 2004). This 
would be the lion without the fox and it would not just be unappealing. It would also be se-
verely lacking in virtù - especially in contemporary democratic politics. 
      
 6. 4. 2. Projecting Machiavelli’s Insights on to Democratic Politics 
 
The obvious domain in which Machiavelli’s insights on political friendships and 
hypocritical deception seem to immediately apply is international diplomacy. The shifting 
tactical alliances, the frequent betrayals and rivalries between modern states in an interna-
tional realm that seeks to avert the cementation of binary oppositions and descent into war-
fare have always provided a fertile ground for illustrating Machiavelli’s ideas. “The actions 
of states” Martin Jay (2008: 141) and Ruth Grant (1997: 41) write, always “take place with-
in a particular moral horizon” and are “subject to ethical judgment”. It is imperative for 
states to “attend to the way their actions will appear”: they are required to “speak a moral 
language” so as to build useful alliances whilst, at the same time, exploiting “the opportuni-
ties to advance their aims” (Grant, 1997: 41; Jay, 2008: 141). Dependence between states in 
a pluralist cosmos where no single state possesses absolute and unconstrained power neces-
sitates a willingness to hide their contempt and cooperate; to pretend to be trustworthy and 
to speak a common language, even if trustworthiness is impossible to maintain and even if 
their substantive aspirations and interests are conflicting and incompatible. The alliance be-
                                                                                                                           
innocence and the hypocrisy of experience. For, abstract cruelty and the hypocrisy of 
innocence have in common a certain naiveté and ignorance about the realities of politics. 
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tween the USSR, the US, and the UK forged against the common threat of fascism is, ac-
cording to Jay (2008), indicative of this. For, in order to forge such an alliance, the Allies 
had to pretend that their mutual antipathies stemming from the struggle between com-
munism and capitalism and their fundamentally different attitudes toward the maintenance 
of the British Empire did not matter; these were comfortably cast aside - only to intensify 
once the alliance was no longer useful to maintain and the Allies parted ways.  
 
Whilst this may already suggest that the cultivation and, in certain circumstances, 
the exhibition of hypocrisy is necessary, it does not necessarily warrant the more specific 
argument I wish to pursue here: that liberal democratic societies are somehow implicated in 
promoting the necessity of hypocrisy - or that hypocrisy is an inevitable by-product of ordi-
nary democratic politics - would be too quick a deduction to draw from the above argument 
(at least if it is taken on its own). Yet, the relatively under-theorized relationship between 
hypocrisy and ordinary democratic politics aside (apart from the utilization of the latter as a 
means to condemn the former), it is not hard to see how the Florentine’s insights relate to 
ordinary democratic politics. Even though our ordinary democratic politics is perhaps less 
heroic and seemingly more mundane than in Machiavelli’s era, it is no less complex and 
demanding. Democratic politics involves a struggle to secure some level of order and secu-
rity, to transform power into authority, to achieve certain goals and policy outcomes which 
stem from one’s particular tradition and to maintain tenure against competition and public 
opinion (Williams, 1978; Philp, 2001). Anyone who takes politics seriously, Janos Kis addi-
tionally tells us, has to “compete for the limited good of elected office” and possess “con-
siderable capacities to win allies, to neutralize his enemies, to make good bargains” and “to 
use the means of threat effectively” (2008: 28 -29). In short, practitioners of democratic pol-
itics are embedded in complex webs of conflict and dependence. The necessity to ‘build 
coalitions’ and to ’build or mobilise the base’ merely constitutes the democratic form of the 
prince’s need for allies and supporters (Grant, 1997).  
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 But it would also be hard to think of a less autonomous political actor than a demo-
cratic politician. Unable to take their support for granted and subject to frequent rituals of 
elections, democratic politicians must continuously seek the support of the demos and po-
tential coalition partners. In order to achieve anything at all in democratic politics, politi-
cians need the cooperation of a great many others and are far more dependent than their 
counterparts in inegalitarian, undemocratic regimes. And they need to be able to count on 
that cooperation over time by cultivating trust via the difficult art of persuasion and rhetoric- 
as opposed to open and brute coercion (Patapan & Kane, 2010; Markovits, 2008). “The lan-
guage of democratic politics”, Grant tells us, “requires ‘You can count on me’ and ‘I know I 
can count on your support’” (1997: 45). However, as Shklar (1984) and Hampshire (1989; 
1993) remind us, contemporary democratic societies are cultures of subcultures and tradi-
tions of traditions. In complex societies like ours, support can only be cultivated by appeal-
ing to diverse audiences, whose interests and conceptions of the good conflict and are irrec-
oncilable with each other and with those of the politician. As Martin Hollis writes, demo-
cratic politics requires its practitioners to:  
 
Keep a kind of faith with several groups, who lay conflicting claims of loy-
alty upon him. In our system a local councillor, for instance, must answer 
doctrinally to party workers in the language of the manifesto, must care 
pragmatically for the interests of constituents with words of common sense, 
must administer with the aid of officials in an Enlightenment language of 
reason, must manoeuvre humanely among pressure groups, each with its 
own single criterion of progress …. Each claim is legitimate; each sets a 
standard for what is best, which he will not meet. Confronted with this plu-
rality of aims and of values and of languages, he can only plead that the 
best is the enemy of the good (1982: 396 - 397). 
 
Democratic politicians, Hollis tells us, operate in a context where the competing and incom-
patible claims of different citizens, groups and traditions render the paying of lip service to 
values and the feigning of virtue difficult, if not impossible, to avoid. The impetus to hypo-
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critical behaviour here stems from a recognition I have been stressing throughout the last 
three chapters of the thesis: leading a political life is inextricably intertwined with enduring 
and irresolvable moral conflicts and with difficult, but nonetheless inevitable, choices (or 
paradoxes of action). Any attempt to accommodate the competing and conflicting claims of 
each tradition is bound to result in a messy compromise and in the partial abandonment of 
some of those claims. Given that the interests and aspirations of such groups are plural, con-
flicting and irresolvable without remainder, the politician ‘can only (privately) plead that the 
best is the enemy of the good’: to secure even the basic goods of politics, he is required to 
preserve a moral front and persuade others of his ex ante impossible loyalty, trustworthiness 
and faithfulness.   
 
 But the recognition that liberal democratic politics takes place within a context of 
dependence, competing traditions and an ethos of multiplicity casts the necessity of hypocri-
sy even farther. No less fervent a proponent of liberal democracy than Shklar (using terms 
that echo Machiavelli and Hampshire) tells us that contemporary democratic societies are 
composed by an unruly assemblage of conflict-prone public figures: “we do not agree on the 
facts of social life and we heartily dislike one another’s religious, sexual, intellectual and 
political commitments - not to mention one another’s ethnic, racial and class 
ter”113(Shklar, 1984: 78). In short, members of each tradition are likely to look at each other 
with mutual suspicion and contempt. Political friendships in contemporary democratic poli-
tics are often characterized by no less disdain than those between the Allies in WWII or Re-
naissance princes. Pace Plato and his heirs, the building and sustaining of such friendships 
is possible neither because practitioners of democratic politics are motivated by a common 
set of substantial moral convictions or values nor because unconditional candour is a politi-
                                            
113 It is surprising that Shklar, despite the affinities of her position with Machiavelli’s, 
unlike Hampshire and Berlin, does not align her thought with Machiavelli but denounces 
him. On this point see Whelan (2004) and Oakley and Cocking (2001).  
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cal virtue. “The democracy of everyday life”, Shklar tells us, “does not arise from sinceri-
ty”. Rather: 
 
It is based on the pretence that we must speak to each other as if social 
standings were a matter of indifference in our views of each other. That is, 
of course, not true. Not all of us are even convinced that all men are entitled 
to a certain minimum of social respect. Only some of us think so. But most 
of us act as if we really did believe it, and that is what counts (Shklar, 1984: 
77). 
 
Since our everyday politics is a logocentric enterprise (Markovits, 2008), the cultivation of 
support and trust necessary is doomed to fail if practitioners of democratic politics do not 
engage with one another in a way that respects the customs and norms of social discourse - 
even if they despise their interlocutors and their values; and even if they do not necessarily 
agree with such norms and customs.  
 
 Hypocrisy is thus bound to be an inevitable “side effect” of “the politics of conver-
sation” - and in particular of the practices of negotiation and debate as well as the arts of 
persuasion and rhetoric which are inherent in any open, pluralistic and competitive political 
system (Berkowitz, 1997: 37). In conditions of pluralism and dependence, such practices 
inevitably require “a certain amount of dissimulation” and hypocritical manipulation “on the 
part of all speakers” (Shklar, 1984: 48). These practices - and consequently hypocrisy - are 
not only an alternative to open cruelty, which is politically undesirable and not always pos-
sible but they also constitute an alternative to a politics of uncontaminated sincerity which 
might be equally corrosive. “One might well argue”, Shklar tells us, “that liberal democra-
cy” and the practice of politics in conditions of dependence and pluralism “cannot afford 
public sincerity” (1984: 78). Zealous candour, Hannah Arendt stresses, possesses “a despot-
ic” and “oppressive character”. Truth, in its mode of asserting validity, demands a once-and-
for-all settlement: it peremptorily claims to be acknowledged and precludes debate, unre-
solved conflicts and negotiation which constitute the essence of political life (Arendt, 2000: 
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555-556). Indeed, if there is anything that the history of philosophy - and its affinities with 
the Platonic Ideal - shows, it is that the ‘big truth’ - the absolute and univocal truth - can be 
as oppressive and inimical to plurality and democratic politics as the ‘big lie’ or open cruel-
ty. 
 
At best, unconditional sincerity is bound to lead to a failure to build political rela-
tionships (Whelan, 2004; Waldron, 2011). This much is also acknowledged by the same 
Simmel who stressed the importance of trust in complex societies: “The morally negative 
value” of deception, he says, “must not blind us” from its “positive significance for the for-
mation” of public relationships (Wolff, 1950: 336). For, the “forces of cooperation” neces-
sary to sustain trust in contemporary societies are inevitably “interspersed with distance, 
competition” and “repulsion”. And public “relationships being what they are” necessitate “a 
certain measure of concealment” (Wolff, 1950: 315- 316). The literature on negotiation 
pushes Simmel’s point even further. For instance, Alan Strudler stresses that hypocritical 
deception and concealment “constitutes a signalling device” that people who “neither know 
nor trust each other”, but are dependent on one another, can use to strike “mutually advanta-
geous agreements in an otherwise risky environment” (1995: 805). Honest bargaining, nego-
tiation theorists suggest, cannot be classified as bargaining at all (Raiffa, 1982; Steele, 1986; 
Frank, 1988; Peppet, 2002). It hampers any possibility of either negotiating or persuading 
others to cooperate or endorse (even reluctantly) one’s proposed policies. Unconditional 
truthfulness would, in certain venues, bring discussion and negotiation to a halt; it will nei-
ther aid the reaching of mutually advantageous agreements on matters of shared importance, 
nor will it sustain political relationships.  
 
This point is neatly captured in Arnold Schwarzenegger’s announcement in 2007 
that, as Governor of California, he had to change the way he would speak in public: “At-
tacking people and saying ‘girlie men’ and all those things . . . I didn’t know any better . . . 
I’ve learned that there’s a better way, and that is to bring people together, not insult them” 
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(Kane & Patapan, 2012: 74). Commentators such as George Skelton suggested that the 
Governor upgraded his verbal communication: “upgraded as in some signs of humility and 
less hubris. More charm without being cocky. Inﬂection in his voice, not bombast. Subdued 
rather than strident”. Schwarzenegger was now “fully the governor. No longer the Termina-
tor” (Skelton 2007: 1). Skelton attributes this upgrade to the Governor’s previously ineffec-
tive acts of transparent bullying, which were “thrashed by voters in a special election on his 
reforms”. Schwarzenegger’s blatant and unreflective honesty was incompatible with politi-
cal success and “the necessity of selling the public on sweeping health care and costly pub-
lic works programs” (Skelton, 2007: 1).  
  
 At its worst, zealous candour - and, in particular “honesties that humiliate” - might 
jeopardize public order: it may “ruin democratic civility in a political society in which peo-
ple have serious differences” (Shklar, 1984: 78). This need not deny that an open expression 
of disdain or the issuing of a threat is politically inappropriate tout court. But the adage that, 
if one does not have anything to say, it might be politically best to say nothing at all is also 
suggestive here; when silence is impossible, some hypocritical dissimulation might be the 
best one can do. At the very minimum, this can keep conversation going and facilitate both 
compromise and the building and sustainment of political relationships.   
 
 It is worth noting more clearly that my defence of hypocrisy as a political virtue is 
partially intertwined with a two-fold recognition that I shall explore and defend in chapter 7: 
i) that dependence renders compromise and negotiation an inevitable characteristic of politi-
cal life and ii) that an overlapping consensus on substantive values and principles of justice 
in societies characterized by deep moral conflict is implausible, both in theory and in prac-
tice. What I seek to additionally emphasize here though, is that, given that compromise is 
inescapable and an overlapping consensus is impossible, it should not be a surprise that hy-
pocrisy runs rampant during election campaigns:  
 
 195 
 
Consider a politician running for President who declares that one of his pri-
orities is to reform health care …. He promises a "National Health Insur-
ance Exchange to help increase competition by insurers. He states his une-
quivocal opposition to any law that requires everyone to buy health insur-
ance, an approach favoured by his main rival … He promises that his health 
care reform “won't add a dime to the deficit and is paid for upfront.” Alt-
hough he presents himself as willing to "reach across the aisle" … he offers 
no concessions at all during the campaign (Gutmann & Thompson, 2010: 
1128).   
 
This example bears a recognizable likeness to Obama in his 2008 presidential campaign. 
Whilst Sandel (2009) and others, saw Obama’s election as “a great hope for moral renewal” 
arising from “restless impatience with politics as it is”, Obama’s reign was a confirmation of 
ordinary politics. For, Obama’s pre-election commitments to health care reform were a far 
cry from the 2010 Affordable Care Act; the latter, which was the product of a compromise 
between Republicans and Democrats, contained elements to which Obama was strongly op-
posed during his campaign. And whilst the cries of hypocrisy were heard loudly (especially 
by those who shared Sandel’s optimism), it is hard to imagine any political candidate openly 
proclaiming his willingness to abandon or betray some of his commitments once elected.  
 
 The reason for this is simple: candidates are ineffective in mobilizing and gaining 
the trust of supporters if they talk about prudent compromises or honestly confess that their 
steadfast commitments are never going to materialize tout court (Gutmann & Thompson, 
2010; 2012; Boudreaux & Lee, 1997). Despite our obsession with ‘straight shooters’, it is 
even more difficult for us to trust, let alone to be inspired by, a politician who is openly vi-
cious and cynical; in addition to the insights of the standard DH thesis and the public recep-
tion of Schwarzenegger’s transparent bullying, Pullman et al’s recent crusade for innocence 
in public life
114
, as well as Hugo’s abhorrence towards Hoerderer’s testament of his com-
                                            
114 See chapters 1 and 5. 
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promise are suggestive here
115
. Again, what is important to note here is that support cannot 
be cultivated without some form of hypocrisy and without an appeal to an unattainable ide-
alism or virtue: success in a campaign depends on a public reaffirmation of an uncompro-
mising and consistent commitment to core principles or high-minded ideals, combined with 
a private acknowledgement that these cannot be fully realized. To refuse to cultivate and 
exhibit hypocrisy would, in Bernard Williams words, mean that “one cannot seriously pur-
sue even” some of “the moral ends of politics” (1978: 62). 
 
A more general way of putting this is to acknowledge that few, if any, campaigns 
would be successful if democratic politicians fail to inspire the majority of a nation with a 
vision of collective social hope (and that they can be entrusted with the task of its imple-
mentation). But, in societies characterized by deep conflicts, “there is in principle no basis 
for collective hope”. For “your justice is, not my justice; the fulfilment of your hopes is the 
disappointment of mine” (Edyvane, 2013: 118 - 119). In short, since a homogenous majority 
based on a harmony of shared substantive values and interests is impossible, democratic 
politicians are required to cultivate support on the basis of fictitious commonalities. Hypoc-
risy is inevitable as the practice of building and sustaining political relationships entails the 
public proclamation of, or commitment to, a vision which presupposes shared values, aspi-
rations and interests combined with a private acknowledgement of their hollowness and un-
feasibility - that the vision is a fiction and that, at best, its realisation is bound to be partial, 
shabby and compromised. 
 
So, in this section, I sought to draw on Machiavelli’s insights on political relation-
ships and the necessity of hypocrisy and to project these on to the context of ordinary demo-
cratic politics. In so doing, I have tried to illustrate that if hypocrisy is understood as the 
wearing of a mask or the putting on of a theatrical act, politics - especially in its democratic 
form - will certainly always be hypocritical. This is the paradox of democracy. Because lib-
                                            
115 See Sartre (1989). I say more on this in chapter 7. 
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eral democracies uphold certain ideals - such as egalitarianism, trust and accountability - 
they will abhor hypocrisy. But on account of these very values they will continue to gener-
ate it. And because liberal democratic politics is typically thought to be capable of providing 
open and transparent political processes and rituals - such as elections and conversation or 
debate - they will abhor hypocrisy. But because ordinary democratic politics relies on such 
processes and rituals as a means of structuring power-struggles, it will continue to necessi-
tate it. For, democratic politics takes place in a context of a plurality of conflicting and in-
compatible interests and aspirations and is structured in such a way that dependencies con-
ducive to hypocrisy are increased. “Where all are equal”, or at least thought to be so, Grant 
tells us, “no one can go it alone” (1997: 176). In democratic politics, it is neither possible 
nor desirable for a politician to rise to power and rule by relying “on his arms”, to invoke 
Machiavelli’s phrase (Prince: 96). Nor would open candour sustain political friendships and 
the support necessary to pursue certain political ends. 
 
To put it simply, then, hypocrisy is a contemporary political virtue. It enables dem-
ocratic politicians to cultivate support, build coalitions and advance some of their preferred 
policies; it can also aid the maintenance of some modicum of civility and cooperation 
amidst conditions of conflict and competition. The cultivation and exhibition of hypocrisy 
also allows for the sustainment of a shared public space, in which practitioners of democrat-
ic politics can move, carry on discourse and reach agreements on matters in which they have 
a stake, whilst pretending to leave their differences and antipathies in abeyance. 
 
The implications of the points I have been trying to make here are quite profound 
and sometimes explicitly accepted. Bernard Mandeville’s infamous contention in The Fable 
of Bees that private or ordinary vices constitute political virtues is a prominent example. As 
he tells us, we should “leave complaints” aside. For “only Fools strive to make an honest 
hive”. Hypocrisy, Mandeville suggests, is “utterly” necessary: it constitutes the glue that 
holds political relationships together (1924: 36). What follows from this is that, if hypocrisy 
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is a by-product of liberal democratic politics, a failure to cultivate and exhibit it is not just 
intertwined with a failure to lead a virtuous political life. Rather, the longing for a moralistic 
and unbroken democratic politics of unconditional transparency, openness and truthfulness - 
a romantic nostalgia for an imaginary harmony and wholeness - is incompatible with the 
context in which democratic politicians operate. This is not just because the practice of 
democratic politics, even in its least vicious manifestations, involves an element of coercion 
which should not be too readily publically displayed - or, as Theodor Adorno observed in 
Minima Moralia, that it is only totalitarian governments which openly proclaim “the princi-
ple of domination that is elsewhere concealed” (1974: 108). The incompatibility of demo-
cratic politics with perfect candour is such that the aspiration to eliminate hypocrisy from 
ordinary politics once and for all might well corrode the democratic character of our politi-
cal arrangements. On the one hand, the satisfaction of our enduring appetite for more trans-
parent public officials would inevitably require more autonomy for democratic politicians. 
But, as Grant reminds us, “it is precisely because politicians depend on supporters and coali-
tion partners” to bring about some of their ends, “and because they remain beholden to them 
for their support, that they can be held [imperfectly] accountable and the system can main-
tain its democratic character” in the first place (1997: 54). On the other hand, to eliminate 
hypocrisy from political life would, at best, require the elimination of political discourse 
tout court - or, at least, one would have to create a harmonious and homogenous community 
where the political character of politics is eliminated; at worse, it would lead to the almost 
complete erosion of public order. 
 
In what follows, I want to push some of these implications a bit further. I want to 
suggest that extirpating hypocrisy would not merely jeopardize our current political ar-
rangements. Rather, the very desire to wriggle free from it runs the danger of being incoher-
ent and self-defeating. For, it is not the case that extirpating hypocrisy is possible but our 
current political arrangements do not allow this. What is alarming about hypocrisy is that 
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the more one tries to break away from it the more hypocritical, unfit for and dangerous to 
contemporary democratic life one becomes.  
  
6. 5. The Quest for Anti-hypocrisy: The Hypocrisy of Innocence 
 
 The hypocrisy I have discussed and defended so far might be termed the hypocrisy 
of experience. Experience, I suggested in previous chapters, entails a certain kind of 
knowledge which is the sine qua non of Machiavelli’s virtù: knowledge about the unpleas-
ant realities of political life, an awareness of its ends and an understanding of how to wield 
and use political power to achieve those ends. Unlike Walzer’s politician, Machiavelli’s pol-
itician does not gaze at the future with the innocent and hopeful aspiration of salvation or 
perfection; this has been relinquished by the time he decided to pursue a life of politics. The 
hypocrisy which Machiavelli advises practitioners of politics to cultivate and exhibit is cal-
culating and clear-eyed; an experienced hypocrite is self-conscious and cognizant that his 
hypocrisy constitutes a useful political tool. Despite being nothing less than a conman, 
Machiavelli’s hypocrite is self-conscious: he deceives his audience but he is not untruthful 
or hypocritical to himself about his vices.  
 
 But hypocrisy is not inescapable only for those who have earnestly taken Machia-
velli’s infamous advice to heart. Not all hypocrites are self-conscious. Nor is the hypocrisy 
of experience the only style of hypocrisy. There exists a second type of hypocrisy which is 
often ignored by critics of this vice and which does not preclude innocence: it presupposes 
it. And, as I shall suggest in due course, failure to distinguish between these two types of 
hypocrisy coupled with the innocent belief in a perfectly transparent and sincere politics has 
serious, indeed potentially disastrous, political implications. To be sure, the innocent hypo-
crite shares with the experienced hypocrite this much: they both wear masks. But the latter 
knows himself for what he is: his mask is worn deliberately to deceive others. This 
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knowledge is lacking in the former - his mask is so compelling that he deceives himself
116
. 
This point sits well with an argument I advanced in chapter 4 - that innocence involves an 
absence of knowledge - but extends it further: the innocent not only lack knowledge about 
politics; they also lack knowledge of themselves.     
 
What is striking about the hypocrisy of innocence is that it is those who cannot tol-
erate, and seek to liberate themselves from, the vices that are most prone to exhibiting it. As 
Shklar tells us, “the more conscience rails against hypocrisy, the more it encourages the 
vice”. The quest for anti-hypocrisy demands “an ever more complete reliance on the con-
science’s own supremacy and inwardness … that forces one into hypocrisy” (1978: 192 - 
193). In short, the hypocrisy of innocence is exemplified by those who put hypocrisy first- 
those modern practitioners of politics who have “some inner vision of a transformed human-
ity” and like to think of themselves as “one of these purer and better beings” and imagine 
“that in the past or in the future a better version of mankind” and politics “did or will exist” 
(Shklar, 1984: 194). Whilst the notion of the unselfconscious and innocent hypocrite may 
seem paradoxical, the phenomenon of self-deception is far from uncommon; the anorexic 
who is neither capable of acknowledging her anorexia nor acknowledge her failure to 
acknowledge it comes readily to mind here. 
 
This type of hypocrisy is famously captured by Moliere in The Misanthrope, in his 
portrayal of Alceste: “there’s nothing more I detest like the contortions, of all these great 
dispensers of lip service” he says; it “reduces me to utter despair to see men living as they 
do. I meet with nothing but base flattery… villainy everywhere. I can’t stand it anymore” 
(Moliere, 2000: 97). Alceste’s disgust with the hypocrisy of public life steers him to commit 
wholeheartedly to the development of his chief talents: frankness, sincerity and the exposure 
of the hypocrisies of his contemporaries. As Rousseau (2004) laments, The Misanthrope 
                                            
116 What I term here as the hypocrisy of innocence has parallels with what Runciman 
(2008) terms second-order hypocrisy.  
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does not provide us with a sketch of the perfectly virtuous man. Nor did Moliere wish to 
correct the vices but only what is ridiculous. But, in line with the insights of the dynamic 
account, Moliere’s reason for avoiding this is because the Diogenic search for this individu-
al is futile, precisely because this individual is impossible. Alceste is not ridiculed by Mo-
liere because he is virtuous as Rousseau complains
117
. Alceste is ridiculous because he inno-
cently believes that he is virtuous.  
 
Pliny the Younger’s remark that “he who hates vice hates mankind” already sug-
gests some of the reasons as to why Alceste’s belief that he constitutes a paragon of perfec-
tion is misplaced (quoted in Shklar, 1984: 192). But whilst Alceste’s misanthropy plants a 
question mark over his sense of perfection, it is not his misanthropy per se that constitutes 
the most troubling and dangerous quality of his character. Indeed, like hypocrisy, misan-
thropy is, as I gestured in the previous section, neither evadable in, nor - as Shklar (1984) 
and Edyvane (2012) suggest - necessarily destructive for political life. To contain its de-
structiveness though, one is required to maintain an acute awareness of what Williams 
(2002a) terms the first question of politics (the need for a modicum of order, stability and 
security), an acknowledgement that individual and societal perfection is impossible and that 
public life, with all its interdependencies, renders hypocrisy necessary. These are touched on 
by the experienced Philinte who tells Alceste that “like you, I observe many times each day 
things which could be better if they were done differently. But whatever I happen to see, I 
don’t show my irritation openly as you do.” For “in certain cases it would be uncouth and 
most absurd to speak the naked truth … It is often best to veil one’s true emotions. 
Wouldn’t the social fabric come undone if we were wholly frank with everyone? (Moliere, 
1993:  19). For Alceste none of this matters - all that matters to him is an abstract truthful-
ness and an impossible perfection. Obduracy with perfection and anti-hypocrisy deems in-
nocent hypocrites so preoccupied with uncovering the vices and hypocrisies of others that 
                                            
117 See also Trilling (1972). 
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they fail to subject their own views to reflection; this amounts to outright hubris: the state in 
which truth is obscured through the ascendancy of self-regarding will over phronesis and 
experience.    
 
Shklar’s and Moliere’s depiction of the innocent hypocrite captures well some of 
contemporary calls for perfection and innocence as well as the cries of despair against hy-
pocrisy and the vices I documented in chapter 1 and here respectively. It also issues a cau-
tionary warning against both such despair and the calls for absolute virtue and innocence 
that accompany the narrative of crisis. For, in contrast to the hypocrisy of experience, the 
hypocrisy of innocence is much more unfit for, even dangerous to, politics. This point is 
related to the argument I have advanced in chapter 4: innocence is not something which 
awaits to be tragically tainted - it constitutes a source of tragedy and political disaster. This 
insight also emerges from the argument I advanced in the previous section - that uncondi-
tional truthfulness, a feature of the hypocrisy of innocence, does little to sustain the practice 
of democratic politics. There is, however, more to be said here. At best, the quest for perfec-
tion and anti-hypocrisy might additionally provoke withdrawal from political life; like 
Rousseau, Alceste repeatedly declares his need to “escape from the abyss where vice reigns 
triumphant” and “find some solitary place and avoid all contact with humankind” (Moliere, 
2000, 98 - 114). Walzer’s politician, who embarks on the quest for politics with the innocent 
aspiration that the virtues of morality and politics can be harmonized, also comes to mind: 
his inability to realize that cultivating the vices - especially hypocrisy - is necessary for poli-
tics provokes his political exodus so as to regain purification. This, of course, is far from a 
virtuous life, especially for the individual who wants to commit himself to the practice of 
politics.  
 
At worst, the hypocrisy of innocence might jeopardize political order and stability: 
it may “easily spill over into the violent will” to extirpate hypocrisy and the vices altogether 
and “demolish the corrupt society and to establish in its place a new way of living” 
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(Edyvane, 2012: 5). Edyvane’s remark brings to mind Robespierre; like Alceste, Robes-
pierre prided himself on being ‘incorruptible’, a perfectly virtuous human species and an 
enemy of hypocrisy, the vice he abhorred the most. As Arendt notes, “the momentous role 
that hypocrisy and the passion for its unmasking came to play in the French Revolution, 
though it may never cease to astound the historian, is a matter of historical record” (1990: 
98). It was the ‘incorruptible’s’ war upon hypocrisy which gave rise to the Reign of Terror 
or, what Arendt calls, the ‘terror of virtue’. This was a war directed against political society 
en masse and against a hidden enemy - a hidden vice. And it was futile not just because per-
fection is unfeasible, but because the hidden nature of hypocrisy deems its unmasking in-
surmountable; the demand that everybody display in public life “their innermost motivation 
demands the impossible”. The terror of virtue was boundless, a hunt for witches and uni-
corns, as “the hunt for hypocrites is boundless by nature” (Arendt, 1990: 98 - 100). “This 
misplaced emphasis on the heart as the source of political virtue,” Arendt writes, and the 
quest to eradicate hypocrisy from public life, are together a recipe for madness. Needless to 
say, the enterprise was also far from politically virtuous, let alone democratic. To be sure, 
just as our demands to purify the public stage from the vicious and the hypocrites once and 
for all, such terror was enacted in good faith. But, “the search for perfection”, Berlin tells us, 
“is a recipe for bloodshed, no better even it is demanded by the sincerest of idealists, the 
purest of heart” (1990a: 18). Innocent intentions and utopian ideals, Machiavelli reminds us, 
never succeed in politics. Robespierre’s unrestrained quest for perfection resulted in a for-
lorn and abstract cruelty - the epitome of “cruelty bad used”. And whilst his innocent hypoc-
risy is hardly an issue when one considers his cruelty, it is remarkable how the latter was the 
product of the former.  
  
  6. 6. Conclusion 
 
  My general aim in this chapter was to suggest that the core insights of the dynamic 
account of DH constitute a real and inescapable issue for contemporary democratic politics. 
 204 
 
In advancing this claim, I turned to the examination of hypocrisy. In particular, I suggested 
that hypocrisy is necessary for the practice of our ordinary and seemingly mundane demo-
cratic politics. The argument I advanced here somewhat bridges what Mendus (2009b) iden-
tifies as a peculiar divide in the contemporary literature of political morality and DH: those 
who focus on political character - and endorse imperfection and dirtiness as an inevitable 
by-product of politics - and those who focus on contemporary institutional structures and 
processes - and thereby condemn both imperfection and dirtiness as democratically undesir-
able and unacceptable. Whilst hypocrisy poses serious challenges for the practice of con-
temporary politics, to assume that democratic politics is tout court inhospitable to hypocrisy 
is unsatisfactory. Nor is it the case that our politics can ever be purged of hypocrisy - or, at 
least, some manifestations of it: what I termed the hypocrisy of experience. For, as I sug-
gested, democratic societies are implicated in promoting hypocrisy; it is, in short, the very 
processes, structures and values inherent in democratic societies coupled with the nature of 
political relationships amidst conditions of conflict and pluralism which exacerbate the ne-
cessity of hypocrisy. To seek to liberate oneself and democratic politics from hypocrisy 
would not merely jeopardize the democratic character of our political arrangements. The 
innocent aspiration to wriggle free from this vice is self-defeating and may have disastrous 
political implications: the more one tries to extirpate hypocrisy the more hypocritical and 
dangerous to contemporary public life one becomes.  
 
It is important to acknowledge here that the account of hypocrisy I have presented 
in this chapter is closely intertwined with the necessity and inevitability of compromise in 
contemporary public life - or, the impossibility of an overlapping consensus of values. Dif-
ferently put, my defence of dynamic DH and hypocrisy - and, in particular, my contention 
that this vice constitutes the glue that holds together a virtuous political life - is bound to be 
partial and incomplete without acknowledging the value and necessity of compromise in 
ordinary politics. For, if an overlapping consensus on substantive values or principles of 
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justice is philosophically possible - if, in other words, it is conceivable for reasonable agents 
to perfectly resolve their disagreements by appeal to a shared conception of justice - there 
would be no need for compromise and betrayal. Nor would there be any need for the hypo-
critical concealment of these vices. The point here is that, in the absence of an explicit de-
fence of compromise in contemporary politics, we cannot fully make sense of the distinctive 
nature of political integrity. Simply put, if external conflicts or disagreements amongst poli-
ticians can be reasonably resolved without remainder - if it is, in short, possible for politi-
cians to materialize their commitments and pre-election promises in toto - the central in-
sights of the dynamic account of DH seem less plausible: political integrity is no different 
from moral integrity or, what Hollis (1982) and Mendus (2009a), term the integrity and con-
sistency of the saint. It is to the exploration of these issues - and to the defence of a com-
promising disposition as a political virtue and of the centrality of compromise to political 
integrity - I now turn. 
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      7. Dynamic DH and Democratic Politics Continued:  
            Compromise, Integrity and the Ambiguities of Betrayal  
                      
 
                          There can be no compromise on basic principles or fundamental issues... 
            when people speak of ‘compromise’ what they mean is not a legitimate  
                         mutual concession   or a trade,  but precisely a betrayal of their principles. 
A. Rand118 
 
7.1. Introduction 
  
    In the previous chapter I suggested that the insights of the dynamic account of DH 
have significant implications for our ordinary politics. In connection to this, I turned my 
attention to the explicit examination of the vices - and, in particular, to hypocrisy. But, as I 
have indicated, my account of hypocrisy and dynamic DH in contemporary politics is bound 
to be incomplete without acknowledging the necessity and value of compromise. And, in the 
absence of such recognition, we cannot fully capture the distinctive nature of political 
integrity either. So, my general aim in this chapter is this: I want to argue that compromise 
is necessary and inescapable in contemporary public life and that acknowledging this helps 
us make better sense of political integrity. 
 
 That compromise is necessary in politics may appear an anodyne claim. After all, 
politics - especially in its democratic form - is known as the ‘art of compromise’ (Wittman, 
1995; Elshtain, 1995). This point however, is not as obvious as one might suspect. Despite 
being widely practiced, compromise is largely ignored by philosophers in general (Golding, 
1979; Day, 1989; Bellamy et al, 2012) and standard DH theorists in particular, who purport 
to capture the nuances of our moral reality. “It is probably the mistrust of this notion”, 
Mohamed Nachi suggests, “that is to blame for the relatively few studies on compromise” 
                                            
118 The Virtue of Selfishness, 64 
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(2004: 493). The way compromise is typically received by philosophers sits well with the 
moralistic account of political ethics which this thesis resists: political philosophers invoke 
the notion of compromise with the purpose of rejecting it (Horton, 2009; Neal, 1993). At 
best, ideal theorists such as John Rawls who claim to be sensitive to pluralism and conflict 
treat compromise as an unnecessary feature of democratic politics. Political agreements are 
thought to be just and reasonable only if they reflect an overlapping consensus, as opposed 
to a ‘mere’ compromise. “Compromise”, writes Avishai Margalit, seems “messy, the dreary 
stuff of day-to-day politics” (2012: 5- 6). At worst, its practitioners are degraded as totally 
unjust and unprincipled: compromise, Martin Benjamin tells us, is often “regarded as a sign 
of weakness, the lack of integrity” (1990: 1; my emphasis). In addition to Rand’s remark in 
the title quote, H. L Mencken’s scorn for compromise is suggestive. “A politician”, he 
writes, “has to make so many compromises that he becomes indistinguishable from a 
streetwalker” (1946: 4). A ‘compromising disposition’119, Mencken suggests, constitutes a 
dangerous vice: practitioners of compromise are incapable of pursuing an integrated life.  
 
 This negative perception of compromise is not limited within the confines of 
philosophical analysis. Consider for instance some of the headlines of the 2010 Liberal 
Democrat and Conservative Coalition which required both parties to abandon some of their 
pre-election pledges
120
. The Guardian reports that “Nick Clegg … the leader of the party 
with a manifesto commitment to ‘clean up’ politics became tarnished by the constant tinkle 
of apparently broken promises” (Jack, 2012: 2). “The coalition government”, Wilby adds, 
“brought betrayals of manifesto commitments that … are unprecedented in British politics” 
(2012: 1). “Tuition fees vote: Hypocrisy and betrayal by Pinocchio Nick Clegg” reports The 
Mirror (2012). “No leader in modern politics”, it adds, “betrayed voters as quickly and 
                                            
119 I borrow this term from Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson (2012).  
120 These accusations, one may retort, are not targeted against Clegg’s compromise per se 
but his hypocrisy. Whilst there is an element of truth in this, compromise and hypocrisy are 
interconnected and cannot be disjointed tout court whilst assessing the lives politicians lead.  
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cynically as this man. Clegg sold his principles and his party's soul for a fancy title” 
(Mirror, 2012). Finally, The New Statesman suggests that Clegg’s ‘selling out’ was a 
profound example of politicians’ lack of integrity (Elmhirst, 2010). 
 
 To be clear, it is not my intention to examine the rights and wrongs of this - or 
indeed any - compromise per se. Nor do I wish to suggest that compromise does not pose 
serious challenges to the practice of democratic politics. What I do want to emphasize here 
is that the above remarks bring to the fore a rather odd paradox: the claim that politics is the 
art of compromise is a platitude, and yet we seem profoundly allergic to compromise in 
politics when it happens. In this chapter, I want to explore this paradox. In particular, I want 
to suggest that: i) compromise is an ambiguous and fox-like public virtue - something which 
is politically expedient but not necessarily morally admirable; ii) a willingness to 
compromise, whilst uncongenial to moral integrity, constitutes an essential part of the 
integrity of practitioners of democratic politics.  
 
 The argument is advanced in two phases. First, I shall provide a preliminary 
examination of compromise, so as to set the context for the subsequent discussion. In 
particular, I wish to consider how it differs from the notion of consensus, which has 
received rather more attention from political theorists. I shall then argue that attempts to 
deny the necessity and value of compromise in ordinary politics misconstrue the realities of 
politics and idealize the messy context in which politicians operate. They also 
mischaracterize the life public officials lead and the nature of political integrity. In doing so, 
I shall build on the argument I advanced in the previous chapters: that making sense of 
political ethics and DH also entails taking the context in which politicians operate seriously. 
To put it differently, the standards of political excellence arise from within politics as 
opposed to any external abstract moral standpoint. In this sense, the rupture between a moral 
and political life is partially conditioned on the recognition that conflict is also manifested 
externally: between different political agents or groups. Politicians are not self-sufficient: 
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they operate in a domain of conflict and dependence which shapes the virtues conducive to 
virtuous political practice. And it is precisely this recognition which renders compromise an 
inescapable feature of ordinary politics and a crucial aspect of political integrity. For, whilst 
commitment to a set of principles which stem from one’s tradition or pre-election promises 
implies a commitment to seeing them realized, the practice of politics in conditions of 
interdependence, pluralism and conflict often requires compromising and partially 
abandoning those principles. An innocent and all-or-nothing pursuit of one’s principles in 
politics is bound to promote abstract cruelty - and thereby jeopardize order and stability - or 
lead to defeat: a rigid refusal to compromise one’s principles would entail the entire 
abandonment of any hope of realizing some of these principles. 
 
 7.2. Compromise: A Preliminary Consideration  
 
 Compromise refers to “the settlement of a dispute by which each side gives up 
something it has asked for and neither side gets all it has asked for” (OED, 1901). This 
definition uncovers two interrelated interpretations of compromise. Its first part conceives of 
compromise as an agreement. The second part alludes to certain processes pursued by each 
side to effect this agreement: compromise is a means of reaching an agreement. Simply 
stated, a compromise constitutes a “type of outcome of a conflict” and “a process for 
resolving conflict” (Benjamin, 1990: 4). A precondition of any compromise, then, is the 
existence of interpersonal conflict: situations where individuals have decided which position 
or course dovetails with their best judgement, but who find themselves in opposition to 
others whose judgment has led them to a conflicting position.  
 
 The question which merits more scrutiny here though - especially if we are to 
discern the distinct characteristics of compromise and capture some of the charges so often 
levelled against it - is this: if a compromise constitutes an agreement in the face of external 
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conflict, how does it differ from the notion of a political consensus
121
? On the face of it, 
both notions seem similar - or, they seem to rest on similar presuppositions. In Political 
Liberalism, John Rawls tells us that contemporary societies are characterized by a “plurality 
of conflicting and incommensurable conceptions of the meaning, value and purpose of 
human life”. Pluralism, he maintains, is “a permanent feature of the public culture of 
democracy” (1996: 36). In our societies, none of these comprehensive doctrines, traditions 
and aspirations is generally affirmed. Nor “should one expect that in the foreseeable future 
one of them” will ever “be affirmed by all or nearly all reasonable” public figures (Rawls, 
1996: xvi). Disagreement about the good is reasonable as our judgement is burdened. For 
instance, different public agents are expected to reach different conclusions from the same 
stock of evidence. In addition, the way evidence and values are assessed depend on one’s 
life experiences; and, since life experiences differ, we expect public agents to reach different 
judgements
122
. Thus, whilst reasonable individuals might be motivated to reach agreement 
about the good, they will fail to do so.     
 
 However, Rawls contends that, this does not preclude agreement among reasonable 
public agents on a shared and substantive conception of justice or fairness. “The idea of an 
                                            
121 I should highlight two issues here. First, my analysis depends on how one reads Rawls. 
Some philosophers, such as Richard Rorty (1991), interpret Rawls’ position as closer to my 
description of compromise. However, as John Horton suggests, “it is doubtful whether 
Rawls would have accepted” this “as an accurate account of his position” (2010: 10). 
Second, Rawls’ discussion focuses on the question of political stability and mostly applies 
to relationships between democratic citizens as opposed to relationships between 
professional politicians (who are the focus of this thesis). Nonetheless, if a consensus 
amongst reasonable citizens is conceptually plausible as Rawls claims, there is no reason to 
suppose that it might not be plausible for reasonable politicians as well. And since, as I 
explain, the point of a consensus is to foster social unity under the aegis of reason, there is 
no reason to believe that Rawls’ discussion should not apply to broader political questions.  
122 This is a partial summary on how the burdens of judgement affect agreement about the 
good. See Rawls (1996: 56 -57).  
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overlapping consensus”, Rawls writes, enables a regime “characterized by the fact of 
pluralism” to “achieve stability and social unity by the public recognition of a reasonable 
political conception of justice” (1987: 2). The upshot of this, Bernard Dauenhauer explains, 
is that an overlapping consensus is assumed to be capable of “accommodating the existence 
of a multiplicity of reasonable doctrines” (2000: 207). In short, a consensus is reached when 
the parties involved agree with respect to their opinions or when their aspirations are 
congruent with an overarching conception of fairness (Zanetti, 2011; Leif, 2012; van Parijs, 
2012). As Rawls puts it, an overlapping consensus “is not viewed as incompatible with 
basic religious, philosophical, and moral values”. For “there are many reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines that understand the wider realm of values to be (a) congruent with, 
or (b) supportive of, or (c) not in conflict with, political values as these are specified by a 
political conception of justice for a democratic regime” (1996: 157; 169). Suppose, for 
instance, that a cake needs to be split between you and me in circumstances in which we 
would each like to eat the whole thing. If we both share the same conception of fairness (i.e. 
we agree that splitting the cake in half is fair and reasonable) a consensus-based agreement 
would be possible. “As a reasoned response to a political or social question”, Bellamy et al 
tell us, “a consensus not only resolves the situation of conflict itself; the reasons of the 
conflict will also have been deliberated away”123 (2012: 284). Hence, the belief in the 
possibility of consensus - whilst presupposing the existence of prima facie irreducible 
pluralism and conflict - is underpinned by the assumption that a tidy agreement (which is 
congruent with such a plurality) does exist. 
 
 This point marks an important difference between the two concepts. For, whilst a 
compromise is seen as a solution to external conflicts, it is far from a tidy agreement. In a 
manner reminiscent of the insights of the dynamic account of DH, Roy aptly points out that 
“the chief characteristic of a political problem [which is solved, so to speak, via a 
                                            
123 See also Ankersmit (2002) and Gutmann and Thompson (2012).  
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compromise] is that it is insoluble” (1990: 330). To return to the stylized example of 
splitting the cake, if both of us appeal to different conceptions of fairness - if I claim the 
entire cake because I baked it, whereas your claim is premised on the fact that you have 
been on a diet - a consensus is unattainable precisely because disagreement cuts much 
deeper: it goes all the way down to principles of justice. And, it is in these instances where a 
compromise is feasible. A compromise, David Archard explains, shows that “the 
disagreement is not ambivalence or uncertainty on the part of some”. There exists “real and 
substantive disagreement” and “there is no overlapping consensus in Rawls’ sense” (2012: 
405). In short, the pursuit of compromise is underpinned by the assumption that an 
overlapping consensus is, in some sense, unattainable - and this, as I explain, constitutes one 
of the reasons why compromise is necessary in politics.  
 
 In contrast to a consensus then, a compromise “cannot do away with the underlying 
grounds of controversy” (Bellamy et al, 2012: 298). Whilst a compromise is often 
intertwined with peace, it entails neither a ‘peace’ nor a ‘final rational harmony’ in the 
Kantian or Platonic sense of suppression of conflict: the grounds of the conflict, and the 
conflict itself, do not evaporate once an agreement is reached (Bellamy & Hollis, 2007; 
Hirschman, 1994). In this sense, a compromise resembles a notion which Rawls rejects: a 
modus vivendi, a pragmatic arrangement between groups “that affects a workable 
compromise on issues in dispute without permanently settling them” (Dauenhauer, 2000: 
219). A modus vivendi, according to Rawls, is- by virtue of its very nature - “political in the 
wrong way”: its form and content are “affected by the existing balance of political power” 
(1996: 142). In contrast, an overlapping consensus involves “a balance of reasons as seen 
within each citizen’s comprehensive doctrine and not a compromise compelled by 
circumstances” (Rawls, 1996: 169). Or, as he puts it in Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, 
“as a liberal conception, justice as fairness is concerned with stability in a different way. 
Finding a stable conception is not simply a matter of avoiding futility. Rather, what counts 
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is the kind of stability, the nature of forces that secure it” (2001: 185). What is worth 
emphasizing more clearly here then, is that Rawls’ consensus is much more morally 
demanding (Horton, 2009). For, Rawls thinks that in contemporary societies, the parameters 
of any political agreement or relationship should be regulated by quite determinate and 
substantive principles of justice. In a compromise though, no substantive values or 
principles of justice are mutually acceptable to, and perfectly consistent with, each party’s 
interests or aspirations: the parties cooperate only because they believe that doing so 
constitutes a ‘lesser evil’124. To be sure, this need not deny that the outcome of a particular 
compromise could be similar to the outcome of an overlapping consensus (i.e. the parties 
might still decide to divide the cake evenly even if they do not believe that this is 
substantially just). But, in the absence of a common set of substantive values, the terms of 
compromise-based agreements are bound to be much more open. In compromises, Archard 
tells us, the difference “may be split closer to one of the disputants’ starting point than to 
others” (2012: 403); one party can get more out of the deal relative to its initial claim vis-à-
vis what the other party manages to get out relative to its initial claim
125
. Hence, the account 
of compromise presented here is very thin in terms of any substantive content. 
  
It is worth adding that, because compromise “has nothing to with the abandonment 
or the mere denial of conflictuality”, in compromise-based agreements each party gains 
something but not everything (Arnsperger & Picavet, 2004: 168). As Smith puts it “each 
party to a conflict gives up something dear, but not invaluable, in order to get something 
which is truly invaluable” (1956: 45). This remark suggests that compromise shares some 
common elements with the orthodox interpretation of the DH problem: this phenomenon 
constitutes a paradox of action, whereby something of value is sacrificed at the expense of 
                                            
124 In this sense, my account of compromise is closer to what Shklar (1989) and Williams 
(2002a) call ‘the liberalism of fear’ than Rawls’ liberalism: it is about damage control.   
125 The terms of each agreement depend on various factors (i.e. each party’s bargaining 
power and skills). See Schelling (1956). 
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something else
126
. Differently put, in compromises people refrain from doing what they 
consider the tout court right thing to do: they settle for a course of action which 
simultaneously contains elements of rightfulness and wrongfulness.  
 
And yet, despite the similarities between compromise and the standard DH thesis, 
DH theorists have devoted little attention to compromise. To be clear, I do not wish suggest 
that the word compromise does not feature in standard discussions of DH at all. A breezy 
reading of the literature on DH seems to reveal that standard DH theorists tend to utilize 
compromise in the rather pejorative sense I explore in the next section: compromise is akin 
to betrayal (c.f. de Wijze, 2009; Blattberg, 2013). This much also follows from my 
discussion of the standard DH thesis in chapter 3: the departing assumption of such a thesis 
is an innocent man who, once confronted with a momentous paradox of action, is forced to 
compromise his principles. What I want to suggest here however, is that standard DH 
theorists fail to capture compromise in all its complexity. And, this should not surprise us. 
For, compromise is bound to remain elusive for the heirs of Plato and the Enlightenment 
who seek to suppress individual and societal conflict through the derivation of abstract, 
universal and harmonious sets of principles upon which all rational agents ought to ascend. 
By implication, it is also bound to remain elusive for the standard DH thesis. 
  
As I have demonstrated in chapter 4, the standard DH thesis is unsatisfactorily static 
and idealistic: the static conception of DH is maintained at the cost of ignoring the extent 
and the nature of the conflict between morality and politics. In short, the standard DH thesis 
fails to capture Machiavelli’s recognition that the rupture between morality and politics is 
                                            
126 This point sits neatly with John Morley’s (1886) remark that compromise is akin to 
toleration. This is not merely because toleration entails a capacity to endure something 
which one believes to be wrong. Rather, toleration and, as I suggest, compromise are 
ambiguous virtues: they are pragmatically necessary but they are not necessarily morally 
admirable.  
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perpetual and involves a conflict between at least two entire and exhaustive ways of life. It 
also conveniently ignores some of the ways in which this conflict occurs and is sustained 
through time. For, proponents of the standard DH thesis conceive DH as a momentous 
conflict that confronts a philosophical nobody: this is an agent who comes to his choices 
ethically naked - without a pattern of experiences formed by his particular history and 
affiliation with a particular tradition - and who is detached from the real sociological context 
in which she operates. In short, it is not just, as Stephen Garrett (1996) suggests that the 
standard DH thesis ignores the diversity of input that goes into certain policy decisions. 
Rather, the DH thesis also conveniently ignores that certain policy decisions are themselves 
the product of external moral conflict.  
 
The point here is that the standard DH thesis is bound to misconceive compromise 
precisely because it misconceives pluralism and conflict - both in individual and societal 
ethics. The tendency to cast DH in terms of abstract and universal consequentialist or 
deontological moral principles makes little room for the recognition that politicians are 
members of a particular tradition and that their interests and aspirations may conflict with 
those of their political interlocutors. Differently put, by virtue of its conception of morality 
in terms of universal deontological and consequentialist rules, the static account idealizes 
the messy domain in which politicians operate. Nor can the standard DH thesis confront the 
point I wish to advance here: since practitioners of politics operate in conditions of 
perpetual conflict and dependence, a preparedness to forgo some of one’s aspirations and 
interests constitutes an integral aspect of political virtue and a crucial feature of political 
integrity. Thus, the ‘static’ flavour of the standard vogue of DH is partially maintained and 
reinforced by a picture of societal harmony which is, as I shall suggest, uncongenial to the 
societies we live in. It also misses much of the continuous sacrifices and dirt of everyday 
democratic politics. This point is glimpsed by Danielle Allen (2004) and Andy Sabl (2002). 
As they argue, the tendency of political philosophers to focus only on a single, grand and 
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dramatic moral sacrifice misconceives the practice of democratic politics and distorts our 
picture of what political life involves: it turns a blind eye to the recognition that politics 
requires on-going and “quotidian sacrifices” (Allen, 2004: 39) and “guarantees drama at the 
cost of perspective” (Sabl, 2002: 3). 
Irrespective of whether standard DH theorists do account for compromise though, 
the affinities between compromise and the standard DH thesis, suggest that compromise 
might invite the same philosophical objections the DH problem so frequently does
127
 (see 
chapter 3). As Gutmann and Thompson explain, “it is not simply that compromise will fall 
short”, in the sense that something valuable has been forfeited. It “will also include elements 
that are jointly incoherent and inconsistent with each other and with any single theory 
(2012: 193). Since in a compromise the parties “balance inconveniences”, to use Edmund 
Burke’s (1987: 126) words, a curious property of this phenomenon is that it will appear to 
be contradictory and vicious if viewed only from the perspective of a single tradition or 
theory of justice. Unlike consensus-based agreements, compromises contain a melange of 
principles and are not wholeheartedly endorsed
128
. Whilst the agreement is grudgingly 
accepted, “the disagreements among the parties are embodied in the compromise itself” 
(Gutmann & Thompson, 2012: 12) and few of its individual components are acceptable to 
all parties; only the entire package is.    
 
 This brings to the fore an additional feature of compromise which is associated with 
the conception of it as a process: mutual concessions (Day, 1989; 1991; Benditt, 1979). “To 
reach a compromise”, Bellamy explains, “all parties need to concede something; they need 
to adjust their claims and positions so as to facilitate accommodation” (2012: 286). Hence, a 
                                            
127 See for instance, George Santayana (1926).   
128 Rawls’ consensus, Claudia Mills (2000) suggests, is akin to what Jean Hampton (1997) 
calls ‘endorsement consent’: it presupposes that an agreement is explicitly supported, not 
merely endorsed for pragmatic reasons (for the sake of getting something out of the 
dispute).  
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compromise requires each party to ‘hear the other side’ - even when the other side and its 
values appear to be despicable (see chapter 6). This requires negotiation, bargaining and a 
preparedness to sacrifice (some of) one’s interests and values. These rituals reinforce the 
perception of a compromise as a messy agreement. Needless to say, these are hardly 
necessary in a consensus: if a solution which is perfectly acceptable to both parties - one 
which is congruent with, and morally supported by, their tradition - does exist, there is ipso 
facto no need to engage in bargaining, negotiation or persuasion
129
. As Anthony Laden 
writes:  
 
Negotiated agreements are compromises amongst parties who have 
different pre-existing interests ... They engage in bargaining as a means 
of maximizing the satisfaction of [their] interests, because they realize 
that the presence of other agents with different interests places an 
obstacle in their way. Deliberation, on the other hand … is not a 
mutually acceptable compromise, but rather a shared solution ... It aims, 
to put this in Rawls’s terms, at an overlapping consensus and not 
merely a modus vivendi … Deliberation reflects a kind of agreement 
among the parties to resolve their differences … on mutually acceptable 
terms (2007: 280) 
 
These rituals additionally mark a discrepancy between compromise and capitulation (van 
Parijs, 2012; Jones & O’ Flynn, 2012). I should emphasize here though that, whilst the 
proviso that ‘coercion is no compromise’ has become a cliché in the literature dealing with 
compromises, the distinction between coercion and compromise is not as clear-cut as 
assumed. For, “coercion and compromise can happen together” (Margalit, 2012: 52). This 
can be partly explained with reference to the fact that, in the absence of a consensus, the 
more competitive the game is and the more strategic solutions are sought; since ‘more for 
one means less for the other’ the extraction of concessions serves the maximization of gains 
                                            
129 A consensus, according to Rawls, is not reached via “rhetoric and persuasion” but “on 
the basis of mutually recognized criteria and evidence” (1996: 111). 
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(Bellamy et al, 2012). In addition to concealment and hypocrisy (see chapter 6), toughness 
has long been recognized as a virtue in negotiations (Meltsner & Schrag, 1973; Kornprobst, 
2012). “Imbalances in threat-advantage, information and skill”, David Luban points out, 
“are systematically exploited” (1985: 405). These tactics, to borrow Charles Fried’s phrase, 
are “like moves in a game” and form an essential part of the practice of negotiations (1978: 
72).  
 
 Whilst this is not to suggest that concessions in a compromise should not be, in 
some sense, mutual and voluntary, a rigid distinction between compromise and coercion 
would omit agreements that could count as compromises. It would also ignore certain 
processes and virtues necessary for the practice of negotiation and politics. Granted that 
coercion goes in degrees, “the closer an agreement is to a case of compromise, the further it 
is from coercion” and the furthest it is from cruelty (Margalit, 2012: 20- 21). Churchill’s 
remark on the Munich Agreement is suggestive here: “One pound was demanded at pistol’s 
point. When it was given, two pounds were demanded at pistol’s point” (Parliamentary 
Debates, 1938). The proverbial ‘pistol’s point’ entails more than coercion: it constitutes a 
clear reference to cruelty. In contrast to the typical “hardball” bargaining tactics, in such 
instances the opposing party is forced to unconditionally succumb to the other side.   
  
 So, extrapolated as a set of propositions, the distinct features of a compromise are 
the following: a) a compromise takes place in a context of deep and insurmountable 
interpersonal moral conflict and b) a compromise-based agreement reveals that a consensus 
on mutually shared interests, aspirations and conceptions of justice is, in some sense, 
impossible; c) compromise-based agreements are untidy: whilst compromise soothes 
conflict, the grounds of conflictuality and the conflict itself do not evaporate. In short, 
compromise-based agreements are not devoid of a moral remainder: each party in a 
compromise abandons some of its interests, aspirations and values; d) the moral remainder 
involved in compromises stems from each party’s engagement in a process of negotiation 
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and bargaining; e) these concessions are extracted voluntarily - or, at least, not entirely 
through coercion and cruelty.  
 
 To illustrate some of these features, we could consider the infamous 2010 Liberal 
Democrat - Conservative coalition. The coalition involved the formation of a joint 
programme, under which both parties would become partners in government. Each side 
jettisoned some of its policies in order to hold on to others; each party had to promote 
policies which were incongruent with their manifesto and pre-election promises and were 
thought to be wrong (McLean, 2012). The coalition, Richard Bellamy argues, “does not 
reflect a consensus because it involves all sides accepting a settlement that falls short of 
what they regard as right or good in ways that may feel misguided”. Both parties “chose to 
hold their noses and to do certain things they would rather not have done” (2012: 449). For 
instance, the Liberal Democrats abandoned their pledges on student fees whereas the 
Conservatives endorsed different immigration and inheritance tax policies than the ones 
proposed. Furthermore, “Liberal Democrats and Conservatives deeply disagreed about 
constitutional rights and the electoral system” and “had to reach a compromise on both in 
the Coalition Agreement” (Bellamy, 2012: 453). And, despite the fact that “the Coalition 
agreement begins by enunciating three shared principles - freedom, fairness and 
responsibility - the parties “diverge considerably in their interpretation of them” (Bellamy, 
2012: 453). Had this agreement satisfied both parties’ first-options or stemmed from a 
shared conception of justice, we would not speak of a compromise.   
 
 Yet, it would seem that, it is because the Coalition agreement was a compromise 
that it was vilified by a considerable portion of the press. In what follows, I shall explore the 
negative perception of compromise in more detail. In so doing, I want to argue that attempts 
to deny the value of compromise in democratic politics are unsatisfactory: they misconstrue 
and idealize both what politics as a practice involves and the distinctive nature of political 
integrity. The argument I shall pursue here builds on two intertwined points I have advanced 
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in previous chapters. First, making sense of political ethics and DH entails acknowledging 
that there exists an irreducible clash between an admirable moral life and a virtuous political 
life. Second, the standards of evaluation of political excellence arise from within politics 
rather than from an external moral standpoint. The rupture between a moral and political 
life, then, is partially conditioned on the recognition that conflict is also manifested 
interpersonally: between different political agents or groups. Politicians are not self-
sufficient: they operate in a domain of conflict and dependence which affects the virtues 
conducive to virtuous political practice and shapes the nature of political integrity. Simply 
put, I want to suggest that the practical and philosophical impossibility of an overlapping 
consensus in conditions of pluralism deems compromise an inescapable and valuable feature 
of democratic politics and a crucial aspect of political integrity. 
 
 7.3. Compromise and Democratic Politics  
  
 Despite its apparent anachronism, Petrovici’s remark in the 1930s that “compromise 
is perpetually condemned in theory and always used in practice” seems still to be relevant 
(1937: 736; quoted in Nachi, 2004: 293). As Jerry Goodstein adds, “there exists a history of 
antipathy to the topic of moral compromise” (2000: 808). No doubt, the reception of the 
2010 Coalition did not escape this antipathy. The coalition, Bellamy observes, is thought “to 
be defective precisely because it entails compromises that are thought to be inherently 
unprincipled and undemocratic” (2012: 442). To be sure, this attitude can be partially 
explained with reference to the fact that the British public is not accustomed to coalitions: 
coalitions are, though not unknown, less common in Britain (at least in elections and whilst 
governing) as opposed to the US Congress, for instance, where they are the norm (McLean, 
2012). However, it does not follow that in contexts where compromise is widely practiced it 
is viewed with less suspicion. For, similar cries of despair were also heard against the 
mismatch between Obama’s pre-election promises and presidency: “it can’t be a small 
thing, a typical thing, a trivial thing, to ask for belief and then betray it” Michael Gerson 
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notes (2012:1). Obama’s compromises, Jeffrey Kuhner adds “violated his campaign 
pledges”. He:  
 
Has shown that he - and his presidency - are hollow and fake. He is 
posing as a genuine reformer but is … a con man. Americans will 
soon realize this … when they do, Obama’s presidency will resemble 
his campaign rallies: Soaring rhetoric, full of sound and fury, 
signifying nothing (2008: 1). 
 
This is also acknowledged by Gutmann and Thompson who write that: 
  
In the 2008 campaign [Obama] promised to reject tax cuts for the 
wealthiest Americans. Now he was proposing to accept them. His 
Democratic critics cried betrayal. Stick to the principles you 
championed in the campaign. (2011: 1). 
 
These remarks suggest that there exists an inextricable link between the seemingly distinct 
notions of compromise and the vice of betrayal. And whilst these critiques tend to obscure 
the political value of compromise, they are not unfounded in toto. Democratic politicians, 
Gutmann and Thompson suggest, “have a responsibility to their followers to increase the 
chances of achieving what they stand for” and materialize their pre-election promises (2012: 
149). Yet, as indicated, compromise carries a moral remainder: a compromising disposition 
entails a willingness to abandon a portion of one’s interests, aspirations or public 
proclamations and to endorse certain policies or actions favoured by one’s political rivals. It 
is worth adding that politicians who compromise do not merely stand accused of betraying 
their tradition and the manifestos of their parties. Political compromises often entail the 
breaking of some electoral commitments - some of which were the reasons why the demos 
was inspired by, and voted for, the politicians in question in the first place. In other words, 
the relationship between compromise and betrayal bears an additional property in the 
context of democratic politics: the victim of this betrayal is also the electorate. 
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 But to acknowledge that compromise involves a betrayal of some sort does not 
necessarily entail that compromise should not be practiced. Whilst the appearance of an 
uncompromising stance might serve politicians well during campaigns, it does not follow 
that an uncompromising disposition is a political virtue - especially whilst governing. It is 
not the case that compromise is unjust and undemocratic tout court and it does not follow 
that virtuosos of political compromise are characterized by a profound lack of integrity as 
some of its critics argue
130
 (c.f. Meehan, 1984; Rand, 1996; Mencken, 1946; Downs, 1957; 
Reno, 1972; Aspinal, 2005). To suggest otherwise, would be to reinstate a vision I have 
arduously resisted and which I shall further challenge here: the Platonic Ideal or the doctrine 
of final rational harmony - the claim that conflicts, either in individual political ethics 
(between the standards of excellence that apply to an admirable moral life and those that 
apply to a virtuous life of politics) and in societal ethics (between the aspirations and 
interests of different agents or groups) are irrational and ultimately surmountable. In this 
sense, to view politicians who compromise as having no integrity at all would be to 
mistakenly conceive political integrity as akin to moral integrity- or, what Martin Hollis 
(1982) and Sue Mendus (2009a) aptly term, the integrity and consistency of the saint. To 
use Bernard Williams’ (2002a: 2) words, this would erroneously “make the moral prior to 
the political”: it would misrepresent the messy context in which politicians operate as well 
as the nature of political practice and integrity. And these very problems also permeate 
Rawls’ political thought - his hopeful belief in the possibility of an overlapping consensus. 
Or, so I shall argue. 
 
 
 
                                            
130 The tendency to conflate political and moral integrity is exhibited by a considerable 
portion of philosophers. See Halfon, (1990), Rand (1996), Broad, (1952), Santayana (1926), 
Blustein (1991) and McFall (1987).  
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7.3. 1. Democratic Politics and the Possibility of an Overlapping Consensus 
 
Rawls’ political thought, I have noted, severely curtails the space for compromise in 
public life. This is acknowledged by John Gray (2000) who suggests that within Rawls’ 
theory the need for compromise is eliminated. Even more forceful is Claudia Mills’ remark 
that: “it is odd that throughout Political Liberalism ‘compromise’ is treated as a dirty word, 
as though the last thing we would ever want is (curled lip, sneering tone) a compromise” 
(2000: 196). That Rawls’ theory makes little room for compromise is hardly surprising. As 
Gutmann and Thompson remind us, “you will reject nearly every compromise if you try to 
anticipate the outcome by testing it against a coherent theory of justice. By its nature, a 
compromise will almost never satisfy such a theory” (2012: 37). In this sense, the political 
liberal’s perception of compromise is, perhaps, not that different from the contemporary 
vilifications of Obama’s and Clegg’s compromises. The fact that compromise is not 
grounded on a substantive set of common values and interests renders it morally and 
politically unjust. This perception of compromise, Richard Bellamy and Martin Hollis tell 
us, is not uncommon within the ranks of political liberalism: most political liberals conceive 
compromise as an unacceptable “sacrifice of principle to expediency” (2007: 54- 55). What 
seems to emerge from the political liberal’s rejection of compromise then, is this: in 
ordinary democratic politics, political integrity is not incongruent with moral integrity.  
 
This insight emerges more clearly from a point I highlighted in the previous section: 
Rawls’ insistence that conflict can and should be soluble without remainder via an 
overlapping consensus. An overlapping consensus, according to Rawls, aspires “to make it 
possible for all to accept the political conception as true … from the standpoint of their own 
comprehensive view” (2005: 13). What is worth reiterating here is that an overlapping 
consensus presupposes that the substantial terms and content of the agreement are explicitly 
supported, not merely endorsed for pragmatic reasons. In connection to this, Rawls suggests 
that in instances where “the (liberal) principles of justice” and those stemming from one’s 
 224 
 
comprehensive doctrine or tradition conflict, reasonable public individuals “might well 
adjust or revise [the latter] rather than reject those principles” (1996: 160). In short, political 
liberals do not merely seek to sanitize public life by rejecting compromise as totally 
unacceptable. They also reject compromise on the basis that it is not strictly necessary. For, 
if an overlapping consensus is possible - if it is possible for all the parties involved to agree 
on a substantive set of values and endorse these as true from the standpoint of their 
comprehensive views or traditions - then a more optimal and integrity-preserving agreement 
is not unfeasible. This is noted by Gutmann and Thompson when they suggest that 
“common ground agreements”, which “resemble what philosophers call an overlapping 
consensus”, are “morally and politically attractive because they have a principled coherence, 
judged from all sides” (2012: 38). Again, the point here is that an overlapping consensus 
does not just eliminate interpersonal or societal conflict about justice. It also eliminates 
conflict in individual political ethics - between morality and politics: in Rawls’ account, 
moral and political integrity are neither necessarily incompatible nor that different. 
Differently put, Rawls’ ideal theory - by virtue of its emphasis on the possibility of an 
overlapping consensus - does not just propound a tidy and perfect agreement (or society). It 
also feeds into a conception of the perfect individual life.  
  
 Needless to say, some of the above examples of compromises as well as mere 
reflection on historical experience already suggest that an overlapping consensus is 
practically difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. We should thus not expect a consensus to 
always obtain in practice; it is unlikely that most political agreements are underpinned by a 
substantive set of common values or principles of justice, whatever these may be. 
Disagreements about justice seem as pervasive as disagreements about the good. Hence, the 
disparity between morality and politics does not evaporate: compromise is often the only 
way to reach an agreement in conditions of conflict. A version of this argument is put 
forward by Gutmann and Thompson who argue that: 
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Few doubt that consensus is desirable … and most agree that it is 
usually preferable to the standard form of compromise, which leaves 
all parties dissatisfied. But the common ground is more barren … than 
the inspiring rhetoric in its favour might suggest …. Consensual 
agreements are not impossible, but they are rare and, in polarized 
politics only getting rarer … It is the classic compromises that offer 
the best hope (2012:  13 - 39).  
 
This is an important indication of the necessity of compromise in politics. It also constitutes 
the commonest argument advanced in its favour (c.f. Philp, 2001; Margalit, 2012). 
However, it is not in itself a definitive objection to the political liberal’s stance. For the 
political liberal’s response is that failure to obtain a consensus-based agreement is a mark of 
unreasonableness; so, too, are disagreements about justice. A failure to reach an agreement 
on substantive and common principles of justice is a sign of defect: it signals that something 
has gone “wrong” (Rawls, 1996: 55). For, our irrationality and practical incapacity to 
achieve this aside, the burdens of judgement are not sufficiently burdensome to preclude 
this agreement. Public officials may be too feeble-witted, vicious or irrational to reach 
agreement, but agreement is nevertheless philosophically conceivable. At least in theory, a 
perfect solution even in conditions of pluralism and conflict (and even if one accounts for 
the burdens of judgement) always exists. In other words, Clegg’s or Obama’s compromises 
do not constitute sufficient evidence for mounting a defence of compromise in politics. That 
these politicians betrayed their pre-election pledges constitutes an unfortunate indication 
that they (and those with whom they compromised) are unreasonable. For, a more optimal 
and integrity-preserving agreement always existed. Hence, whilst a compromising 
disposition is required in practice, it is neither inescapable nor necessary per se. It is, in fact, 
plausible to sanitize public life from compromise and betrayal and harmonize moral and 
political integrity: all it takes is good public reasoning which would aid practitioners of 
politics from different traditions to converge on certain common substantive values. By 
implication, the task of political philosophy is not to contemplate compromises; it should 
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help us achieve what is, albeit practically difficult, not philosophically inconceivable: 
perfection in societal and individual ethics under the aegis of “social concord” and reason 
(Rawls, 2005: 148). Or, so it is claimed.  
 
 What lurks in the background of the political liberals’ rejection of compromise is a 
version of the utopian vision which we have previously encountered in the works of Plato, 
the Utilitarians and Kantians and which is integral to the view of innocence: value monism. 
“This monistic model”, Claude Galipeau observes, “runs throughout the ethical tradition 
from Plato, to Aristotle, to Hegel and Marx and from Kant to Rawls” (1994: 67). Now, one 
could retort here that to lump the Rawlsian liberal vision in this category would be a 
mistake. For Rawls’ account is not monistic. It does, as I have mentioned, prima facie 
accommodate pluralism and conflict. Nor is it utopian in toto. Rawls is clear that his 
political philosophy is realistically utopian: it probes the limits of practical political 
possibility. Indeed, one might go as far as to claim that Rawls’ account in Political 
Liberalism sits well with the dynamic account of DH in at least two respects: i) the 
aspiration of Rawls’s theory to be ‘political’ dovetails with my suggestion that an adequate 
account of political ethics should draw on the resources of politics itself; and ii) since a 
consensus constitutes an interpersonal agreement in the face of prima facie disagreement, 
moral conflict and pluralism, Rawls does take the permanence of these features seriously.  
 
 But variants of these claims are also advanced by the standard DH thesis. Yet, 
whilst standard DH theorists do allude to pluralism and conflict they fail to adequately 
capture these. As I have demonstrated in chapter 4, the standard DH thesis is hardly 
distinguishable from the monistic vision it seeks to reject: the Platonic Ideal or the doctrine 
of final rational harmony. And, it is precisely for this reason that the orthodox way of 
thinking about the DH problem fails to live up to its purported capacity to capture the 
complexity of political ethics. This insight, I contend, also extends to Rawls’ political 
thought. For it is not just that an overlapping consensus is practically difficult to achieve but 
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nonetheless philosophically plausible. Rather, an overlapping consensus is practically and 
philosophically implausible. The upshot of this is that the hopeful belief in the possibility of 
an overlapping consensus ends up displacing the realities of politics. It fails to capture the 
messy context in which politicians operate and does not live up to its purported capacity to 
capture the limits of what is politically possible.  In so doing, it also mischaracterizes the 
nature of political integrity. 
 
 To illustrate this point, I want to begin by highlighting more clearly certain parallels 
between the political thought of the Rawlsian liberal and the standard DH thesis. For 
instance, just as the DH thesis puts the moral prior to the political and ignores the political 
necessity of hypocrisy, so too does Rawls: he rejects compromise for moral reasons. This 
point also emerges from Bellamy and Hollis’ (2007) abovementioned remark but is more 
explicitly advanced by Bernard Williams (2002a) and William Galston (2010) who suggest 
that Rawls’ account echoes Kant’s insistence that: 
 
Though politics by itself is a difficult art, its union with morality is no 
art at all ... One cannot compromise here and seek the middle course 
of a pragmatic conditional law between the morally right and the 
expedient. All politics must bend its knee before the right (1903: 
183).   
 
And just as the standard DH thesis attempts to resolve the conflict between morality and 
politics by appealing to certain cathartic rituals which are thought to be compatible with 
both ways of life, so too does the Rawlsian liberal: he presupposes a substantive super-value 
which is universally accepted by all reasonable individuals and resolves both societal 
conflict and the conflict between moral and political integrity. As Stuart Hampshire 
remarks: 
This picture of a possible harmony under the governance of reason is 
carried through the Christian centuries and persists in the philosophy of 
the Enlightenment, and it persists in contemporary liberalism ... 
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Whatever the contingent differences between us arising from our 
personal history the king in his castle and the peasant in his hovel are 
one, in their common humanity, in virtue of the overriding superiority 
of rational moral principles that king and peasant both implicitly 
recognize (2000: 157).  
 
Hence, both liberal moralists and standard DH theorists share this much: messiness, conflict 
and imperfection are apparent, even possible to an extent. But they are not necessarily 
insurmountable; the fact of pluralism aside, a tidy and rational solution to moral conflicts 
should exist: some overarching principles which perfectly resolve moral conflicts should 
exist. To put it simply, both approaches follow a large amount of philosophers since Plato 
and take conflict to be a sign of pathology - a disease that can and should be overcome.  
 
 What follows from this, is that just as the standard DH thesis - by virtue of its 
idealism and incapacity to take pluralism and conflict seriously - is bound to fail to capture 
the complex realities of politics so too is Rawls’s ideal theory. This point is explicitly 
accepted by a considerable portion of political realists who, in a Machiavellian fashion, have 
grown exasperated with the moralism of contemporary political philosophy (see chapter 1). 
Appeals to the possibility of an overlapping consensus, political realists suggest, 
mischaracterize the messy context in which politicians operate and displace what is 
distinctive of politics as a practice. “To realist critics”, Horton explains, Rawls’ theory is 
“more likely to appear plain, unqualified utopianism, well beyond anything that is a 
practicable political possibility” (2010: 436). This is not merely because “one could read the 
entire corpus of Rawls’ work without ever having much sense of the seminal role of 
political parties”, nor because “elections figure little more than the right to vote”. Rather, 
liberal moralists mischaracterize politics in more fundamental ways: for them, the realities 
of politics are a source of embarrassment: “there is no real recognition within liberal 
moralism that the winning and maintaining political power is a crucial and unavoidable part 
of the context in which it is exercised” (Horton, 2010: 434). The liberal and post-
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Enlightenment representation of the political sidelines the fact that people are embedded in 
relationships of power, competition and interdependence. As a consequence, the Rawlsian 
conception of politics appears to be “etiolated, antiseptic and impossibly high-minded” 
(Horton, 2010: 433). Put bluntly, Rawls resembles what Bernard Crick terms as the “a-
political liberal”: the liberal who “expects too much” and “wishes to enjoy all the fruits of 
politics without paying the price” (2005: 97). His deeply hopeful belief in the possibility of 
harmony under the governance of reason ignores the circumstances which, as I have noted 
in chapter 5, make politics necessary in the first place. What emerges from Rawls’ account, 
then, is an abhorrence and displacement of politics. To use Crick’s words, the apolitical 
liberal likes “to scrub (politics) down, clean it up, and tether it firmly until this terrier 
becomes a fairly lifeless, lap-dog” (Crick, 2005: 123).  
 
 To be clear, the point here is not just that the hopeful belief in the possibility of 
consensus does not sit well with real political practice. Rather, the conviction that it is 
possible to discover certain common and substantive principles of justice which would 
achieve harmony amongst seemingly incompatible interests and values is philosophically 
unfounded. What is particularly problematic with Rawls’ account is that, Rawls erroneously 
claims universal rational authority for certain substantive principles when they rest on the 
tradition of liberalism itself, which is just one tradition amongst the many. In Hampshire’s 
words, Rawls “leaves space for the plurality” of traditions “to be found in any society, but 
only if they can be called reasonable, and this means reasonable as judged by the traditional 
standards of liberalism itself” (1993: 44). A more general way of putting it is this: given 
Rawls’ recognition that a plurality of incommensurable conceptions of the good exist, “why 
should an overlapping consensus among reasonable persons about basic liberal values or 
principles be either required or expected”? (Hampshire, 2000: 45- 46). In short, if such 
traditions are incommensurable, why then should a set of common and substantive 
principles of justice -which is congruent with each tradition - be possible even in theory?   
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 At this point my earlier appeal to history takes on renewed force: pace the heirs of 
Plato and the Enlightenment project, there is nowhere evidence that the tendency of reason 
is to converge on a fixed set of substantive principles (whatever these may be). As Christian 
Arnsperger and Henry Picavet emphasize: 
  
While the fact that social antagonisms may be forever unbreachable has 
been a constant object of deep preoccupation for all of post-
Machiavellian political philosophy, endeavours in the Rawlsian vein to 
create the social and cognitive conditions for an ‘‘overlapping 
consensus’’ between irreducibly antagonistic comprehensive 
conceptions of the good … appear to neglect some deep implications of 
irreducibility itself (2004: 176). 
 
If one takes pluralism, irreducibility and conflict seriously, there is no reason to assume that 
these should not hold for justice as well. John Gray drives this point home forcefully: 
“certainly, value-pluralism is not restricted to conceptions of the good. It goes all the way 
down, right down into principles of justice” (1995: 149). A quick reading of history, 
Hampshire tells us, would suggest that “all determination is negation” (omnis determinatio 
est nagatio) (2000: 34). In seeking to distinguish themselves from others in terms of their 
traditions, groups have tended to define themselves - their conception of the good and 
justice - in oppositional terms: not just in terms of who they are and what they espouse but, 
more importantly, in terms of who they are not and what they reject. A liberal may thus 
“rightfully criticize the distribution of wealth and of income in America or Britain today as 
grossly and substantially unjust”. This “is done in the light of a particular conception of 
distributive justice, which is part of a whole moral outlook and a particular conception of 
the good” (Hampshire, 2000: 160). But “we will expect opposition from conservatives who 
have another conception of justice that they can defend and that is part of their conception 
of good, stressing property rights and the autonomy of individuals” (Hampshire, 2000: 160). 
This, as I have indicated, was also the case in the 2010 Coalition: whilst both parties 
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appealed to fairness, each party conceptualized this notion in different and incompatible 
ways.  
 
 As long as practitioners of politics are affiliated with diverse and conflicting 
traditions, and have different life stories, neither conflict nor political enmities - either 
within a community or between different communities - can ever be expected to cease 
(Hampshire, 2000; Shklar, 1989). By virtue of its failure to take pluralism, conflict and 
irreducibility in societal ethics seriously, Rawls’ account idealizes the context in which 
politicians operate. It unsatisfactorily stretches the limits of what is politically possible and, 
as such, it mischaracterizes the nature of political integrity. Put bluntly, in Rawls’ account 
the very possibility of harmony between moral and political integrity rests on an a priori 
assumption of societal harmony which is, at best, a moralistic and innocent fairytale.    
 
 7.4. Compromise and Political Integrity  
  
 I have been arguing that the philosophical endeavour to sanitize politics from 
compromise is unsatisfactory. The attempt rests on an unwarranted obsession with harmony 
which ends up misrepresenting societal and individual political life. The belief in the 
possibility of an overlapping political consensus idealizes the context in which politicians 
operate and what is politically possible even in the most ideal circumstances. It also 
misconstrues what is distinctive of politics and political integrity. In this section, I want to 
push this point and its implications further. I want to suggest that if societal harmony is 
impossible, both in theory as well as in practice, compromise is inevitably bound to be a 
necessary part of political virtue and an integral aspect of political integrity.  
 
 The necessity of political compromise is premised on a point I have advanced in 
previous chapters: that if we want to make sense of political ethics and DH, we should take 
the context in which politicians operate seriously. For, the standards of political excellence 
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arise from within politics as opposed to any external abstract moral standpoint. To be more 
specific, an integral aspect of political virtue is the capacity to satisfy some of the ends of 
politics in a Heraclitian domain characterized by perpetual conflict and a complex web of 
interdependencies without (re)producing a ‘war of all against all’. Interdependence and 
conflict, I have suggested following Machiavelli, inevitably entails that one cannot pursue a 
virtuous political life by merely relying “on one’s own arms”. “Good friends” are also 
necessary (Prince: 96). In short, political virtue entails a capacity to recognize and exploit 
these ineliminable features of politics. To put it differently, one cannot remain alive to the 
perpetual conflict between a moral and political life (which, as I suggested in previous 
chapters, is an integral part of political experience) if one disregards some of the ways in 
which this very conflict is manifested. Leading a virtuous political life is impossible if one 
is vested with the innocent belief that societal conflict and competition for power are not 
perpetual features of politics. “Political prudence”, Hampshire remarks, “expects a perpetual 
contest between hostile conceptions of justice” (1991: 1). By implication, political prudence 
also entails a capacity to realize what is politically possible under the circumstances and to 
dexterously manage conflict by building and sustaining mutually useful political 
relationships. Satisfying the ends of politics often requires cooperating with one’s political 
enemies - with public agents who are not affiliated with one’s tradition or party and do not 
share one’s interests and aspirations. Given that the mutual antipathies amongst political 
rivals are ineliminable as well as the fact that in contemporary societies an overlapping 
political consensus is impossible this cooperation cannot be forthcoming; forming political 
relationships is often impossible if each political party or tradition is unwilling to negotiate 
and trim some of its principles and interests.   
 
 This insight is also glimpsed by Bellamy et al who tell us that “there are always 
limits to what individual decision-makers can do on their own, and to what extent they can 
make others follow them”. And it is “these limits [that] make compromises necessary” 
(2012: 275). Herein emerges the paradox of compromise then: whilst commitment to a set 
 233 
 
of principles and interests inextricably entails a commitment to seeing them realized, in 
politics it also means partially abandoning and betraying them (Luban, 1985). This need not 
suggest that compromise is strictly inescapable per se - that is, inescapable in the sense that 
one has no other alternatives to pursue. Besides, as I have noted, it is difficult to speak of a 
compromise if a party is left with no other alternatives at all. What this does suggest though, 
is that an uncompromising disposition, whilst admirable with respect to a moral or purely 
private life, is not a political virtue. As Hampshire reminds us: 
 
Machiavelli is particularly vivid in his descriptions of reversals of 
fortune which demand powers of bold improvisation and of sudden and 
decisive changes of plan. A successful politician is always rather loose 
in his think, flexible, not bound by principles or by theories, not bound 
by his own intentions (1989: 163).  
 
Those who find compromise and betrayal intolerable are characterized by a dogmatic 
inflexibility which closely resembles innocence and the integrity of the saint. Saints, 
Bellamy remarks, are determined to keep their position or realize their vision come what 
may: they “concede nothing either to those who hold different views to theirs or to the 
failure of the world to measure up to their expectations of it” (2010: 417). An 
uncompromising disposition is characterized by an obsession with purity, an attempt to 
eradicate conflict and any sort of dependence or intermingling with others which pollutes 
that which must be kept pure. “Shit”, Margalit tells us, “is the negation of the pure”. To seek 
to extirpate oneself from compromise and betrayal is to “crave life without shit” (2012: 
157). The problem, however, is that dependence and conflict are part and parcel of the shitty 
world of ordinary politics. So, too, are compromise and betrayal.  
  
 This recognition sits well with a point which I have advanced in previous chapters 
and which lies at the core of the dynamic account of DH: consistent moralists or innocent 
individuals who are unaware of the realities of politics and choose to stick rigidly to certain 
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clear-cut moral dictates are not suited for public life. At its worst, an uncompromising 
disposition might easily spill into a violent will to publically impose one’s principles 
through abstract cruelty. As Bellamy puts it “salvation, be it in the hereafter or in their own 
estimate of themselves”, might tempt uncompromising individuals “to clean up us and the 
rest of the world whatever the dirtiness of the cost ... Heaven is purchased at a terrifying 
price - of creating a hell on earth to save us all” (2010: 417). This is the lesson Jean Paul 
Sartre’s Les Mains Sales forces upon us. As have I suggested in chapter 4, whilst this is the 
play from which the standard DH thesis takes its name, Sartre’s insights on politics (like 
Machiavelli’s) are only superficially acknowledged by standard DH theorists: Hoerderer’s 
character and his insights on political practice share little with the current vogue of DH. To 
say that Hoerderer merely attempts to convince Hugo to lose his innocence - conceived as 
the absence of wrongdoing - would be misleading. For, Hugo is not unwilling to get his 
hands bloody in order to advance the revolutionary party’s vision. His remark that “I'm not 
afraid of blood” foreshadows Hoerderer’s sarcastic answer: “Really! Red gloves, that's 
elegant. It's the rest that scares you. That's what stinks to your little aristocratic nose” (1989: 
218 - 219). The ‘rest’ should be highlighted here: Hoerderer alludes to an insight which 
forms the essence of Sartre’s play and which lies at the core of our ordinary politics but is, 
nonetheless, ignored by Hugo and those who attempt to evade it: the necessity of 
compromise and the centrality of this notion to political integrity.   
 
 If the revolutionary party is to rise to power, Hoerderer explains, a compromise is a 
lesser evil: “You ought to know that we can't get power through an armed struggle … Who 
will support us?” (1989: 214 - 215). As an experienced politician, Hoerderer is aware of the 
muddle and realities of politics: rising to power through “one’s own arms” is impossible; 
political success requires cooperating with others who share neither the party’s vision nor 
its aspirations. If the party is to fulfil some of its goals a coalition with its political rivals is 
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necessary: “we can take power with Ka-rsky’s liberals and the Regent’s conservatives” says 
Hoerderer. It is this phenomenon which the innocent Hugo finds impossible to contemplate:  
 
Hoerderer: A class traitor! No less? … Why am I a class traitor?  
Hugo: You have no right to involve the party in your schemes … The 
party has one program: the realization of a socialist economy, and one 
method of achieving it: class struggle. You are going to use it to pursue 
a policy of class collaboration ... We'll go from compromise to 
compromise … We shall be contaminated, weakened, disoriented … in 
the end the bourgeois parties won't even have to go to the trouble of 
liquidating us (1989: 214 - 215).  
 
Hugo evokes the familiar charges often raised against compromise: to compromise is to 
betray one’s integrity and alienate the party’s aspirations; it is to legitimize the enemy the 
party is supposed to be fighting against; it is to eschew justice. Hugo’s innocence however 
renders him severely impaired. The realities and demands of politics evade him: he discards 
Hoerderer’s remark that the party is dependent upon others with different aspirations and 
that its goal is to exert political power. “Why take it? …You should not take power at such 
a price” he tells him (Sartre, 1989: 216 -217). At the core of his innocence lies an aspiration 
which I have alluded to in the previous chapter: a vision of a perfect and pure society, 
where “our ideas, all our ideas and only these victorious” (1989: 217). As the heirs of 
Machiavelli have long recognized, it is those innocent individuals who are eager to 
eliminate conflict once and for all and fail to recognize their dependency on others that are 
prone to jeopardize the precarious stability of the public realm and are unsuited for a life of 
politics: “You, I know you know, you are a destroyer” Hoederer tells Hugo; “Your purity 
resembles death. The revolution you dream is not ours. You don’t want to change the world; 
you want to blow it up” (1989: 220).  
 
 At this point, it is appropriate to emphasize two issues. First, whilst compromise is, in 
general, a ‘lesser evil’ vis-à-vis cruelty I do not wish to argue that cruelty is entirely 
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unnecessary in politics. Second, it does not follow, as Margalit argues, that compromises 
“that perpetuate cruelty” should never be struck (2012: 2). To suggest otherwise would not 
just push us back to an undesirable moralism I have rejected. It would also ignore a crucial 
Machiavellian point I have alluded to in chapter 6: whilst Machiavelli sought to economize 
cruelty, the prospect and necessity of this vice cannot be eliminated altogether from politics. 
As Horton puts it, public agents who refuse to compromise and pose a threat to political 
stability “still have to be dealt with one way or another” (2009: 10). In addition, when the 
survival of the political community is threatened it may be necessary to forge political 
relationships with regimes that promote cruelty.  
 
 This is neatly captured by an example from WWII, which is also used by Margalit 
(2012) and which contradicts his basic principle: on June 1941, Churchill stated that 
Hitler’s plan to attack Russia relied on right-wing sympathies in Britain not to interfere. But 
Hitler’s expectations, he added, were wrong: Britain would aid Russia. His remark invited 
an expression of dissent from his secretary: “how could Churchill, the arch anti-communist 
support Russia? Does not this support amount to bowing down in the House of Rimmon?” 
(Churchill, 1986: 332) Churchill’s secretary alludes to the typical charges raised against 
compromise: a deal with Stalin would render Churchill inconsistent; it would be a pact with 
injustice and a betrayal of one’s principles. Churchill was quick to acknowledge this: “No 
one has been a more consistent opponent of Communism than I have for the last twenty 
years. I will unsay no word that I have spoken about it”. “The Nazi regime” he continued 
“is indistinguishable from the worst features of Communism. It is devoid of all theme and 
principle … It excels all forms of human wickedness in the efficiency of its cruelty” (1986: 
332). Yet, “all this fades away before the spectacle which is now unfolding” (1986: 332). 
Churchill alludes to a point which I have touched on in chapter 6: in contrast to Stalin, 
Hitler’s cruelty was much more open. At least, Margalit tells us, Stalin was a hypocrite in 
his foreign policy: “the cliché that hypocrisy is the homage paid by vice to virtue has a 
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profound meaning”. For, “hypocrisy, as irritating as it is, recognizes morality” and entails a 
willingness to, at least, sit down at the table, negotiate and compromise (2012: 196). 
Hitler’s foreign policy on the other hand left nothing disguised - it sought to eradicate 
morality, conflict and politics altogether. More importantly, it posed an imminent threat to 
the community Churchill was responsible for. Despite his commitment against communism, 
which he regarded as a despicable enemy - because of its cruelty - Churchill realized that he 
was confronted with an even larger cruelty: to defeat evil a pact with evil was necessary. 
 
 To be clear, I do not wish to suggest that there are (or should be) no limits as to 
when politicians should compromise. Rather, my point here is that it is impossible to 
determine a priori what these limits should be. “There is”, to use Hampshire’s words, “no 
completeness or perfection to be found in [political] morality” (1989: 177). Political virtue, 
as Machiavelli recognizes, should be sensitive to the specifics of each circumstance. To 
reject a compromise with Stalin based on a supposedly absolute principle whilst one’s 
community is on the verge of destruction would not be just politically irresponsible. It 
would be immoral. A refusal to compromise in abstracto of the concrete and particular 
circumstances of politics is bound to be uncongenial to the realities of this domain and the 
inevitable conflicts this way of life involves
131
. It is also bound to jeopardize some of the 
ends those who lead a political life are supposed to serve.  
 
 This recognition need not emerge only from such drastic cases. It can be also 
illustrated by considering our seemingly more mundane and everyday democratic politics 
where an uncompromising disposition typically entails an unwillingness to sit down at the 
negotiation table. Whilst this may not jeopardize the stability of the community, one has 
reasons to wonder whether such a disposition is politically virtuous. Since ordinary 
democratic politics is characterized by a plurality of traditions and represents conflicting 
and incommensurable points of view, neither the partial satisfaction of one’s pre-election 
                                            
131 A similar point is raised by Williams (2002a). 
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promises and commitments nor change can occur without compromises. A dogmatic refusal 
to cooperate with one’s political rivals and compromise whilst discussing policy formation 
would practically mean to entirely abandon the hope of seeing one’s principles realized. 
This follows from the paradox of compromise I highlighted above. To refuse to partially 
betray one’s principles and pre-election promises would, paradoxically mean betraying them 
in toto. As Donald Boudreaux and Dwight Lee remark, “uncompromising politicians” are 
hardly, if ever, successful in politics. One of the obvious reasons for this is that they “gamer 
too little pork to send home to voters” (1997: 365). A refusal to compromise would also 
mean to abandon the hope of altering the status quo - even if this alteration is incremental. 
As Gutmann and Thompson put it, “if parties to a compromise become obsessed with 
finding common ground or consensus solutions, they are likely to miss the chance of any 
compromise” (2012: 207). And, without compromise “on health and taxation or other major 
issues, the status quo prevails, even if it preserves a policy that serves everyone’s interests 
poorly and even if it leads to major crisis” (2012: 30). The example I utilized in chapter 6 - 
Obama’s pre-election commitment to public healthcare - is suggestive here. Had Obama 
refused to compromise with the Republicans on public healthcare he would have entirely 
abandoned any possibility he had for effecting positive change to a problematic healthcare 
system. 
 
 But, it is not just that a refusal to compromise would lead to the complete 
abandonment of one’s principles or public pledges in contemporary politics. There is more 
to be said here. For, in certain circumstances, an uncompromising disposition would 
inescapably lead to the betrayal of one of the ends of politics: rising to power or staying in 
office. This point is neatly captured in McLean’s (2012) and Bellamy’s (2012) analysis of 
the 2010 Coalition in the UK. The option to refuse to compromise was open to both parties: 
the two largest parties - the Conservatives or, less plausibly, Labour - could form a minority 
government with sufficient passive support from other parties to get their budget approved. 
On the one hand, this would have left the Liberal Democrats out of office. On the other 
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hand, the party which would form a minority government would have been severely 
handicapped. Minority governments have historically proven to be unstable, short-lived and 
unsuccessful - even more so, one could suggest, amidst economic crises and political 
upheavals (McLean, 2012). Either way, each party’s rigid adherence to its principles and 
pre-election commitments would have resulted in a failure to achieve (some of) the ends of 
politics.  
 
 So far I have sought to suggest that, since politicians operate in conditions of 
interdependence and conflict, a compromising disposition is bound to be a necessary part of 
ordinary politics and political integrity. Political integrity is not akin to the integrity and 
consistency of the saint. The argument I have advanced thus far echoes Nancy Rosenblum’s 
suggestion that “a disposition to compromise” constitutes an essential quality that partisans 
must cultivate and possess if partisanship is to serve democratic politics well. This 
recognition, she maintains, rejects “uncompromising extremism” because it lacks a 
“commitment to getting the public business done” and represents “an abdication of the 
responsibility for governing” (2008: 361- 362; 402). In a similar vein, Martin Benjamin 
suggests that “one who cannot abide the glad handling and the various compromises” often 
“required to get elected” or “who takes no enjoyment from the rough and tumble of political 
bargaining and negotiation is cut out for the life of democratic politics” (1990: 178). 
However, to acknowledge that “good politicians”, to use Donald Wittman’s words, “create 
coalitions and find … compromises” is not the end of the story (1995: 154). There is more 
to be said here. For, it is worth remembering that politics is an on-going practice; and, 
especially in the context of contemporary democratic societies, politicians are not only 
dependent on their political rivals; they are also dependent on the electorate. As suggested in 
chapter 6, politicians professing no high-minded principles and unreservedly admitting that 
their highest skill is to compromise and partially betray their principles and commitments 
neither inspire the electorate nor do they have long-lived political careers. In other words, 
whilst the satisfaction of some of the ends of politics becomes impossible without 
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compromise, these very ends run the danger of being jeopardized if politicians are not 
careful with the way they publically present their compromises.  
  
 This point is nicely captured in Boehner’s interview with Lesley Stahl on CBS’s 60 
Minutes, before he became Speaker of the House after the Republican success in the 2010 
congressional elections: 
 
Boehner: We have to govern. That’s what we were elected to do. 
Stahl: But governing means compromising. 
Boehner: It means working together. 
Stahl: It also means compromising … 
Boehner: I am not going to compromise on my principles, nor am I going to 
 compromise the will of the American people…When you say the word   
compromise a lot of Americans look up and go, ‘Uh-oh, they are going to   
sell me out’. 
Stahl: But you did compromise … to get the Bush tax cuts made   
permanent? 
Boehner: We found a common ground. 
Stahl: Why won’t you say - you are afraid of the word. 
             Boehner: I reject the word (CBS, 2010). 
 
This interview brings to the fore an insight I defended in previous chapters and which lies at 
the core of the dynamic account of DH: the necessity of hypocrisy - the recognition that this 
vice constitutes the glue that holds together a virtuous political life. Whilst compromises are 
necessary in politics, politicians are often required to hypocritically reject its practice and 
disassociate themselves from it. Given that politics involves a continuous struggle for 
power, successful politicians must not be seen as too willing to compromise; political 
success often requires glossing one’s compromises by diverting the public’s attention away 
from the moral remainder (or the betrayal) inherent in them. In other words, politicians are 
often required to pretend that they have achieved a fictional consensus which fully preserves 
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the interests of their constituents and their public proclamations. As Donald Boudreaux and 
Dwight Lee argue:  
 
Successful politicians are those who understand how [politics] is 
played and are willing to play it skilfully. These politicians somehow 
succeed in portraying their compromises as being fully consistent 
with principled commitments to voters’ visions. Platitudes and 
political obfuscation [enable] skilful politicians continually to strike 
interest-group deals (1997: 373). 
 
As president, George Bush learned this lesson the hard way from his autumn 1990 
compromise with congressional Democrats which violated his “read my lips, no new taxes” 
campaign pledge (Bush, 2011: 5 - 15). To be sure, Bush’s campaign pledge served a 
politically legitimate strategic imperative: mobilize the base. It was a factor in Bush’s 
victory, clearly differentiating him from his Democratic rival. Once elected however, Bush 
could make no headway with a Congress controlled by Democrats. Rather than let the 
budget expand even further, Bush agreed to raise several taxes. The problem though, was 
that Bush ‘got caught in the act’ and failed to deflect the voters’ attention from his 
compromises. Bush displayed a naïveté and innocence which brings to mind Walzer’s 
(1973) moral politician: he paid little attention to the strategic aspect of his statements and 
the necessity to conceal his dirt or the moral remainder inherent in his acts. Consequently, 
his rivals found it easy to portray him as purely unprincipled, hypocritical and self-
interested (Boudreaux & Lee, 1997; Gutmann & Thompson, 2012). Contrast Bush to his 
immediate predecessor, Ronald Reagan. Even though Reagan compromised his pre-election 
commitments during his presidency, his communication skills and rhetorical dexterity were 
well-enough refined to deflect voters’ attention from his compromises and focus instead on 
his proudly proclaimed ideological beliefs and high-minded ideals 
132
 (Bovard, 1991). 
                                            
132 For example, Reagan dropped his pledge to eliminate the Departments of Energy and 
Education and agreed to several tax hikes (Weidenbaum, 1988; Stockman, 1986; Gutmann 
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Despite his compromises, Reagan was perceived as one of the most ideologically committed 
presidents of modern times, and it was his pretentious staunch ideological commitment that 
seems to have appealed most powerfully to voters.  
 
 7.5. Conclusion  
 
 My aim throughout this chapter was to build on my defence of hypocrisy and 
dynamic DH in contemporary politics. I sought to suggest that if want to make sense of 
political integrity we should accept that an overlapping consensus in conditions of pluralism 
is philosophically and practically unfeasible; that compromise is a necessary feature of 
political life and an essential aspect of political integrity. An innocent and dogmatic pursuit 
of one’s commitments in politics might well promote abstract cruelty - and thereby 
jeopardize order and stability - or lead to defeat: a rigid refusal to compromise one’s 
commitments would mean the entire abandonment of any hope of seeing them realized. 
Political integrity, as I have repeated, is not akin to the integrity and consistency of a saint.  
Rather, it involves the recognition that in politics one’s choices are, in most circumstances, 
bound to be the lesser of two evils and one’s dependency on others is such that one cannot 
ever be free from seeking an uneasy conciliation of competing and incombinable claims. In 
other words, the integrity of those engaged in politics is intertwined with a capacity ‘to keep 
dancing’ in conditions of perpetual conflict and ubiquitous dependence. At the core of 
political integrity lies, at best, an enduring soil and sweat on one’s hands and soul - the 
product of the hypocrisy, dissimulation and the various handshakes and compromises 
politics requires. At worst, one’s hands are bound to be bloody - especially when the 
precarious order and stability of the public realm is jeopardized and when the above avenues 
                                                                                                                           
& Thompson, 2012). James Bovard mentions a telling example of Reagan’s rhetorical 
dexterity. In 1984 Reagan ordered the raise of trade harriers. But, in announcing this 
protectionist order, Reagan began with a paean to free trade. Bovard (1991: 79 - 81) called 
Reagan’s speech “a masterpiece in trade doubletalk”.  
 243 
 
for solving the conflict more civilly and less viciously fail. The integrity of the politician is, 
to invoke Hollis’ words, “the integrity of the trimmer” (1982: 397). Viewed starkly from the 
perspective of a theory of justice or moral integrity, political integrity will, almost certainly, 
appear to amount to no integrity at all. This conviction sits neatly with the accounts 
propounded by the heirs of Plato but is nonetheless misplaced: it turns a blind eye to the 
distinctiveness of political life and to the very ends, virtues and characteristics which render 
this way life distinct.  
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8. Political Morality, the Problem of DH and Crisis: A Retrospect  
 
I recall a remark made to me by Stefan Korner, which I found a compliment, 
 after a paper on moral conflict: “You said it’s all a mess, and it is all a mess”.                     
B. Williams
133 
     
 8.1. Introduction 
 
The aim of this concluding chapter is to rehearse the argument I sought to advance 
throughout the thesis. In particular, I wish to bring together the most crucial aspects of the 
dynamic account of DH and outline why such an account matters - not just by virtue of its 
capacity to make us rethink what it really means to have DH in politics but also in terms of 
its capacity to make us reconsider what it means to lead a virtuous political life in the 
context of contemporary, liberal democratic societies. Put another way, by bringing together 
the core insights of the dynamic account of DH, I want to delineate not only how it 
contributes to the literature on DH but also how it illuminates the enterprise of political 
philosophy in general. In so doing, I shall revisit the problem I registered in the introduction 
of the thesis: the prevalent perception of a moral crisis in contemporary political life. I shall 
suggest that the dynamic account of DH raises important implications surrounding the 
precise nature of that crisis: it helps us better understand what the crisis we are confronted 
with is really about. In this sense, whilst the insights of the novel account of DH and 
political morality I have developed here might appear to be bleak and pessimistic, this is 
only because we have unrealistic expectations of what political morality involves in the first 
place. In short, our sense of the crisis is misguided. The crisis we are confronted with is not 
political or moral per se but philosophical: it relates to the concepts we employ and certain 
assumptions which contemporary philosophers and commentators in general as well as 
                                            
133 In the Beginning Was the Deed, 52 
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standard DH theorists in particular have unquestioningly inherited from Plato and the 
Enlightenment project. 
 
   8.2. The Dynamic Account of DH: A Synopsis 
 
  Throughout this thesis, I sought to articulate a new perspective on political 
morality by developing: i) a new critique of the standard dirty hands (DH) thesis and ii) a 
novel, dynamic interpretation of the DH problem. In doing so, I sought to help us better 
understand what it really means to have DH in politics.  
 
Whilst the affinity between Machiavelli’s political thought and the standard DH 
thesis is taken for granted, in this thesis I have demonstrated that standard DH theorists in 
fact displace the Florentine’s insights on political ethics, moral conflict and pluralism. In 
particular, I have argued that the standard DH thesis is inadequately ‘static’: it conceives the 
conflict between morality and politics as a single, stark and rare paradox of action - a mere 
tragic anomaly which disrupts the normality of past and future harmony. Consequently, the 
orthodox way of thinking about DH in politics misconceives the extent of the rupture 
between morality and politics: Machiavelli’s vision is supplanted by an unsatisfactory vision 
of honesty, innocence and harmony. But the standard DH thesis also mischaracterizes the 
precise nature of such a conflict. For, Machiavelli does not say that one must merely ‘learn 
how not to act well’. Rather, Machiavelli is adamant that ‘one must learn how not to be 
good’. In connection to this, I have suggested that there exists a discrepancy between 
innocence as the absence of wrongdoing - which, as standard DH theorists emphasize, is 
lost following one’s confrontation with a paradox of action - and innocence as a disposition 
- which is irretrievably forfeited once one takes Machiavelli’s advice to heart and heeds the 
standards of excellence conducive to a virtuous politics. The upshot of this, as I have 
explained, is that conceptualizing the conflict between morality and politics as a paradox of 
action is not enough: the standard DH thesis’ overemphasis on action fails to capture the 
way moral character enters politics and jeopardizes political existence. In other words, 
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innocence is not merely passive as DH theorists typically assume: something which is only 
acted upon and thereby tragically tainted following one’s confrontation with a paradox of 
action. Rather, it has an active sense: innocence is itself a source of political incompetence, 
tragedy and disaster. What has emerged from my critique of the standard DH thesis then, is 
that that thesis - by virtue of its failure to take Machiavelli’s insights seriously - fails to live 
up to its purported capacity to capture the complexity and messiness of political ethics. It is 
too tidy and does not sufficiently depart from the idealism it professes to challenge: the 
Platonic Ideal or the doctrine of final rational harmony. 
 
Thus, the novel account of DH I sought to develop in this thesis, constituted an 
attempt to reinterpret and capture the problem of DH in politics in all its complexity. Simply 
put, by developing a dynamic account of DH I have attempted to restore Machiavelli’s 
insights on political ethics and conflict which have been displaced by the orthodox and 
modern interpretation of DH. This was achieved by turning to MacIntyre’s account in After 
Virtue. MacIntyre’s negative thesis, I have argued, offers a historical explanation as to why 
proponents of the standard DH thesis displace Machiavelli’s thought: they have inherited 
from post-Enlightenment ideal theories a non-teleological worldview. In developing a 
dynamic account of DH, I used elements from MacIntyre’s positive thesis as a theoretical 
premise upon which I grounded Machiavelli’s insights on political agency, integrity and 
virtù. Hence, the key insight of the dynamic account is that approaching political morality 
and the problem of DH entails conceiving political life as a whole. And this, as I have 
explained, involves approaching politics as a practice and a way of life. In other words, we 
are required to consider the dispositions, virtues, agency and integrity of those aspiring to 
lead a virtuous political life. 
 
To cut a long story short, approaching politics as a practice - as an activity with 
goods, values and standards of excellence internal to itself - provides us with: i) a concrete 
approach for grounding ethics contra to the abstract rules advanced by contemporary 
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philosophy; and ii) quasi-dynamic ethical standards, as it enables us to identify certain 
distinct dispositions of character conducive to political excellence. Conceiving politics in 
terms of abstract and universal action-guiding rules and principles as deontologists, 
consequentialists and standard DH theorists do, misconstrues and oversimplifies the 
concrete realities and complex requirements of political practice. It also misrepresents the 
qualities of character necessary for participating in politics and meeting its demands and 
ends. Put simply, the standards of political excellence arise from within politics as opposed 
to any external moral standpoint. But, as I have suggested, we are also required to conceive 
politics as a way of life - that is, we should explicitly approach politics in dynamic or 
narrative terms. For, in the absence of such a dynamic approach, we are inevitably bound to 
fail to fully capture the essence of political integrity and certain distinct dispositions and 
actions that hold together a virtuous political life. And, as I have illustrated, one political 
virtue which we cannot fully make sense of without a dynamic approach is hypocrisy. This 
vice is not only one of the necessary qualities that politicians should cultivate whilst 
unlearning a portion of their virtue and exhibit for strategic or political purposes. Hypocrisy 
also forms a coping mechanism for concealing the rest of the vices or the moral remainder 
inherent in political actions: it enables politicians to marshal on amidst conflict; it 
constitutes the glue that holds together a virtuous life of politics.  
 
The key insight of the dynamic account of DH then, is that a fundamental re-
orientation in the way we approach the problem of DH and political morality is required: if 
we want to make sense of DH and political ethics, we should turn our attention neither to 
ordinary moral virtue nor to mere ‘snapshot’ or ‘episodic’ acts of moral wrongdoing. For, as 
I have argued, at the core of the dynamic account of DH lies Machiavelli’s recognition that 
the conflict between morality and politics is perpetual and cuts much deeper than a mere 
incompatibility of action-guiding prescriptions: it also involves a conflict between (at least) 
two incompatible ways of life each with its own ends, virtues and standards of excellence. In 
this sense, the problem of DH in politics does not merely involve a paradox of action (or 
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even a continuous series of these): it also involves a paradox of character. Conducive to 
politics as a practice and way of life is the cultivation and exhibition of certain ordinary 
moral vices: the toughness and cruelty of the lion and, more importantly, the experience, 
cunningness and deception of the fox.  
 
What additionally lies at the core of the dynamic account of DH is the recognition 
that politics is a much messier and grubbier domain of practice than most philosophers in 
general and standard DH theorists in particular recognize. In other words, whilst elucidating 
the dynamic account of DH, I sought to consider the complexity of politics and the context 
in which politicians operate more carefully. For, as I have suggested, we cannot fully make 
sense of DH and political ethics if we do not acknowledge the peculiarities and messiness of 
politics - that is, without considering certain ends and concepts which are distinctive of 
politics as a practice and way of life: the peculiarity of political relationships and the 
centrality of power, conflict and dependence to this activity. The dynamic account of DH, 
then, captures the Machiavellian recognition that conflict is not manifested only with respect 
to individual morality - between an admirable moral life and a life of politics. Rather, it is 
also manifested externally: politics as a practice and a way of life involves a perpetual 
conflict and competition for power between different but mutually dependent political 
agents or groups, each with its own incompatible aspirations and interests. It is this very 
recognition, I have argued, which partially shapes political actions, decisions as well as the 
distinctive nature of political integrity. Put another way, it is the recognition that conflict is 
also manifested externally that partially sustains the rupture between a moral and a political 
life. Since politicians are not self-sufficient - in other words, political agents operate in a 
domain of perpetual conflict and dependence- knowledge and experience of how to 
manoeuvre in such a messy context is a crucial fox-like characteristic of a virtuous 
politician. Again, the point here is that the problem of DH and political ethics arise from 
within politics.  
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My primary aim in this thesis was, therefore, to contribute to the literature on DH - 
by exposing and correcting its philosophical limitations as well as the idealistic and tidy 
account of political ethics that emerges from it. In addition, the discussion I have advanced 
in this thesis has revealed that there exists an overlooked and unacknowledged split within 
the contemporary tradition of DH: between those who explicitly embrace Walzer’s 
conventional but nonetheless ‘static’ and idealistic conceptualization of the problem (Steve 
de Wijze, Tom Goodwin, Michael Stocker, Christopher Gowans, Suzanne Dovi and 
Anthony Cunningham for instance) and philosophers who we may describe as DH theorists 
(such as Bernard Williams, Stuart Hampshire, Martin Hollis, Sue Mendus and Richard 
Bellamy) but who conceptualize DH in a different and more nuanced way - one which is 
sensitive to Machiavelli’s insights on political ethics, pluralism and conflict. 
 
What I want to additionally emphasize here however, is that the dynamic account of 
DH does not constitute a mere archaeological artefact - something that is of an abstract and 
historical interest but of little or limited relevance to our contemporary political and ethical 
cosmos. So, whilst my primary endeavour in this thesis was to restore Machiavelli’s lost 
insights on DH and political ethics, it does not follow that the dynamic account of DH has 
nothing to say about political ethics in the context of contemporary liberal democracies. 
Whilst restoring Machiavelli’s political thought I also sought to make the Florentine tell us 
something about us and our politicians. And, in so doing, I sought to expose the limitations 
of our conceptions of political morality. Machiavelli’s world, as I have demonstrated, is not 
that different from ours: the Machiavellian insights of the dynamic account of DH - the 
perpetuity of conflict in individual as well as societal political ethics - constitute a real and 
inescapable issue for our contemporary politics. To be more specific, I have argued that 
modern democratic societies are somehow implicated in promoting and exacerbating the 
necessity of certain vices - or, at least, some manifestations of the vices. For, modern 
democratic politics entails a quest for order, stability and power in conditions of conflict and 
dependence; democratic societies are composed by a plurality of conflicting and 
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incompatible traditions, each with its own aspirations, interests as well as substantive 
conceptions of justice. The upshot of this, I have argued, is that conflicting loyalties, 
antipathies, sleazy handshakes and compromises, treacheries, hypocritical dissimulation 
and, in certain instances, even the solicitous use and toleration of cruelty cannot be 
eliminated from the practice of contemporary democratic politics as standard DH theorists 
and political moralists like to assume.  
 
The general point here is that the contemporary relevance of the dynamic account of 
DH compels us to reconsider what it means to lead a virtuous life of politics in the context 
of contemporary, liberal democratic societies. In doing so, the dynamic account does not 
just contribute to the literature of DH. It also illuminates the discipline of political 
philosophy as a whole. In the next section, I want to say a bit more on how the dynamic 
account achieves this by revisiting the problem I registered in chapter 1: the growing 
perception of a moral crisis in contemporary political life.  
 
8.3. Reflections on a Crisis: Insights from the Dynamic Account of DH 
 
I began this thesis by registering a conviction which is rather prevalent amongst 
contemporary philosophers and public pundits: that we are confronted with a moral crisis in 
modern political life. In the background of such a narrative of crisis, I have suggested, lurks 
a popular way of reflecting on political morality - one which is underpinned by a particular 
perception on what political philosophy is or should be doing. On this account, political 
philosophy should involve a quest for an ideal theory: it should aspire to conceive and 
revive the perfect society and individual. At the core of an ideal theory, I have repeated, lies 
what Stuart Hampshire (1987) and Isaiah Berlin (1969; 1990) term the doctrine of final 
rational harmony or the Platonic Ideal. For, regardless of its specific content, every ideal 
theory since antiquity postulates that individual or societal ethics can be understood in a 
unified and harmonious way that allows for the possibility of perfection. Hence the narrative 
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of the moral crisis: our politics is presently a dirty and unsavoury business - moral goodness 
has been eroded by conflict, vice and outrageous acts of moral wrongdoing. But this does 
not entail that it is impossible to clean up political life per se. On the one hand, when it 
comes to individual political morality, ideal theorists tend to believe that the dispositions, 
virtues, actions and integrity political agents should exhibit can (and should) be perfectly 
harmonized with those which characterize a moral or a purely private individual. On the 
other hand, when it comes to societal life, they suggest that it is not implausible to discover 
certain common and substantive values and interests that are universal and mutually shared 
across seemingly different but rational public agents. And, in so doing they claim, we shall 
also find ourselves one step closer to individual perfection in modern political life. For, as I 
have explained in chapter 7, there would be no need for political compromise, nor the 
mutual antipathies, betrayals and hypocrisies that are typically associated with it.  
 
What is worth highlighting here is that most discussions of moral crisis in 
contemporary politics convey a picture similar to the one painted by standard DH theorists: 
that we are confronted with a ‘static’ problem. In other words, it is typically assumed that 
we live in a society which is ridden with vice, disintegration as well as internal and external 
conflict and that it is only in our politics and society where these features tend to be 
observed. Regardless of the precise timeline of the unravelling of this crisis, there once 
existed an era in which moral and political virtue were harmonized. Or, so it is thought. 
And, according to this account, the rehabilitation of political ethics is intertwined with the 
rediscovery of something lost: the notion of ordinary moral goodness and innocence as an 
integral aspect of political virtue. In connection to this, proponents of the narrative of crisis 
also suggest that the crisis we are confronted with is, in its nature and character, a political 
crisis - that is, a crisis which is primarily associated with the content of political morality. 
Again, what underpins this assumption is the very conviction that political philosophy 
should involve a quest for an ideal theory. For, whilst difficult to practically dispense with, 
conflict and imperfection in individual and societal political ethics are always bound to be 
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the product of unintelligible public arrangements and irrational or wicked lapses of our 
public agents. At least in theory, a rational solution to (apparent) conflicts that allows for the 
possibility of perfection must exist.   
 
The argument I have developed in this thesis suggests that our sense of the crisis is 
misdirected: we mistakenly believe that we are confronted with a moral or political crisis in 
contemporary politics precisely because we have an unsatisfactorily idealistic understanding 
of what political morality involves in the first place. To be sure, this need not deny that 
some of the scandals that periodically hit the headlines are uncongenial to a virtuous 
politics. Nor is this to suggest that we are not confronted with any political and social 
problems at all. Nonetheless, the critique of the standard DH thesis as well as the dynamic 
account of DH I have articulated here urges us to reject this popular narrative of crisis and 
the moralistic account of political ethics which underpins it. And, in so doing, it helps us 
better understand what the crisis we are confronted with is really about.  
 
To put it bluntly, the crisis we are confronted with is neither ‘static’ nor is it 
political or moral per se. Our crisis is far from static precisely because, as I have repeated 
throughout this thesis, politics and morality can never be harmonized. The idea that we live 
in a society which is ridden with conflict and imperfection and that it is only in our society 
and our politics where these features are observed constitutes a gross and historically 
unfounded exaggeration. And this is not because conflict and imperfection in political ethics 
merely constitute an unfortunate characteristic of practical politics. Rather, conflict is 
intrinsic to political morality. As Stuart Hampshire puts it:    
 
Everywhere ... the mark of vitality is conflict ... the historical 
development of a state or society depends on the competition between 
different social groups in an unceasing struggle for power. This is the 
engine of history and we do not expect it to come to a dead stop, 
although in some of despair we ay indulge in a fantasy of a final stage, 
of a Utopia, or we may dream of ... harmony, as Plato did after the 
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failures of Athenian democracy. Nowhere is there evidence ... of a 
sovereign reason that can secure consensus, the end of conflict, a 
uniform order, a harmony of interests, the heavenly city of philosophers 
(1993: 46). 
 
This much also applies to conflict within individual political morality: the vision that there 
once existed a paradise lost where politics was harmonious, sanitized and conducted by 
angels or saints constitutes a romantic and moralistic fairy-tale. A virtuous political life 
becomes impossible without the cultivation and exhibition of the vices of the lion and the 
fox. Whilst such qualities are uncongenial to an admirable moral life, they are nonetheless 
conducive to the sustainment of a virtuous life of politics: they aid practitioners of politics to 
satisfy some of the ends of their practice. 
 
 The point here is that the aspiration for perfection and serenity in individual and 
societal political ethics is philosophically unwarranted and practically impossible. 
Differently put, it is the very assumption that political philosophy should involve a quest for 
an ideal theory, harmony and perfection which is at fault. As I have repeated throughout this 
thesis, the innocent optimism which emerges from this conviction ends up misrepresenting 
political life: it mischaracterizes the qualities conducive to virtuous political practice, the 
nature of political integrity as well as the peculiarities of political relationships and the 
messy context in which politicians operate. This insight of the dynamic account of DH is 
also acknowledged by Callicles in The Gorgias who, in a Machiavellian fashion, objects to 
Socrates’ and Plato’s conviction on what the point of political philosophy should be: 
 
If a man is exceptionally gifted and yet pursues philosophy far on in 
life, he must prove entirely unacquainted with all the accomplishments 
requisite for a gentleman and man of distinction. Such men know 
nothing of the laws in their cities, or of the language they should use in 
their business associations … with other men, or of human pleasures 
and appetites, and in a word they are completely without experience of 
men’s characters (484c – 485b).  
 254 
 
 
What follows from all this is that our crisis is primarily philosophical and conceptual neither 
political nor moral per se: it relates to the concepts we employ and presuppose when we 
contemplate political ethics. This crisis, I have suggested, initiated from Plato and was 
further compounded by the Enlightenment’s rejection of teleological ethics.  
 
And it is precisely because such an obsession with harmony is still deeply 
entrenched in the way we think about political morality that the argument I have pursued 
here might mistakenly strike some political philosophers as excessively dark, depressing 
and pessimistic - or, perhaps, too inchoate and unambitious. By contrast, the dynamic 
account of DH suggests that, it is only by rejecting such moralistic fantasies and correcting 
our misconceptions about what political morality involves that we can better appreciate the 
point and limits of politics. In connection to this, it is worth emphasizing two intertwined 
points here. The first is a note of reassurance: it does not follow that in politics anything 
goes. Precisely because the standards of political excellence arise from within politics, it 
does not necessarily follow that any manifestation of the vices will do - especially when it 
jeopardizes some of the fundamental ends of political life, such as a modicum of order, 
stability and civility. To put it simply, the dynamic account of DH - by virtue of its 
Machiavellian affiliations - does not suggest that the exhibition of abstract cruelty and 
hypocrisy is conducive to a virtuous life of politics. For, as I have argued, a necessary 
prerequisite of political virtue is the fox-like quality of experience: a certain kind of 
knowledge of both the messy realities, requirements and feasible ends of politics as well as 
knowledge of oneself. This brings us to the second point which is a note of caution. It is not 
just that the quest for perfection and harmony in individual and societal political ethics is 
impossible. It can also prove dangerous, and indeed catastrophic, for political life. The 
unrestrained quest for utopian ideals in politics denotes a certain absence of knowledge and 
experience. And it is such a lack of experience which constitutes the mark of innocent 
individuals and which disqualifies them from a virtuous life of politics and renders them too 
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dangerous for politics. This much, as I have illustrated, is evident (amongst others) in the 
literary examples of William Shakespeare’s Henry and Brutus, Jean-Paul Sartre’s Hugo as 
well as the real-life examples of Robespierre and Senator Schwarzenegger. Now, for those 
who still find the dynamic account of DH overtly depressing and pessimistic, I can do no 
better than refer them back to the capricious and eloquent remark from Bernard Williams, 
which I have cited in the title quote of this chapter: politics is pretty much a mess, and 
largely inescapably so. The dynamic account of DH, unapologetically and unashamedly, 
reflects that fact.  
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